PA v13.3.0
content: ai_generated 142 sources retrieved model claude-sonnet-5 · 2026-07-04

Panama

PA schema world-payments-v1 trajectory: not yet assessed

Last updated · 14 modules · 61 sourced findings · 184 sources in the cumulative register

14Modulesbaseline.modules[]
61Findingsmodules[].findings[]
98Tier-1 sourcesrun_metadata.t1_source_count
Confidence mix (sums to 14 rendered modules; click to filter)
No modules moved this cycle.

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 18 October 2026

Lead Signal

Panama's payments-regulatory environment shows targeted tightening at the bank-access and AML interface this cycle. The Superintendencia de Bancos de Panama (SBP) Rule 1-2026 (Acuerdo No. 01-2026), published 27 January 2026, requires banks to apply enhanced AML/CFT risk-mitigation documentary checks, covering corporate formation documents, proof of economic activity, AML/CFT programme documentation, and ultimate-beneficial-owner declarations at the 25 percent threshold, when banking fintechs, payment service providers and virtual-asset service providers. This is probable, resting on Tier-3 law-firm commentary; the primary SBP Acuerdo text was not independently retrieved this cycle. The rule formalises what banks serving the fintech and VASP sector must document before extending or maintaining bank-access relationships, directly addressing the de-risking and bank-access friction that has historically constrained non-bank payment firms operating in Panama.

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Panama has no dedicated EMI/PSP licensing regime; payment and e-money activity is carried out under general banking-licence or non-bank financial-service-provider status supervised by the SBP, which now additionally requires tightened AML/CFT documentation per Acuerdo 1-2026 for account opening and ongoing monitoring. Draft Law 314 (filed 13 Jan 2026) would introduce activity-based PSP/EMI/VASP licensing but remains unenacted.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026274 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá (SBP) publishes a registry of Means of Payment and E-Money Issuers, but this registry is an anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist-financing and weapons-proliferation-financing registration under Law 23 of 2015 rather than a prudential or conduct-of-business licence. A World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program technical note corroborates that this arrangement creates public confusion between AML registration and genuine licensing, with only four fintechs formally registered as Financial Obligated Parties according to secondary commentary. For non-bank payment institutions and e-money issuers, the practical effect is legal uncertainty that complicates market entry and correspondent-bank due diligence, since counterparties cannot rely on the registry as evidence of prudential supervision.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's bank-access and licensing landscape tightened at the documentary level this cycle through SBP Rule 1-2026 (Acuerdo No. 01-2026), published 27 January 2026. The rule requires banks to apply enhanced AML/CFT risk-mitigation documentary checks when onboarding or maintaining relationships with fintechs, payment service providers and virtual-asset service providers, specifying corporate formation documents, proof of economic activity, AML/CFT programme documentation, and ultimate-beneficial-owner declarations at the 25 percent ownership threshold. This is probable, resting on Tier-3 law-firm commentary summarising the Acuerdo rather than the primary SBP text itself. For non-bank payment and e-money firms, this rule effectively codifies the documentary bar banks must clear before extending bank-access relationships, which has historically been one of the principal practical constraints on non-bank payment-sector growth in Panama.

Separately, the SBP's Board approved Acuerdo No. 7-2026, amending Articles 4 and 5 of Acuerdo No. 4-2011 to eliminate or cap several retail-banking fees, including cash withdrawal and deposit fees below monthly thresholds, SWIFT-confirmation fees, bank-reference-letter fees, and beneficiary-designation fees. This is probable, also pending primary-source confirmation. While this measure is primarily consumer-facing, bank-reference-letter and SWIFT-confirmation fee changes are directly relevant to payment firms and correspondent relationships that rely on bank-issued documentation for onboarding or cross-border verification.

Against this backdrop, Panama's dedicated VASP/PSP/EMI licensing framework, Draft Law No. 314, filed 13 January 2026, remains under legislative review with no confirmed movement this cycle, notwithstanding industry expectations of progress in the second half of 2026. This is probable. Until the bill advances, Rule 1-2026's enhanced documentary regime is the most concrete near-term lever shaping how non-bank payment and virtual-asset firms access the Panamanian banking system, in the continued absence of a dedicated licensing category for those firm types.

Outlook

The practical test of Rule 1-2026 will be whether SBP-supervised banks apply the enhanced documentary checks in a manner that facilitates rather than further restricts bank access for fintech, PSP and VASP clients; this is not yet observable from the available sourcing and would require primary SBP guidance or bank-level implementation evidence to resolve. Draft Law No. 314's legislative trajectory remains the single most consequential open question for Panama's licensing architecture; as scheduled for potential second-half-2026 movement, no confirmation has yet emerged, and the next legislative session is the marker to watch.

6 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's licensing and market-access architecture for payments tightened at the bank-sector level this cycle without any corresponding advance at the non-bank level. SBP Acuerdo No. 1-2026, dated 16 January 2026, repeals the prior Acuerdo 10-2015 and updates due diligence obligations attaching to remote and digital-channel client onboarding, applying to banks, fiduciary companies and payment or e-money issuers alike. For firms using digital or remote channels to open accounts or contract financial services, this raises the bar for the onboarding controls a licence-holder must demonstrate, a market-access-adjacent development insofar as it changes what a firm must show to serve customers through those channels rather than changing who may be licensed in the first place.

