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Ireland

IE schema world-payments-v1 trajectory: not yet assessed

Last updated · 14 modules · 63 sourced findings · 173 sources in the cumulative register

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Law made at European Economic Area level that applies in Ireland is covered once, on the European Economic Area page. This page covers Ireland’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement.

Jurisdiction brief

Latest update · 20 October 2026

Lead Signal

Ireland's payments and fintech profile is shaped by a confirmed conduct-regulation milestone and two commercial developments that reinforce the country's role as a European payments-technology base. The Consumer Protection Code 2025 entered into force on 24 March 2026, replacing the Consumer Protection Code 2012 for firms regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland, including electronic money institutions and payment institutions. This is a conduct and consumer-protection framework update rather than a licensing or prudential change, and it sets the baseline conduct standard, including an Error Notification Template process relevant to firms facing payment-safeguarding shortfalls that cause consumer loss, against which Irish-regulated payment firms now operate.

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Payment institutions and EMIs in Ireland are authorised and supervised by the Central Bank of Ireland under PSD2 as transposed by the European Union (Payment Services) Regulations 2018. Ireland remains one of the EU's principal PI/EMI authorisation hubs. PSD3/PSR final compromise texts were circulated by the Council on 17 April 2026 for COREPER approval, with formal adoption/OJEU publication anticipated toward end-Q2 2026 and application expected mid-to-late 2027 after an ~18-month transition.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026345 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Ireland operates a single-authority licensing architecture for payments and e-money firms. The Central Bank of Ireland is the competent authority for the authorisation and registration of payment institutions, e-money institutions, account information service providers and small EMIs under the European Union (Payment Services) Regulations 2018 (S.I. 6/2018, transposing PSD2) and the European Communities (Electronic Money) Regulations 2011 (S.I. 183/2011, EMD2); it applies the EBA authorisation and registration guidelines and charges no application fee. This positions the CBI as the gatekeeper to the EU market for any non-bank PI or EMI seeking access via Ireland, since CBI authorisation confers EU passporting rights.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-06

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The Central Bank of Ireland's 2026 Regulatory & Supervisory Outlook has corrected a material dating point for crypto-asset licensing in Ireland: the transitional (grandfathering) period for firms moving from pre-MiCA VASP registration to full Crypto-Asset Service Provider authorisation under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation ended on 31 December 2025, not on the EU-wide backstop date of 1 July 2026 previously carried in this record. The Outlook states that MiCAR has been fully applicable in Ireland since December 2024, which is the basis for the earlier Irish end-date; Ireland did not take advantage of the full length of the EU-wide transitional allowance available to other member states.

The consequence for market access is direct. A firm that was operating as a registered VASP in Ireland and had not obtained CASP authorisation before 31 December 2025 has been outside the transitional allowance since that date, regardless of any later EU-wide deadline it may have been tracking. This is not a change to the substantive licensing requirements themselves — Ireland's CASP authorisation regime under MiCAR is unchanged in content — but a correction to when those requirements became strictly binding on firms that had been relying on transitional status.

Outlook

Firms should treat 31 December 2025 as the authoritative Irish transitional end-date for assessing their own authorisation status, and should not rely on the later EU-wide backstop as applicable to Irish operations. Any firm still trading on the basis of legacy VASP registration in Ireland after that date carries a market-access exposure that the Central Bank's own published Outlook now makes explicit.

6 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-04

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The Central Bank of Ireland's second Payments and E-Money Newsletter is this cycle's material development for Irish payment institution and e-money institution licensing. The newsletter flags that many PI/EMI firms have not completed, or have not completed in sufficient detail, their assessment of the impact of EBA Q&A 6336's narrower interpretation of electronic money on their own business models, and the Central Bank is urging firms, as a matter of priority, to complete that assessment.

This is a market-access-adjacent development rather than a change to licensing criteria themselves: the EBA's narrower reading of what qualifies as electronic money can affect how a firm's existing product set maps onto its existing authorisation scope, which in turn can raise questions about whether certain products sit inside or outside the perimeter of a firm's current PI or EMI licence. The Central Bank's newsletter does not itself change any licence condition; it signals that supervisory attention is now focused on whether firms have done the internal work to understand where the redrawn boundary falls relative to their own activities.

