#
Curacao's payments licensing regime is anchored in the Centrale Bank van Curacao en Sint Maarten (CBCS) as sole prudential/AML regulator. Banks are licensed under the 1994 National Ordinance on Supervision of Banking and Credit Institutions; money transfer companies (MTCs) require a full license under the 2014 National Ordinance on Supervision of Money Transfer Companies (effective March 2015). Critically, there is NO dedicated EMI/PI licensing statute yet: PSPs, EMIs and VASPs currently operate under a registration-only regime pending the draft National Ordinance on the Supervision of Payment Service Providers, which the Curacao FinTech Association is actively lobbying Parliament to pass.
The structural gap sits one layer up the value chain. Since July 2024, payment service providers and e-money institutions operating from Curacao have been required only to register, not to obtain a license, with CBCS; no dedicated EMI/PI licensing statute exists, and the matter awaits a draft National Ordinance on the Supervision of Payment Service Providers that has not yet been enacted. CBCS itself confirmed the consequence of this gap in an official warning issued in April 2025: digital payment service providers currently operate without full regulatory oversight, and consumers are left without legal protection as a result. The Curacao FinTech Association has responded with direct legislative advocacy, formally petitioning Parliament's President to fast-track the pending PSP Ordinance -- a market-development signal that reflects industry frustration with the registration-only status quo as much as it does regulatory urgency.
This bifurcation is a defining feature of the jurisdiction's market-access architecture: bank-PSPs (deposit-taking credit institutions) and MTCs operate under full statutory licensing with defined prudential and foreign-exchange-authorisation requirements, while non-bank PI/EMI entities -- the segment most associated with newer fintech and payments innovation -- operate under the lighter registration-only regime pending the draft PSP Ordinance. This asymmetry has direct competitive consequences: non-bank entrants face materially different regulatory certainty and consumer-protection backstops than their bank-supervised counterparts, even where they compete for similar payment-services business.
Outlook
The pending draft National Ordinance on the Supervision of Payment Service Providers is the single most consequential forward-looking item in this module: its enactment would close the registration-only gap, but no confirmed date for enactment or even formal introduction has been identified this cycle. Continued CFA lobbying, and the reputational pressure created by CBCS's own April 2025 warning, suggest the political conditions for progress exist, but the absence of a scheduled legislative timetable means this remains a watch item rather than a dated horizon entry. Sint Maarten's parallel MTC/PSP framework lag is a secondary item to track, given its bearing on cross-island payment-services parity.
Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access
The Curacao FinTech Association pressed Parliament this cycle to fast-track a Payment Services Law, writing to the President of Parliament to warn that the absence of a dedicated electronic-money-institution or payment-institution licensing mechanism under current law is a daily operational obstacle, limiting banking access and investment capital for Curacao-based payment firms. The structural reality behind this appeal is that the Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten's current framework requires mandatory registration, not licensing, for virtual-asset service providers, payment service providers, and electronic-money institutions. Registration and licensing are materially different market-access gateways: a licensing regime typically carries prudential capital requirements, fit-and-proper review, and ongoing supervisory obligations that a registration-only regime does not impose with the same force, and industry's letter frames this gap as a live constraint on access to banking relationships and investment capital for firms operating under the lighter registration standard.
Alongside this, the Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten restructured its supervisory framework effective 1 January 2026, adopting what has been described as a tougher enforcement approach. This is a conduct-of-supervision change operating within the existing registration-only perimeter rather than a change to the perimeter itself; it signals CBCS applying its current toolkit more assertively even as the underlying market-access question, whether payment institutions and EMIs should be brought into a full licensing regime, remains before Parliament. Draft national ordinances addressing payment services and VASP/FMI supervision are before Parliament's central committee, with an expected horizon around 2027 for adoption. Until enacted, market access for payment institutions and EMIs in Curacao continues to run through CBCS registration rather than licensing.
Outlook
The draft national ordinances before Parliament's central committee are the structural development to watch, with an expected 2027 adoption horizon. Their passage would convert the current registration-only market-access gateway into a formal CBCS licensing regime for payment institutions, EMIs, and FMI managers. Nearer term, watch for evidence of how CBCS's restructured, tougher supervisory approach, effective since 1 January 2026, is applied in practice against registered entities under the existing framework.
1 earlier distinct update(s)
Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access
The Centrale Bank van Curacao en Sint Maarten (CBCS) has formalised virtual-asset service providers, payment service providers and e-money institutions as a distinct supervised licensing and registration category, confirmed via the CBCS's own application-forms register for supervised institutions. This sits alongside CBCS's pre-existing licensing gate for money-transfer companies, which require CBCS permission or a licence to operate under the central bank's supervision-general guidance. Together these confirm that Curacao's nonbank payments perimeter is now explicitly demarcated within the CBCS supervisory umbrella, rather than left as an informal extension of banking supervision.
The bank-versus-nonbank distinction is explicit in the underlying claims: the VASP/PSP/EMI category is expressly nonbank, sitting apart from CBCS's credit-institution supervision, while the money-transfer-company licensing gate has historically applied to nonbank remittance businesses. This distinction matters for market entrants, since prudential expectations, capital requirements and ongoing supervisory intensity plausibly differ between the bank and nonbank tracks even where both ultimately answer to the same central bank.
A second, cross-sector signal this cycle comes from the gambling regulator rather than CBCS itself: the Curacao Gaming Authority's June 2026 crypto policy guideline bars gambling licensees from acting as an exchange, payment service provider or virtual-asset service provider outside gambling transactions, explicitly delineating CGA-licensed gaming-sector crypto handling from CBCS-licensed PSP/VASP activity. This is boundary-setting between two regulators rather than a change to either regulator's own licensing criteria, but it is directly relevant to market-access analysis: an entity seeking to operate as a PSP or VASP in Curacao, as distinct from a gambling operator merely accepting crypto for wagering, sits under the CBCS licensing category rather than under a CGA gaming licence.
No primary CBCS legislative text, such as a national ordinance or decree formalising the VASP/PSP/EMI licensing consolidation, was retrieved this cycle; the confirming evidence is the CBCS forms-register webpage itself rather than the underlying statutory instrument. This should be treated as a sourcing gap rather than a substantive uncertainty about whether the category exists, since the forms register is itself a CBCS primary source, but the precise legal basis and conditions attached to the category remain to be located.
Outlook
The clearest near-term test of this licensing formalisation is uptake: whether the distinct VASP/PSP/EMI category attracts new licensed entrants distinct from Curacao's existing gaming-sector crypto footprint, or whether it principally functions to formalise supervision of institutions already operating. Locating the primary legislative or regulatory instrument behind the category would materially improve confidence in the specific conditions, capital requirements and ongoing obligations attached to it.
Sources and findings (6)
- T1https://www.centralbank.cw/faq/supervision-generalretrieved
- T1https://www.centralbank.cw/faq/supervision-generalretrieved
- T3https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/unknown/curacao-fintech-association-urges-parliament-to-fast-track-payment-services-lawretrieved
- T1https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/local/curacaos-central-bank-issues-warning-over-unregulated-digital-payment-services/retrieved
- T4https://www.zitadelleag.com/news/zitadelle-ag-your-trusted-partner-for-psp-emi-mtc-licensing-in-cura%C3%A7aoretrieved
- T1https://www.centralbank.cw/legislation-guidelines/foreign-exchange-regulationsretrieved