The larger market-access question for Panama's payments sector remains unresolved: Anteproyecto de Ley 314 would introduce the jurisdiction's first dedicated licensing regime for payment service providers, electronic-money institutions and virtual-asset service providers, under joint prudential supervision by SBP and anti-money-laundering oversight by the Unidad de Analisis Financiero, together with a regulatory sandbox mechanism. As of the most recent dateable reporting, from around April 2026, the bill remained in Asamblea Nacional committee review, having completed only its introduction phase; committee review, two plenary debates and presidential assent would all still need to occur before enactment. No confirmed progression was found dated within the current reporting window, and that absence of confirmed movement should be read as an information gap rather than as evidence the bill has stalled or advanced. Until Anteproyecto 314 is enacted, non-bank payment and e-money firms seeking to operate in Panama continue to do so without a purpose-built licensing framework distinct from the bank-centric regime the 2026 Acuerdos now update.

Outlook

The marker to track for Panama's licensing and market-access environment is whether Anteproyecto de Ley 314 moves out of committee review toward plenary debate; its current stalled status, last confirmed dated around April 2026, means the timeline to enactment remains genuinely open rather than merely delayed. In the interim, the practical effect of Acuerdo No. 1-2026 on digital-onboarding market access for banks, fiduciaries and payment and e-money issuers will depend on how SBP supervises implementation of the updated due-diligence standard, a question current reporting cannot yet answer given the instrument's recency.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's licensing landscape for payments and digital-asset businesses is at a genuine inflection point. Draft Law No. 314, filed with the National Assembly on 13 January 2026, proposes Panama's first dedicated licensing framework covering payment service providers, e-money issuers, and virtual-asset service providers, placing all three categories under joint supervision by the Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá (SBP) and the Unidad de Análisis Financiero (UAF). Prior to this proposal, Panama had no unified regime of this kind; non-bank payment institutions and e-money issuers operating in Panama have generally done so under general corporate and AML obligated-entity registration rather than under a purpose-built licensing category, and virtual-asset businesses have operated in a similar regulatory gap.

While Draft Law No. 314 remains at the proposed stage before the legislature, the practical licensing and onboarding environment has already been reshaped by SBP Rule (Acuerdo) No. 1-2026, in force from 27 January 2026. This rule expressly revokes four prior regulations, Rules 10-2015, 1-2013 and 8-2000 among them, and tightens AML/CFT documentary and customer-due-diligence obligations across the full population of SBP-supervised entities. Because this rule applies to bank and non-bank PSP/EMI entities alike wherever they fall under SBP supervision, it functions as a de facto tightening of the market-access bar even in the absence of the dedicated PSP/EMI/VASP licensing category that Draft Law No. 314 would create. The distinction between bank and non-bank supervised entities matters here: a bank entering this documentary regime does so as an already-licensed and long-supervised entity, while a non-bank PI or EMI applicant faces the same tightened documentary bar as a threshold matter for any future licensing application, without yet having a dedicated licence category to apply for.

Outlook

The central market-access question is the pace and outcome of Draft Law No. 314's legislative progress; current expectations point to a 2027 timeframe at the earliest, with no confirmed committee stage this cycle. Until enactment, market access for non-bank payment and virtual-asset businesses in Panama will continue to run through the combination of general AML registration and SBP Rule 1-2026's tightened documentary standard, rather than through a dedicated licence.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's payments licensing landscape saw two material developments this cycle, both pointing toward a formalisation of a previously undefined regulatory space. Draft Law 314, the Ley Marco Integral de Tecnologías Financieras, introduced 13 January 2026, would establish Panama's first dedicated licensing categories for payment-service providers, electronic-money issuers, and virtual-asset service providers. This is a market-access-defining development: today, none of these categories has a dedicated licensing pathway, meaning non-bank payment providers operate in a space defined more by what is not prohibited than by what is affirmatively authorised.

Separately, and already in effect, the Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá published Rule 1-2026 on 27 January 2026, tightening AML/CFT documentary requirements for bank account opening and ongoing monitoring. This is a bank-side instrument in form, but its market-access consequence for non-bank payment institutions and EMIs is direct: since Panama has no dedicated non-bank licensing regime today, PSPs and EMIs seeking to operate depend on banking relationships, and any tightening of the documentary bar for account opening raises the practical bar for market entry via the bank-access channel that currently substitutes for a dedicated licence. The bank-PSP versus non-bank-PI/EMI distinction is therefore central to this module this cycle: banks face a documentary-tightening obligation directly, while non-bank PSPs and EMIs face the same tightening indirectly, as a precondition of the banking access they currently rely on in the absence of their own licensing track.

Outlook

Draft Law 314 remains at the consultation stage with an estimated 2027-Q1 impact window carrying year-level uncertainty. The key question for market access is whether the eventual licensing framework will create a standalone non-bank licensing pathway that reduces dependence on the bank-access channel, or whether banking-relationship dependency persists even after formal licensing categories exist.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-05

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's payments-market-access environment is undergoing simultaneous change on two distinct tracks. Anteproyecto de Ley 314, presented to the Asamblea Nacional plenary on 13 January 2026 by Deputy Ernesto Cedeno Alvarado, proposes distinct licence types for payment service providers, virtual-asset service providers, and PSP-like intermediaries, with capital and governance requirements calibrated proportionally to risk, under joint supervision by the Superintendencia de Bancos de Panama (SBP) for prudential matters and the Unidad de Analisis Financiero (UAF) for AML/CFT matters. This is assessed with probable confidence from a Tier-3 legal-commentary source and remains at an early legislative stage: the bill requires committee review and two further plenary debates plus presidential assent before taking effect, corroborated by an independent Tier-3 source describing the same filing and legislative posture.

Separately, and already in force, SBP Rule 1-2026 requires banks to collect enhanced evidence of economic activity, beneficial ownership, and source of funds before account opening. This is a confirmed, Tier-1 primary-source finding directly sourced from the regulator itself, and it has immediate practical effect on how non-bank payment institutions and e-money issuers access Panamanian banking rails, independent of and preceding any dedicated licensing framework Bill 314 might eventually establish. The bank-or-nonbank distinction is significant here: Rule 1-2026 formally applies to banks' own account-opening practices, but its effect flows through directly to the nonbank PSPs and EMIs seeking to bank with them, tightening market access for that segment ahead of any dedicated licence category existing for them.