The Central Bank will host a Payments and E-Money industry seminar on 21 October 2026 at its North Wall Quay office. The agenda has not yet been published, but the act of convening a dedicated seminar so soon after flagging incomplete industry assessments is itself a signal of priority. For firms licensed as non-bank payment institutions or e-money institutions, this sequence, a newsletter identifying a gap followed swiftly by a direct-engagement seminar, is a pattern that typically precedes closer supervisory follow-up on the specific issue raised, rather than a one-off communication intended to be read and filed.

Outlook

The 21 October 2026 seminar is the near-term event to track. Once its agenda is published, it should clarify whether the Central Bank intends to issue further guidance on the EBA Q&A 6336 interpretation question, request firm-level assessments directly, or take a more informal engagement approach. Irish-licensed PI/EMI firms whose product range sits close to the redrawn electronic-money boundary should treat the period before the seminar as the window in which to ensure their own internal assessment work is in a state they would be comfortable describing to their supervisor.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Authorisation as a payment institution in Ireland requires being granted approval under Regulation 18 of the European Communities (Payment Services) Regulation 2009 before a firm may provide and execute payment services — the foundational legal gate for market access in this sector. Against that legal baseline, Ireland's PI/EMI sector has grown rapidly: from 14 firms in 2016 to 51 firms in 2023, with safeguarded funds held by these firms rising from EUR726 million to EUR7,820 million over the same period. This makes the PI/EMI sector the Central Bank of Ireland's fastest-growing supervised segment by a clear margin.

Authorised firms are subject to an annual Industry Funding levy, with a minimum charge of EUR5,300 for the 2025/2026 levy year plus a variable component tied to transaction value — a recurring cost of authorised status that scales with business volume. Set against this growth, the Central Bank has signalled an increase in supervisory scrutiny of the PI/EMI sector, citing the operational and financial-failure risk that firms of this scale now pose to the broader EEA financial system. This is a distinction worth carrying explicitly: the bank-PSP model, where a firm operates under full banking authorisation, differs materially in prudential expectation from the non-bank PI/EMI model most of this sector's growth reflects, and it is specifically the latter population whose scale has prompted the CBI's signalled scrutiny increase.

Outlook

Whether the CBI's signalled increase in supervisory scrutiny translates into concrete measures — enhanced reporting, safeguarding-fund requirements, or firm-specific supervisory action — is the clearest near-term marker to watch. Given the sector's growth trajectory, a continuation of the 2016-2023 expansion pattern into the current period would further test the capacity of the CBI's supervisory approach to the non-bank PI/EMI population specifically.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The Central Bank of Ireland is Ireland's PSD2 competent authority for authorisation, prudential regulation and supervision of payment institutions, a standing regulatory-architecture fact. Against this settled base, the most significant development this cycle is external to Ireland alone but directly consequential for it: final PSD3/PSR legislative texts were published in April 2026, merging the existing payment-institution and e-money-institution authorisation categories into a unified framework and tightening safeguarding requirements across the EEA. This is a Confirmed-confidence, high-impact development that, once transposed, will require currently-separate PI and EMI licensees in Ireland to be assessed under a single authorisation category.

Within the current framework, Ireland offers a zero-fee EMI/PI authorisation, a distinctly commercial-attractiveness feature relative to peer EEA jurisdictions that charge authorisation fees. Capital thresholds are EUR 20,000, 50,000 or 125,000 for payment institutions depending on service mix, and EUR 350,000 for e-money institutions. This fee-and-capital combination, together with full PSD2/EEA passporting and the CBI's supervisory reputation, continues to support Ireland attracting international PSP and EMI relocations, particularly post-Brexit. The bank-versus-non-bank distinction remains structurally important here: non-bank PIs and EMIs access the market on this authorisation track, distinct from banks' own separate authorisation and prudential regime.