This combination reflects and updates the standing characterisation of Panama's fintech regulatory environment as a 'legal nothingness', a patchwork of general banking and AML statutes without a dedicated PSP, EMI, or VASP framework. That characterisation, assessed with probable confidence, remains accurate as of this cycle in the sense that no dedicated licence category yet exists, but the picture is now one of a regulatory gap actively being addressed on two fronts simultaneously: immediate, already-effective tightening of the terms under which nonbank entities can access bank accounts, and a proposed, not-yet-enacted structural fix in the form of Bill 314's tiered licensing regime.

The proposed licensing structure's risk-proportionate design merits note for its market-access implications specifically. By differentiating capital and governance requirements across PSP, VASP, and PSP-like intermediary categories rather than applying a single uniform bar, the bill's design would potentially lower the market-access threshold for smaller or lower-risk payment intermediaries relative to a one-size-fits-all licensing standard, while still imposing a supervisory perimeter that does not currently exist. This is a design observation drawn directly from the bill's proposed structure rather than an independent judgment about its likely effect.

Outlook

The committee-stage progression of Anteproyecto de Ley 314 is the primary item to watch for Panama's licensing and market-access landscape, with an expected impact window in the fourth quarter of 2026 carrying a half-year uncertainty band given the bill's early stage and the multiple further legislative steps required. In the interim, the practical market-access reality for nonbank payment institutions is shaped more immediately by SBP Rule 1-2026's already-effective account-opening documentary tightening than by the still-pending licensing bill. A primary-source gap remains: the Asamblea Nacional's own hosting of Bill 314's text was not independently fetched this cycle, meaning the bill's precise legislative language has not been directly verified against a Tier-1 source.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's payments-licensing landscape is currently defined by absence: there is no enacted licensing regime specific to payment service providers, electronic-money institutions, or virtual-asset service providers. Non-bank payment activity — illustrated by an estimated eighteen registered remittance companies — operates under the general money-services-business framework rather than under a dedicated PSP/EMI licensing statute. This gap is the backdrop against which Draft Law No. 314, introduced in the National Assembly on 13 January 2026, should be read: the draft would create Panama's first dedicated licensing regime for PSPs, EMIs and VASPs, placing them under Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá supervision with Unidad de Análisis Financiero suspicious-activity-report intake. Commentary on the draft indicates it would additionally impose capitalisation and governance standards on newly licensed entities. As a draft moving through the legislative process, its provisions are not yet binding, and its practical timeline is assessed as multi-year and uncertain.

On the bank side of the licensing ledger, a distinct but related development occurred: SBP Rule 1-2026 tightened AML/CFT documentary requirements for account opening and ongoing monitoring. This is a bank/PSP-side supervisory tightening, formally distinct from the non-bank PSP/EMI/VASP licensing gap that Draft Law No. 314 targets, but material to market access in practice, because non-bank payment and crypto firms in Panama depend on correspondent and business-banking relationships with SBP-supervised banks to operate.

The bank-versus-non-bank distinction is therefore the organising fact for this module this cycle. Banks and their PSP relationships are governed by an increasingly formalised, actively tightening AML/CFT documentary regime under direct SBP supervision. Non-bank PSPs, EMIs and VASPs, by contrast, remain outside any dedicated licensing perimeter, governed only by the general MSB framework and by whatever conditions their banking relationships impose. Draft Law No. 314 would collapse this asymmetry by bringing non-bank entities into a comparable direct-supervision structure, but until enactment the asymmetry is the operative market-access reality for any prospective non-bank payments entrant into Panama.

Outlook

The single most consequential development to track next cycle is legislative progress on Draft Law No. 314: whether it advances through further Assembly debate, is amended, or stalls. Its current proposed-stage, multi-year uncertainty band means market entrants planning around a licensed PSP/EMI/VASP pathway in Panama should not assume near-term availability of that pathway. In the interim, entrants relying on the existing MSB framework, or on banking relationships with SBP-supervised institutions, should expect those banking relationships to be subject to the tightening documentary standard introduced by SBP Rule 1-2026.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-11

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Act 7 of 2025 (SB 202) is the structural licensing development for Pennsylvania this cycle: it extends Money Transmitter Act licensure to virtual-currency transmission conducted for a fee, effective August 26, 2025. This closes a licensing gap that had previously allowed fee-based virtual-currency transmission to operate outside the state's money-transmission licensing perimeter, and it is a high-confidence, Tier 1 finding corroborated by both the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities' own announcement and the Pennsylvania Bulletin's statutory text. As a market-access matter, the change is squarely nonbank-PI/EMI-facing: bank-chartered payment service providers in Pennsylvania already operate under a distinct prudential supervisory track, so Act 7's extension of licensure to virtual-currency transmission principally affects nonbank payment institutions and electronic-money issuers offering virtual-currency transmission services, bringing them onto the same licensing, examination, and ongoing-compliance footing as fiat money transmitters rather than an unlicensed or ambiguously licensed model.