Outlook

The PSD3/PSR transposition process is the central item to track for this module. Once transposed, Irish-authorised PI and EMI licensees will need to reassess which category they fall into under the merged framework, and the zero-fee, tiered-capital entry proposition that has made Ireland attractive to relocating PSPs and EMIs may need to be reconsidered against the new unified authorisation standard.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-05

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The PSD3/PSR legislative package reached a decisive procedural milestone this cycle: the Council of the EU circulated a final-compromise 'I' Item Note on 17 April 2026, inviting COREPER approval ahead of second-reading agreement, with formal adoption anticipated by the end of the second quarter of 2026. This is high-confidence intelligence from a Tier-2 EU-legislative-tracking source. Once in force, the Payment Services Regulation will apply 21 months after entry into force, with payee-name verification following a further six months, and Member States will have 21 months to transpose the accompanying Directive — both figures corroborated across Matheson's EU legislative-insights briefings.

For Irish payment institutions and e-money institutions currently authorised under PSD2/EMD2, this establishes a mandatory re-authorisation horizon rather than an immediate change: firms authorised at the PSD3 transposition deadline may rely on six-month transitional provisions under Articles 44-45 while re-authorisation is processed, a confirmed transitional-relief mechanism that mitigates the risk of an authorisation gap. Throughout this transition, the Central Bank of Ireland remains the authorising and prudential supervisor for Irish payment institutions, retaining EEA-wide passporting rights under the current PSD2-derived regime — the identity of the supervisor is not changing, only the rulebook it supervises against.

The practical planning implication for both bank and non-bank payment institutions and e-money institutions is that the licensing framework they hold today will need active renewal within the 21-27 month window following formal adoption, and firms should not treat the current PSD2/EMD2 authorisation as a permanent status.

Outlook

Formal adoption by the end of Q2 2026 is the marker to watch first; once that milestone lands, the 21-month PSR application clock and the parallel 21-month Member State transposition period both start running, and Irish PIs/EMIs should expect the Central Bank of Ireland to begin signalling its own transposition and re-authorisation process shortly thereafter.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-11

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Provisional political agreement on the recast Payment Services Directive and the new Payment Services Regulation (PSD3/PSR) was reached on 27 November 2025, with the agreed texts published on 23 April 2026. This is a supranational, EEA-wide development, but it lands directly on Ireland's licensing perimeter: existing Central Bank of Ireland-authorised payment institutions and e-money institutions are grandfathered into a single, unified payment institution authorised to issue e-money category, rather than being required to re-file authorisation applications from scratch. Grandfathered firms will nonetheless need to update their authorisation files, internal governance arrangements, and regulatory reporting documentation to meet the new PSD3/PSR standard, so the practical compliance burden does not disappear even though the formal re-authorisation step is avoided. The development is corroborated by two independent Tier 2 specialist-legal sources, Freshfields and Norton Rose Fulbright, on the agreement and publication dates, with the grandfathering detail itself sourced to a Tier 4 vendor guide and treated as assessed rather than confirmed. Both bank-affiliated and non-bank payment institutions and e-money institutions fall within the scope of this transition; the PSD3/PSR framework is explicitly designed to apply the bank-versus-non-bank distinction consistently rather than carving non-banks out of the re-authorisation and documentation-update requirement. Member States, including Ireland, must transpose PSD3 into national law within eighteen months of the instrument's entry into force, a timeline that anchors the implementation clock for the Central Bank of Ireland's own supervisory adjustment as much as for firms themselves.

Outlook

The eighteen-month PSD3 transposition deadline is the primary marker to track for Ireland's licensing perimeter, though the precise entry-into-force date has not yet been established in current evidence, meaning the deadline can currently only be horizon-tracked as a multi-year band rather than a fixed date. A narrower, six-month transposition and application window applies specifically to the Settlement Finality Directive amendments enabling direct non-bank participation in designated payment systems, which will land materially sooner than the main PSD3 transposition and is worth tracking as a distinct, earlier milestone. Watch for the Central Bank of Ireland's own implementation guidance to grandfathered firms as the practical signal that the re-authorisation-avoidance provision is operating as reported.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Ireland's payment institution and e-money licensing perimeter is tightening across several fronts simultaneously. The Central Bank of Ireland has published its "Expectations for Authorisation of Payment and Electronic Money Institutions and Registration of AISPs," identifying inadequate preparation and unstable business-model descriptions as the most common reasons authorisation applications fall short. This is a direct readiness signal for prospective payment institution and e-money institution applicants, and for registering account information service providers, ahead of any wider licence-regime change.