The underlying statute was renamed to the Money Transmission and Virtual Currency Transmission Business Licensing Law, with expanded definitions and exemptions, including a self-hosted-wallet carve-out and a business-entity transaction exemption; neither exemption type maps cleanly onto a standard licensing-exemption enum, which itself signals how bespoke Pennsylvania's carve-outs are relative to more standardized state virtual-currency licensing regimes elsewhere. This is a high-confidence, Tier 1 finding corroborated by law-firm secondary commentary. In parallel, Pennsylvania rescinded 10 Pa. Code Section 19.1a, its prior non-binding Virtual Currency Statement of Policy, in its entirety, effective the same date, on the basis that the guidance had become redundant once Act 7's statutory coverage took effect; this is a lifecycle transition from interpretive guidance to a licensing statute carrying enforcement consequences, and it is itself a high-confidence, Tier 1 finding. This is a standing-brief content-tier item rather than a dated dashboard entry, reflecting that Act 7 is a durable statutory change to the state's licensing perimeter rather than an episodic dashboard-level event, and market-access questions for virtual-currency transmission in Pennsylvania now rest on that statutory text rather than on the withdrawn policy statement.

Outlook

The practical significance of Act 7 for market access will be measured over coming cycles less by the statutory text itself, which is now settled and in effect, than by how the Department of Banking and Securities applies the new licensing perimeter in practice: whether virtual-currency transmitters previously operating in the state without a money-transmitter licence come forward to obtain one, and whether the self-hosted-wallet and business-entity exemptions are interpreted narrowly or broadly in early licensing determinations. No enforcement or licensing-decision data specific to the new virtual-currency transmission category has yet been reported this cycle; that is the next materiality threshold to watch for Pennsylvania's nonbank payment-institution and electronic-money-institution market-access conditions.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/authorizations/means-paymentretrieved
  2. T2https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3f2a65c9-efa5-4b1d-ad1b-dd721ca9be10retrieved
  3. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
  4. T3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banking_in_Panamaretrieved
  5. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099040424151021308/pdf/P179962143f93d0531a2901588726639e71.pdfretrieved

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Panama has no dedicated conduct-of-business or safeguarding regime for non-bank payment/e-money providers; consumer and conduct protection for banking relationships defaults to the SBP and ACODECO under general banking and consumer-protection law, with AML documentary/onboarding obligations tightened via SBP Rule 1-2026.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026186 words · last cycle 2026-10-11

Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions

SBP Rule 1-2026, issued 16 January 2026, updates customer-due-diligence, enhanced-due-diligence, transaction-monitoring and internal-control obligations for all SBP-supervised entities, revoking prior rules 10-2015, 1-2013, 8-2000 and 10-2000. Secondary commentary anticipates a period of narrower fintech-client onboarding while institutions absorb the new compliance requirements, a conduct-adjacent effect that sits alongside the module's core safeguarding question.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-11

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

Panama's conduct-side regulatory activity this cycle centred on three SBP Acuerdos issued across 2026, each addressing a distinct conduct or operational dimension. Acuerdo No. 7-2026, dated 25 August 2026, modifies Articles 4 and 5 of the existing Acuerdo 4-2011 to strengthen transparency requirements around bank commissions and charges, a direct consumer-facing fee-disclosure development applicable to licensed banks. Separately, Acuerdo No. 8-2026, signed 22 September 2026, imposes a new supervision and validation scheme for the movement of funds through electronic channels within national territory, a development reported through Panamanian press coverage of the primary regulatory act rather than independently retrieved from SBP's own published text this cycle. The same date produced Acuerdo No. 9-2026, which defers the formal entry into force of Acuerdo 6-2026's credit-adequation standard to 31 March 2027, a sequencing decision affecting the timeline on which an existing conduct standard takes effect rather than a substantive change to that standard itself.

These three instruments should be read as incremental conduct tightening layered onto the existing bank-centric regulatory structure, with fee transparency and electronic-funds-transfer supervision both strengthening in 2026 while a separate credit-adequation standard is given additional implementation time. No safeguarding-specific instrument distinct from these three was identified in this cycle's research for Panama.

Outlook

The near-term marker for Panama's conduct and safeguarding environment is the 31 March 2027 credit-adequation deadline now set by Acuerdo No. 9-2026; whether that standard takes effect as rescheduled, or faces a further deferral, will be a relevant indicator of SBP's sequencing approach to conduct-standard implementation generally. Acuerdos 7-2026 and 8-2026 have not yet been independently verified against SBP's own full published text in every particular, since the record relies in part on secondary press reporting of the primary acts; confirmation against the primary instruments would strengthen the evidentiary basis for assessing their practical effect in future cycles.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

Bank conduct requirements in Panama tightened on two fronts this cycle, both issued by the Superintendencia de Bancos de Panama. Acuerdo No. 01-2026, dated 16/27 January 2026 and retrieved directly from SBP's own publication, sharpens AML/CFT documentary requirements for account opening and ongoing monitoring across both bank and non-bank account relationships. This is primarily a due-diligence and monitoring instrument, but its effect on conduct toward customers opening accounts is direct: documentary expectations at onboarding are now higher than they were before 27 January 2026.

Separately, Acuerdo 7-2026, approved on 25 August 2026, amends the existing Acuerdo 4-2011 to ban fees on in-branch cash withdrawals and deposits from savings and checking accounts, effective from its approval date. This is a consumer-facing fee-conduct change with no AML or licensing dimension: it restricts what banks may charge customers for basic cash transactions at branch counters. The only sourcing located for this instrument this cycle is Tier-3 press reporting; SBP's own text of Acuerdo 7-2026 has not been independently retrieved, so this finding carries Probable rather than Confirmed confidence, and any firm relying on the fee-ban's precise scope or effective-date mechanics should treat the press account as provisional pending the primary text.

Both instruments point in the same direction: Panamanian banking-sector conduct regulation is tightening, whether on the documentary side of account opening or on the fee side of routine account servicing. Safeguarding-specific developments with a Panama nexus were not identified this cycle; the conduct movement observed is concentrated in AML-onboarding documentation and cash-transaction fee structure rather than in client-asset safeguarding or financial-promotions rules specifically.