That wider change is now moving from provisional to near-final: the Payment Services Directive 3 and Payment Services Regulation (PSD3/PSR) package reached provisional political agreement on 27 November 2025, with the final text public since April 2026 and Official Journal publication expected around the second quarter of 2026. Publication starts an 18-month transposition clock (six months for the related Settlement Finality Directive amendments), which will require Ireland to replace its PSD2-based Payment Services Regulations 2018 and merge the separate PI and EMI licence categories into a single authorisation regime, on a horizon currently expected to land in 2027. The reform also carries a safeguarding dimension directly relevant to non-bank payment firms: mandatory diversification of safeguarded client funds across at least two credit institutions, with explicit recognition of central-bank safeguarding accounts where available — a change that will affect how both bank-affiliated and non-bank PI/EMI safeguarding arrangements are structured.

Alongside the conventional PI/EMI track, Ireland's crypto-asset authorisation track under MiCA is reaching its own hard deadline. The Article 143(3) VASP-to-CASP grandfathering window closes 1 July 2026 across the EU; firms not authorised as a Crypto-Asset Service Provider by that date must cease crypto-asset services in Ireland, and the Central Bank has required mandatory online portal submissions since 2 April 2026. A related supervisory layer is being built alongside the authorisation deadline: the Central Bank's Notice of Intention to amend the Minimum Competency Code 2017 adds crypto-assets as a new Category 9 retail financial product, importing ESMA's MiCA Guidelines knowledge-and-competence standards for CASP staff from 28 July 2026, with an experience-based transitional arrangement for existing staff.

On the ongoing cost side, the 2025/2026 Payment Institution Industry Funding Levy is calculated as a minimum of EUR 5,300 plus a variable component tied to transaction value, with no fee currently charged for authorisation applications themselves — a detail relevant to both prospective and currently-authorised non-bank payment firms budgeting for supervisory costs.

Taken together, Ireland's licensing perimeter is being reshaped on three parallel tracks at once: domestic authorisation-readiness scrutiny, EU-level PSD3/PSR licence-regime overhaul, and MiCA CASP transition — each with its own compliance horizon but converging around mid-to-late 2026 and into 2027.

Outlook

The immediate marker to watch is confirmation of the PSD3/PSR Official Journal publication date, which will fix the exact start of the 18-month transposition clock and the resulting 2027 Irish PI/EMI licence-merger horizon. In parallel, the 1 July 2026 MiCA CASP grandfathering closure will produce a visible market-access outcome — the count of firms that complete CASP authorisation in time versus those that must cease Irish crypto-asset services — that should be verifiable in the following reporting cycle.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1Central Bank of Ireland — PI/EMI authorisation guidance; EU PSD2 (SI 6/2018) & E-Money Regs (centralbank.ie)
  2. T1Central Bank of Ireland — PI/EMI authorisation process (centralbank.ie)
  3. T1Central Bank of Ireland — E-Money Regulations; Small EMI €3m monthly cap (centralbank.ie)
  4. T1Central Bank of Ireland — Payments Authorisation expectations 2024 (centralbank.ie)
  5. T1https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/industry-market-sectors/electronic-money-institutions/passportingretrieved

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Central-bank deposit option under PSR 2018 reg. 17 is unusable in practice following ECB Decision (EU) 2025/222 (applying from 9 April 2025); commercial-bank segregation, eligible-asset investment and insurance remain. Head of Safeguarding (PCF-56) controlled function applies from 10 February 2026 under S.I. 20/2026.