Outlook

As scheduled, both Acuerdo 1-2026 and Acuerdo 7-2026 are already in effect as of their respective dates, so the relevant near-term question for market participants is implementation and compliance with the tightened onboarding-documentation and fee-restriction standards rather than anticipation of further rule change. Confirmation of Acuerdo 7-2026's precise terms against SBP's own primary text remains an open item; until that is retrieved, the fee-ban's scope should be treated as reported rather than confirmed.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/node/1652retrieved
  2. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
  3. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/sac/preguntas-frecuentesretrieved
  4. T3https://www.infobae.com/panama/2026/06/24/panama-pone-orden-a-la-forma-de-evaluar-los-incumplimientos-bancarios/retrieved

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Panama has no comprehensive crypto/stablecoin law in force. A 2021-22 crypto bill (Bill 697) was partially vetoed by President Cortizo in June 2022 over AML concerns and was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in July 2023, leaving digital assets in a legal grey area; a renewed Bill No. 247 (2025) is pending before the National Assembly.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026212 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Stablecoins & Digital Money

Panama's most consequential crypto-regulatory event remains the 2022-23 nullification of Bill No. 697: partially vetoed by President Cortizo in June 2022 on anti-money-laundering grounds while Panama sat on the FATF grey list, then declared entirely unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in July 2023, resetting the country's legislative effort at comprehensive crypto regulation to zero. The Supreme Court's ruling sided fully with the President's veto objections, leaving no comprehensive crypto framework in force and establishing a legal precedent that now weighs on any future legislative attempt, including the pending Bill No. 247.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/06/17/panamanian-president-partially-vetoes-crypto-regulation-legislationretrieved
  2. T3https://sb-sb.com/services/crypto/crypto-license/latam/panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2025/07/31/panama-crypto-law-aims-to-make-the-country-a-bitcoin-hub/retrieved
  4. T3https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/is-crypto-legal-in-panamaretrieved

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Panama's operational-resilience framework for regulated financial entities rests on a set of pre-DORA SBP agreements covering outsourcing, electronic banking, and IT risk management, with cloud-service use outside Panama requiring prior SBP/SMV approval or notification; there is no consolidated cyber-resilience statute equivalent to DORA.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026176 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

Panama's operational-resilience framework rests on pre-DORA agreements issued by SBP and the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores: Acuerdos 009-2005, 006-2011, 003-2012 and 005-2018 cover outsourcing, electronic-banking risk and IT-risk management respectively. Cloud services located outside Panama require prior SBP approval or SMV notification, and no consolidated cyber-resilience statute equivalent to the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act exists; comparators such as DORA are cited by market commentary for contrast only, not as a benchmark Panama has adopted.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T2https://aws.amazon.com/financial-services/security-compliance/compliance-center/pa/retrieved
  2. T2https://aws.amazon.com/financial-services/security-compliance/compliance-center/pa/ Applies beyond this jurisdiction (World Bank)retrieved
  3. T3https://emailmarketingpanama.com/en/email-banking-financial-services.html Applies beyond this jurisdiction (World Bank)retrieved
  4. T3https://gladiium.com/cybersecurity-panama/ Applies beyond this jurisdiction (World Bank)retrieved
  5. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099613104102429031/pdf/SECBOS1af572a90621b72716e27781ecaec.pdf Applies beyond this jurisdiction (World Bank)retrieved

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Card-scheme rails in Panama run through the domestic Telered/Clave debit network alongside Visa and Mastercard acceptance via bank-operated gateways; PCI DSS compliance is expected of payment gateways and processors but there is no bespoke Panamanian interchange-regulation or surcharging statute identified.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026137 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Scheme & Network Compliance

All Panamanian banks operate through Telered's Clave debit-card system and the traditional ACH, alongside newer bank-specific instant-transfer platforms such as Yappy. Visa and Mastercard are accepted via bank-operated gateways, and no bespoke interchange-regulation or card-surcharging statute was identified in this cycle's research; the gap is recorded as no-source rather than confirmed non-existence.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.martesfinanciero.com/relieve/yappy-evoluciona-para-ser-una-plataforma-de-pagos-independiente/retrieved
  2. T3https://jootser.com/pasarelas-de-pago-para-e-commerce-en-panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://jootser.com/pasarelas-de-pago-para-e-commerce-en-panama/retrieved
  4. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/retrieved

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Panama is a fully dollarized economy with no foreign-exchange controls, functioning as a regional trade-finance and correspondent hub; the dominant retail corridor is US-Panama remittances, while digital/mobile remittance fees remain persistently higher across Central America/Panama/Dominican Republic (CAPDR) than the global average despite a declining trend.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026146 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Payment Corridor Dynamics

Panama remains fully dollarized with no foreign-exchange controls, functioning as a regional trade-finance and correspondent-banking hub. International Banking Center external deposits grew 14.72% to US$48,097 million, with Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic together accounting for over 58% of these funds, corroborating commentary on dollarization's attractiveness for cross-border platforms.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://globallawexperts.com/how-to-open-a-fintech-company/retrieved
  2. T1https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2022/238/article-A001-en.xml Applies beyond this jurisdiction (IMF)retrieved
  3. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/node/1687 Applies beyond this jurisdiction (IMF)retrieved
  4. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/ Applies beyond this jurisdiction (IMF)retrieved

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Panama's payments industry is dominated by an oversized International Banking Center of roughly 50-80 licensed banks, with domestic digital-wallet competition concentrated among a handful of bank-sponsored platforms (Yappy/Banco General, Nequi/Banistmo, Kuara/Global Bank-Banesco-MMG, Zinli/Banco Mercantil), rather than independent non-bank fintech challengers.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026127 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics

Panama hosts 50 to 80-plus licensed banks, and domestic digital-wallet competition is concentrated among bank-sponsored platforms — Yappy (Banco General), Nequi (Banistmo), Kuara (Global Bank-Banesco-MMG) and Zinli (Banco Mercantil) — rather than independent non-bank fintech challengers.