Horizon · 2026-03-24 (±quarter)Consumer Protection Code 2025 enters into force in Irelandin_force_pending · T3
Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026300 words · last cycle 2026-10-20

Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions

Conduct and safeguarding obligations are the live regulatory frontier for Ireland's non-bank PIs and EMIs. Irish PIs and EMIs must safeguard consumer funds either by segregation in a separate account with an EEA-authorised bank or by coverage under an insurance or guarantee policy, per PSD2 and EMD2 as implemented through the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, the PSR 2018 and the EMR 2011; safeguarding is a CBI key priority. The safeguarding model directly affects customer-fund protection and operating cost for IE-licensed PIs and EMIs, and it falls squarely on the non-bank PI/EMI population rather than on bank PSPs, which hold customer funds on balance sheet under separate prudential rules.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-20

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

The Consumer Protection Code 2025 entered into force on 24 March 2026, replacing the Consumer Protection Code 2012 as the governing conduct framework for firms regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland, a category that includes electronic money institutions and payment institutions. This is a confirmed, in-force conduct standard rather than a proposed or consultative one, and it applies directly to Ireland's payments-sector conduct obligations.

Of particular relevance to payments firms is the Code's Error Notification Template process, which is engaged where consumers experience a payment-safeguarding shortfall that causes them loss. Firms operating under electronic money institution or payment institution authorisation should treat this process as part of their standing conduct obligations under the new Code, distinct from the safeguarding rules themselves, which govern how client funds are held and protected. The transition from the 2012 to the 2025 Code represents the kind of baseline conduct-framework renewal that affects every regulated payments firm operating in Ireland, regardless of whether it is a bank-affiliated or non-bank electronic money institution or payment institution, since the Code applies uniformly across Central-Bank-regulated firms rather than differentiating by institutional type for this particular requirement.

No further safeguarding-specific guidance, audit findings or reconciliation requirements beyond the Code's confirmed entry into force were identified; the underlying safeguarding reconciliation and audit intake claims from prior cycles were not independently re-verified; the finding is limited to confirmation that the 2025 Code is now the operative conduct standard for the sector.

Outlook

The period following the Code's March 2026 commencement is the relevant window for observing how Irish-regulated payment firms operationalise its requirements in practice, including use of the Error Notification Template process for payment-safeguarding shortfalls causing consumer loss. No further developments in this area, such as enforcement action under the new Code or supplementary Central Bank guidance, were identified, so the near-term outlook rests on firms' implementation of the Code as confirmed rather than on any further regulatory change.

4 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-10-06

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

The Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (Section 48(1)) (Minimum Competency) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 — S.I. No. 295 of 2026 — came into operation on 28 July 2026, extending Ireland's Minimum Competency Regulations regime to cover MiCA (Category 9) crypto-asset services. The instrument defines a qualifying course for this purpose as one that meets the criteria set out in the ESMA MiCA Guidelines, so the competency bar for staff advising on or dealing in crypto-asset services is now set by direct reference to the European Securities and Markets Authority's own knowledge-and-competence standard rather than a freestanding domestic test.

This commencement follows directly from a Central Bank impact analysis published on 31 May 2026, in which the Bank set out a proposal to recognise MiCA knowledge and competence requirements within the Minimum Competency Regulations. That proposal has now been given binding effect: firms providing MiCA services in Ireland are brought within the same minimum-competency supervisory architecture that already governs other regulated financial services, rather than being left in a conduct gap specific to crypto-asset activity.

Outlook

Firms with personnel advising on or dealing in MiCA services in Ireland need those staff to hold, or be working toward, a qualification meeting the ESMA MiCA knowledge-and-competence Guidelines from 28 July 2026 onward. Because the standard is defined by reference to an external ESMA benchmark rather than a static domestic list, firms will need to track ESMA's own Guidelines for any future revision of what counts as a qualifying course.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

Safeguarding of customer funds is the Central Bank of Ireland's highest 2026 supervisory priority for payment and e-money institutions, a Probable-confidence finding carrying high impact this cycle. The CBI has created a new Head of Safeguarding pre-approval controlled function (PCF), signalling that safeguarding governance now sits at a named, individually-accountable senior-management level within licensed non-bank payment firms, rather than being treated as a diffuse operational responsibility. Alongside this, the CBI is pursuing enhanced AML/CFT regulatory-expectations-questionnaire submissions from licensed firms, tightening the conduct and information-gathering relationship between supervisor and licensee.