Illustrating the structural difficulty non-bank challengers face against bank distribution advantages, telco entrant Tigo Money (Millicom) soft-launched in August 2023 but was shut down by March 2024 — a single-source but illustrative market-structure signal about the durability of incumbent-bank wallet dominance.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T3https://www.centralamerica.com/investing/banking-in-panama/retrieved
  2. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://newsroompanama.com/2024/04/27/banco-general-yappy-makes-an-important-update/retrieved
  4. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved
  5. T2https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/panama-trade-financingretrieved

The most consequential recent payments-adjacent litigation is the Supreme Court's 2023 nullification of the vetoed crypto law; on the supervisory-enforcement side, the SBP operates a public sanctions register for banking/trust/AML breaches and has just codified (Acuerdo 3-2026) a graduated sanctions methodology to replace prior ad hoc practice.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026134 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Legal & Litigation

The most consequential payments-adjacent litigation event remains the Supreme Court's July 2023 ruling declaring the entirety of crypto bill No. 697 unconstitutional, siding with President Cortizo's 2022 veto objections and nullifying Panama's first comprehensive attempt at crypto regulation.

More recently, SBP Acuerdo No. 3-2026 (29 May 2026) established uniform criteria classifying AML/CFT infractions as minor, serious or very serious, weighing duration, recidivism, harm and institution size, replacing what had been ad hoc sanctioning practice; this instrument is sourced only via T3 secondary reporting, with no primary SBP gazette text retrieved this cycle.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://sb-sb.com/services/crypto/crypto-license/latam/panama/retrieved
  2. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/sanciones?field_year_sancion_value=Allretrieved
  3. T3https://www.infobae.com/panama/2026/06/24/panama-pone-orden-a-la-forma-de-evaluar-los-incumplimientos-bancarios/retrieved
  4. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099040424151021308/pdf/P179962143f93d0531a2901588726639e71.pdfretrieved

#

Merchant acquiring in Panama is delivered through bank-affiliated gateways (Banco General/Yappy Comercial, Banistmo, BAC Credomatic, Credicorp) plus independent processors (Wompi, Pagadito, Paguelofacil), with standard percentage-plus-tax merchant discount pricing and hybrid local-acquirer/global-PSP models used for multi-currency and tourism-sector acceptance.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026126 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Merchant Acquiring & Risk

Yappy Comercial, Banco General's merchant-facing product, charges a commission of 1% plus ITBMS (minimum US$0.02) per transaction received, collected daily against that day's total received amount — a primary merchant-pricing disclosure drawn directly from the bank's own site.

Foreign PSPs can operate in Panama but typically must partner with a licensed local entity or establish local presence; tourism-sector merchants commonly combine local acquiring banks such as Banco General with global PSPs such as Worldline and Adyen to achieve multi-currency acceptance.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T2https://www.bgeneral.com/yappy/retrieved
  2. T3https://jootser.com/pasarelas-de-pago-para-e-commerce-en-panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://payatlas.com/countries/panama-paretrieved
  4. T3https://payatlas.com/countries/panama-paretrieved

#

Panama's payments innovation is led by bank-sponsored real-time mobile wallets built on the Telered/ACH Xpress rails, with Yappy the dominant platform and growing interoperability across banks; roughly 93% of the population is reported to use mobile banking, and Caja de Ahorros runs an agency-banking program for financial inclusion in remote areas.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026134 words · last cycle 2026-10-04

Product Innovation & Market Development

Telered's ACH Xpress instant-payment integration had 16 banks integrated by end-2023, executing 1.4 million transactions worth $18 million, with a stated goal of adding ten more banks under the renamed 'Xpress' platform — a clear signal of expanding bank-to-bank interoperability.

State savings bank Caja de Ahorros runs an agency-banking programme for financial inclusion, though agent locations remain absent from the most remote communities such as Darién province, and national postal operator COTEL's financial-service potential remains underutilised for lack of investment, per a World Bank/IMF payments technical note.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Product Innovation & Market Development

The SBP has expanded its Fintech Hub into a structured pre-filing channel, through which fintech applicants present payment-flow diagrams and AML control matrices to the regulator ahead of making formal applications to establish banking relationships. This development is reported at Uncertain confidence, and is characterised in reporting as functioning as a de facto prerequisite for fintech applicants seeking to open or sustain banking relationships in Panama during 2026, rather than as a formally codified legal requirement under any specific rule or statute. The Fintech Hub mechanism is procedural in nature: it does not itself create a new payment rail, product category, or instant-payments scheme, but instead functions as a market-development gate that shapes how fintech and payments innovators access the banking relationships their business models depend on.

No dedicated instant-payments scheme or other novel payments-product development was identified in Panama this cycle. The Fintech Hub's significance for product innovation lies specifically in its function as an access-shaping mechanism: a fintech product or service that depends on a banking relationship for settlement, custody, or account provision must now, as a practical matter reported this cycle, pass through this pre-filing review before that relationship can be formalised, adding a procedural step to product-to-market timelines for payments and fintech innovators in Panama.