This conduct tightening arrives directly ahead of the PSD3/PSR framework, whose final legislative texts, published April 2026, themselves tighten safeguarding requirements at the EU level. The combination of the CBI's own 2026 domestic supervisory priority and the incoming EU-level safeguarding tightening under PSD3/PSR means Irish-authorised non-bank PIs and EMIs face a converging set of pressures on how customer funds are segregated and protected, from both the national supervisor and the EU legislative framework simultaneously.

Outlook

Watch for the CBI's practical implementation of the Head of Safeguarding PCF role, including the pace of individual pre-approvals across licensed firms, and for how the domestic safeguarding priority interacts with PSD3/PSR's own safeguarding provisions once transposition detail becomes available.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-05

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

Central Bank of Ireland-authorised payment institutions are now expected to act honestly, fairly and professionally under the Consumer Protection Code 2025 framework, a confirmed, primary-source conduct-of-business rulebook that governs how authorised firms deal with customers. This sits alongside the Standards for Business Regulations 2025, and together the two instruments constitute the live conduct-of-business layer for Irish payment institutions independent of the PSD3 licensing transition tracked under W1a.

On the cost side of conduct regulation, the Central Bank of Ireland's annual Industry Funding levy is confirmed at a minimum of €5,300 for the 2025/2026 levy year, plus a variable component tied to transaction value. This is a direct, quantified cost-to-operate signal for authorised payment institutions and e-money institutions, distinguishing the nonbank PI/EMI cost base — which bears this levy directly — from bank-supervised payment activity, which is assessed under separate prudential levy arrangements. The variable component means the practical cost impact will differ materially between low-volume and high-volume payment institutions even though the minimum floor is common to all authorised nonbank firms.

Outlook

Watch for the Central Bank of Ireland's confirmation of the 2026/2027 levy year parameters and for any conduct-rulebook amendments accompanying the PSD3 transposition process, since conduct and safeguarding requirements typically get updated in tandem with licensing-framework transitions of this kind.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

Ireland's conduct-of-business layer for payment institutions has been reinforced this cycle. The new Consumer Protection Code 2025 now applies to authorised payment institutions, importing a conduct standard that requires honesty, fairness and professionalism in dealings with customers — a Consumer-Duty-style obligation layered onto the existing payment institution authorisation regime rather than a bank-specific rule, meaning it reaches non-bank payment and e-money firms directly. This sits alongside, but is analytically distinct from, the prudential and licensing track covered under W1a: the Consumer Protection Code operates as an ongoing conduct standard rather than a one-off authorisation gate.

Settlement-finality and safeguarded-funds-insolvency plumbing — the legal-infrastructure question of how client funds and payment finality are treated if a payment institution or e-money institution fails — was not evidenced by a dedicated Irish development this cycle, despite its structural importance to the coming PSD3/PSR transposition. This remains a standing coverage gap rather than a confirmed null result and is flagged for targeted sourcing in a subsequent cycle, particularly as PSD3/PSR's mandatory safeguarding-diversification requirement (tracked under W1a) will have direct insolvency-remoteness implications for non-bank PI/EMI safeguarding arrangements.

Outlook

Expect the Consumer Protection Code's application to payment institutions to be tested in practice as firms adjust conduct and disclosure processes; the more consequential unresolved question is how Ireland's safeguarding and settlement-finality plumbing will be reshaped once PSD3/PSR's diversification and insolvency-related provisions are transposed, an area this cycle's sourcing did not reach.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T1Central Bank of Ireland — Consumer Protection Code (revised 24 Mar 2025, eff. 24 Mar 2026) (centralbank.ie)
  2. T1Central Bank of Ireland — revised Consumer Protection Code 2026 (centralbank.ie)
  3. T3https://www.williamfry.com/knowledge/the-consumer-protection-code-is-modernised/ [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]
  4. T1https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2025/si/81/made/en/printretrieved

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Ireland's national MiCA transitional period for pre-existing VASPs ended 30 December 2025 under S.I. No. 607/2024, Regulation 20; this national date governs for Ireland, distinct from the EU-wide Article 143(3) outer limit of 1 July 2026. Separately, the EBA's PSD2/MiCA No-Action Letter transition for CASPs transacting EMTs as a payment service ended 2 March 2026 EU-wide.

Horizon · 2025-12 (±half_year)MiCA CASP transition window closes in Ireland (reduced to 12 months)in_force · T3
Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026320 words · last cycle 2026-06-24

Stablecoins & Digital Money

Ireland has positioned itself as a MiCA authorisation hub under a demanding national posture. The Central Bank of Ireland is the national competent authority under MiCA, transposed via the European Union (Markets in Crypto-Assets) Regulations 2024 (S.I. 607/2024) per MiCA Articles 60-62; the ART and EMT rules applied from 30 June 2024 and full CASP authorisation from 30 December 2024. Stablecoins are classified as EMTs or ARTs and are not legal tender; EMT issuers must be credit institutions or EMIs holding reserves, with redemption-at-par, disclosure and six-monthly reserve-audit obligations. This defines the stablecoin issuance and CASP authorisation route for firms hubbing EU crypto operations in Dublin, and it spans both bank and non-bank issuers depending on the EMT/ART structure.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1EU MiCA Regulation 2024 (SI 607/2024); CBI as NCA under Arts 60–62 (centralbank.ie)
  2. T1EU MiCA — ART/EMT applied 30 Jun 2024; CASP authorisation by CBI from 30 Dec 2024 (centralbank.ie)
  3. T1SI 607/2024 (EU MiCA Regulation 2024) — CBI CASP authorisation (centralbank.ie)
  4. T1https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/markets-in-crypto-assets-regulation/micar---frequently-asked-questionsretrieved
  5. T3https://cryptoslate.com/kraken-secures-mica-license-via-central-bank-of-ireland-to-ensure-eu-operations-continue/ [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]

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The EU Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) has applied since 17 January 2025; the CBI supervises DORA compliance for in-scope firms (including credit institutions, investment firms, CASPs, PIs and EMIs), embedding ICT risk management, harmonised incident reporting, resilience testing and ICT third-party/outsourcing oversight. DORA layers on the CBI's pre-existing 2021 Cross-Industry Operational Resilience Guidance, which the CBI revised in 2025 to align with DORA; the CBI withdrew its 2016 IT/cybersecurity cross-industry guidance as DORA now sets the harmonised minimum standard.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026251 words · last cycle 2026-10-06

Operational Resilience & Critical Infra

Operational resilience in Ireland is now governed by a harmonised EU framework actively supervised by the CBI. The Digital Operational Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) has applied in Ireland under Central Bank of Ireland supervision since 17 January 2025, covering ICT risk management, harmonised incident classification and reporting, resilience testing and critical ICT third-party oversight, for in-scope firms including credit institutions, investment firms, CASPs, PIs and EMIs. DORA imposes uniform ICT and resilience obligations across the entire in-scope payments population — both bank PSPs and non-bank PIs/EMIs — and its critical third-party provider oversight reshapes how firms manage outsourced technology dependencies.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-06

Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, the Digital Operational Resilience Act, has applied since 17 January 2025 to payment institutions and electronic-money institutions established in Ireland, and its intersection with the safeguarding-reconciliation expectations the Central Bank has set out separately is the specific operational-resilience development worth surfacing this cycle. Where a firm uses a third-party platform to perform the daily safeguarding reconciliation now expected as a core control, that platform is likely to qualify as an ICT service supporting a critical or important function under DORA's classification test, given the central role daily reconciliation plays in detecting the kind of fund-mixing and account-designation failures that have previously resulted in enforcement action in the Irish payments sector. A critical-or-important classification carries concrete consequences: the Article 28(3) obligation to maintain and keep current a register of information covering the arrangement, and the Article 30 requirement that the underlying contract contain specific terms addressing matters such as service levels, data location, and exit arrangements.