Outlook

Watch for whether the SBP formalises the Fintech Hub pre-filing channel into codified rule rather than informal practice, and for whether its expansion correlates with faster or slower fintech product launches in Panama relative to prior periods. The relationship between this pre-filing gate and the eventual Draft Law No. 314 licensing framework, if enacted, is also worth monitoring, since a formal licence category could either supersede or formalise the Hub's current gatekeeping role.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Product Innovation & Market Development

Panama's EMI, payment-institution, and PSP product categories remain in a state of regulatory limbo this cycle: neither expressly prohibited nor formally regulated under any dedicated instrument. This classification uncertainty is the structural backdrop against which Draft Law 314 was introduced, and one legal-commentary source, held at only uncertain confidence given its single-source status, characterises the pre-2026 environment for dedicated PSP and VASP regulation in stark terms, describing it as effectively a regulatory void for these product categories specifically.

This characterisation should be read as commentary rather than confirmed regulatory fact, but it is consistent with the broader pattern visible across this cycle's Panama findings: a jurisdiction where non-bank payment product innovation has proceeded in the absence of a dedicated statutory framework, relying instead on general banking-sector rules applied indirectly wherever a fintech product touches the banking system. Draft Law 314's introduction is itself evidence that this gap has been recognised as a policy problem requiring a dedicated legislative response, even though that response remains at the consultation stage.

Outlook

The product-development question to watch is whether Draft Law 314, once and if it advances, resolves the EMI/PI/PSP classification uncertainty definitively, or whether it leaves residual grey areas for newer product categories not explicitly contemplated in the current draft. Until the framework is enacted, product innovation in Panama's non-bank payments space continues under the same classification ambiguity that has characterised the market to date.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved
  2. T4https://americaretail-malls.com/paises/centroamerica/panama-digital-el-93-de-la-poblacion-ya-usa-banca-movil/retrieved
  3. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/documentos/evaluaciones_fmi/NT-SPN-Pagos-Panama-Payments-TN.pdfretrieved
  4. T3https://www.prensa.com/economia/yappy-nequi-zinli-y-ahora-kuara-compiten-en-el-mercado-de-los-pagos-digitales-en-panama/retrieved

#

Consumer protection for payments splits between ACODECO (general commercial/advertising complaints under Law 45 of 2007, competence up to US$5,000, US$30,000 for vehicles) and the SBP (banking-specific consumer complaints); there is no dedicated APP-fraud mandatory-reimbursement regime, and refund mechanics for misdirected instant-payment transfers rely on voluntary bank features rather than statutory liability rules.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026140 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

Under Law 45 of 2007, ACODECO can decide directly only on consumer complaints up to US$5,000 (US$30,000 for vehicles under Law 14 of 2018); beyond those thresholds consumers must pursue ordinary courts, and no dedicated APP-fraud mandatory-reimbursement regime exists in Panama's regulatory architecture.

Because Panamanian banking regulation prevents banks from unilaterally debiting a client's account for a misdirected transfer without authorization or a court order, Banco General added a voluntary immediate-refund function to Yappy after user complaints — illustrating reliance on industry practice rather than a statutory misdirected-payment liability regime.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://lawgratis.com/blog-detail/consumer-law-panamaretrieved
  2. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/sac/preguntas-frecuentesretrieved
  3. T3https://fmm.com.pa/panama-and-consumer-protection-in-the-digital-era/retrieved
  4. T3https://newsroompanama.com/2024/04/27/banco-general-yappy-makes-an-important-update/retrieved

#

sentinel.baseline: Panama's core AML/CFT instrument is Law 23 of 2015 (as amended), supervised by the SBP for financial obligated subjects and enforced via the newly codified Acuerdo 3-2026 sanctions methodology; Panama was FATF grey-listed June 2019 and formally delisted 27 October 2023, with the EU following in removing Panama from its high-risk list in 2024/2025.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026184 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

AML/CFT & Financial Crime (Sentinel.gi-fed)

Per Sentinel.gi's feed, FATF excluded Panama from its grey list on 27 October 2023 (having listed the country since June 2019) after determining that strengthened AML/CFT controls were in place; the European Commission followed by removing Panama from its high-risk list on 14 March 2024, corroborated by two independent T1 anchors — the FATF country page and the EC removal document.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

AML/CFT & Financial Crime

This cycle's W11 signal is sentinel-fed: Panama's Unidad de Analisis Financiero (UAF), the country's financial intelligence unit, experienced a platform suspension affecting its capacity to process suspicious-transaction reporting. This is an uncertain-confidence signal drawn from the sentinel feed mechanism. Consistent with the sentinel-feed protocol for this module, the substantive analysis of the incident, including its scope, duration, and the volume of affected reporting subjects, is carried in the financial-integrity monitor's coverage rather than re-analysed here; this brief surfaces the signal as relevant to the payments sector's AML/CFT operating environment without duplicating that analysis.

For payment-sector obligated entities operating in Panama, a disruption to the FIU's reporting-intake infrastructure is a relevant operational-environment fact: it indicates a period during which confirmation of suspicious-transaction-report receipt by the national authority may have been delayed or uncertain, independent of any change to the underlying statutory reporting obligation itself, which remains unaffected by the platform incident.

Outlook

Resolution of this item depends on confirmation from the financial-integrity monitor's primary coverage regarding restoration of UAF's reporting platforms; until such confirmation is available, payment-sector entities should treat the reporting-channel status as unresolved rather than assume normal processing has resumed.

Sources and findings (6)
  1. T3https://www.laestrella.com.pa/amp/economia/panama-endurece-las-reglas-de-prevencion-de-delitos-financieros-en-los-bancos-HH23530869retrieved
  2. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) per-JID baseline profile — Panama — Panama exited the FATF grey list in October 2023 and the EU high-risk third-country list in June 2025. AML law criminalises laundering broadly and created a non-public UBO registry (Law 129/2020) under Superintendencia/UAF supervision, but domestic ML prosecution remains weak, professional-enabler oversight (CSPs, lawyers) is uneven, and no comprehensive VASP/crypto law is in force.
  3. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-002) — Gap: regulatory-failure
  4. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-005) — Gap: capacity-deficit
  5. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-003) — Gap: legal-gap
  6. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-001) — Gap: enforcement-absence

#

Panama has no central bank and relies on Banco Nacional de Panamá as settlement bank for domestic clearing; correspondent-banking access has historically been sensitive to FATF/EU listing status, with post-2023 delisting improving relationships even as SBP Rule 1-2026 signals renewed compliance tightening to correspondent partners in the US and Europe.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026186 words · last cycle 2026-10-04

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

Absent a central bank, Banco Nacional de Panamá operates the BNP clearinghouse, Panama's most important settlement system, with final settlement of net retail-payment positions effected in commercial-bank money on BNP's books; the World Bank's Financial Sector Assessment finds this settlement-risk management lacks sophistication, and participants can run largely uncollateralized net debit positions — the module's analytical spine is precisely this bank-versus-non-bank access asymmetry.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The defining feature of correspondent and settlement access in Panama this cycle is the bank-versus-non-bank asymmetry that SBP Rule (Acuerdo) No. 1-2026 has sharpened. The rule, in force from 27 January 2026, tightens AML/CFT documentary requirements for account opening across all SBP-supervised entities, expressly revoking four prior regulations including Rules 10-2015, 1-2013 and 8-2000. Because the rule applies uniformly to SBP-supervised entities, it raises the documentary bar for any fintech, payment institution, or e-money issuer seeking to open or maintain a banking relationship in Panama, at the same time that Panama's banks themselves, as already-supervised entities, absorb the same tightened standard as an incremental compliance update rather than a market-access barrier.

This dynamic is compounded by the SBP's expanded Fintech Hub pre-filing channel, through which fintech applicants must present payment-flow diagrams and AML control matrices before a formal banking-relationship application, reported as functioning as a de facto prerequisite for banking access in 2026. Together, Rule 1-2026 and the Fintech Hub pre-filing practice describe a correspondent-banking-access environment where non-bank payment institutions and e-money issuers face a materially higher documentary and procedural bar to establishing or sustaining the banking relationships their settlement operations depend on, compared to already-licensed banks navigating the same rule as an incremental update.

Outlook

The bank-versus-non-bank access asymmetry described here is likely to persist, and potentially deepen, for as long as Draft Law No. 314's dedicated PSP/EMI/VASP licensing framework remains unenacted; a functioning licence category could, if it materialises, change the terms on which non-bank entities approach banking relationships by giving them a recognised regulatory status distinct from general AML registration alone.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The analytical spine of Panama's correspondent-banking picture this cycle is the tension between structural trade volume and continued illicit-trade characterisation. The Colón Free Zone, a free-trade zone handling an estimated USD 25 billion in annual trade, is characterised in a 2026 anti-illicit-trade report as a smuggling and money-laundering transshipment hub. Panamanian officials rebutted this characterisation while acknowledging customs seizures exceeding USD 1 billion, including cocaine interceptions, over the same period.

For correspondent banks and payment intermediaries with exposure to Colón-linked trade-finance flows, this kind of allegation functions as a de-risking input independent of its ultimate factual resolution: correspondent-banking risk assessments weigh reputational and illicit-trade-exposure factors that a report of this kind directly speaks to, regardless of whether Panama's own authorities contest the framing. The scale of the acknowledged customs seizures is itself evidence that illicit flows through the zone are non-trivial in volume, even if their characterisation as evidence of systemic laundering remains contested between the report's authors and Panamanian officials.

This module's Panama-specific correspondent-banking picture should be read as one instance of a broader access-asymmetry pattern that recurs globally: bank-supervised entities apply risk-based de-risking judgments that non-bank actors further down the payment chain cannot directly influence, and a report alleging free-trade-zone transshipment risk is precisely the kind of input that feeds those judgments without requiring any formal enforcement action to have occurred.

Outlook

The item to watch next cycle is whether any Tier-1 source corroborates or rebuts the Colón Free Zone transshipment characterisation. Absent that, correspondent banks are likely to continue treating the allegation as a live de-risking input. A second item is whether Panama's improving AML supervisory architecture begins to visibly offset correspondent-banking caution specific to the Colón Free Zone, though no evidence of that offset was available this cycle.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099613104102429031/pdf/SECBOS1af572a90621b72716e27781ecaec.pdf Applies beyond this jurisdiction (World Bank)retrieved
  2. T2https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/panama-officially-removed-from-fatf-grey-list-301970490.htmlretrieved
  3. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
  4. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/node/1687retrieved
  5. T4https://ape.socialcatalystlab.org/papers/apep_1234/v1/paper.pdfretrieved

#

Panama's fintech investment activity remains modest in absolute terms relative to its role as a financial hub: trailing-12-month equity funding has been in the low tens of millions of dollars across a handful of rounds, with limited M&A exits in the fintech vertical, alongside the January 2026 legislative event of Draft Law 314's introduction.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026179 words · last cycle 2026-07-04

Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product)

Aggregate 2025 equity funding in Panama's fintech sector fell to $14.4 million across four rounds (through December), down from $18.4 million across nine rounds the prior year; individual deal values are not publicly disclosed. As of January 2026, only 67 of Panama's 707 fintech companies had received funding, and the sector recorded just one acquisition in the year through July 2025 against three historically — again with individual deal values not publicly disclosed.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (3)
  1. T4https://tracxn.com/d/geographies/panama/__M43a-AgsfK3LvgIGrffDKvH7UYcE9F8msaKUAD17KZgretrieved
  2. T4https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-panama/__yCpaKPFTlkZqAiiUSM-AyoXXfjbmrU1FCPMPyAFfEFsretrieved
  3. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
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