This sits alongside, rather than replaces, the European Banking Authority's outsourcing guidelines, which have applied since 30 September 2019, and the Central Bank of Ireland's own notification expectations requiring firms to inform the Central Bank of material changes to critical or important outsourcing arrangements. The practical effect for an Irish PI or EMI is a layered set of obligations attaching to the same underlying arrangement: an outsourcing-notification duty to the Central Bank under existing guidance, and a DORA-specific register-of-information and contract-term duty running in parallel once the reconciliation platform is classified as supporting a critical or important function.

The classification exercise itself, namely whether a given reconciliation platform meets the critical-or-important threshold, is a judgment the firm must make and document, and it is one that connects directly back to the conduct-side safeguarding expectations: a firm that has not performed or documented this classification exercise for its reconciliation platform is exposed on two fronts simultaneously, a potential DORA compliance gap and an unresolved question about the robustness of the very control, daily reconciliation, that the Central Bank treats as central to safeguarding adequacy.

Outlook

Firms that have not yet formally classified their safeguarding-reconciliation outsourcing arrangements against the DORA critical-or-important-function test should expect this question to surface in supervisory engagement, given how closely the Central Bank's safeguarding expectations and the DORA critical-function test now overlap in practice for the specific case of reconciliation platforms. The register-of-information and contract-term obligations that follow from a critical-or-important classification are not one-off exercises; they require ongoing maintenance as the underlying arrangement evolves, which adds a recurring operational-resilience compliance burden on top of the existing Central Bank outsourcing-notification duty.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

The Central Bank of Ireland is the integrated DORA competent authority for banks, payment institutions, e-money institutions, investment firms, insurers and MiCA-authorised crypto-asset service providers, a Confirmed-confidence, standing regulatory-architecture fact. This consolidation under a single supervisor has applied since DORA's application date of 17 January 2025, meaning Ireland's operational-resilience supervisory architecture already spans both bank and non-bank payment entities, as well as crypto-asset service providers, under one authority rather than fragmented sectoral regulators.

This integrated-authority structure is directly relevant to the bank-versus-non-bank distinction that runs through Ireland's payments regulatory architecture: non-bank PIs and EMIs face the same DORA competent authority, and by extension broadly the same operational-resilience expectations, as banks and insurers, even though their prudential and licensing regimes otherwise differ materially. No fresh Ireland-specific DORA enforcement action or incident-reporting development was identified within this cycle's evidence set beyond the confirmation of the CBI's integrated-authority role itself.

Outlook

As DORA's operational-resilience testing and incident-reporting requirements continue to bed in following the January 2025 application date, watch for the CBI's practical supervisory engagement with non-bank PIs and EMIs specifically, given their generally smaller operational scale relative to banks and insurers falling under the same integrated DORA authority.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.idaireland.com/latest-news/insights/dora-regulation-bolstering-cyber-resilience-across-the-eu-financial-sector [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]
  2. T3https://www.mccannfitzgerald.com/knowledge/financial-services-regulation/the-final-countdown-complying-with-the-digital-operational-resilience-act-dora [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]
  3. T3https://www.walkersglobal.com/en/Insights/2025/09/Updates-in-the-Central-Bank-of-Irelands-OpRes-Guidance [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]
  4. T3https://www.arthurcox.com/insights/operational-resilience-2-0-how-dora-is-reshaping-operational-resilience-in-ireland/ [CAVEAT: Tier 3 secondary source — Assessed; verify vs primary pre-publication]

#

As an EU/euro-area member, Ireland applies the EU Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR) caps on Visa/Mastercard interchange, PCI DSS (managed by the PCI SSC), and the SEPA scheme rulebooks (EPC) for credit transfers/direct debits. Card payments dominate non-cash volumes; Visa and Mastercard are the principal card schemes (no surviving national card scheme). Scheme-level dispute/monitoring rules (Visa VAMP, Mastercard ECP) and PCI DSS v4.0.1 future-dated requirements (effective 31 March 2025) bind Irish acquirers and merchants.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026276 words · last cycle 2026-06-24

Scheme & Network Compliance

Ireland's card and scheme economics are set by EU-level and scheme-global rules. Ireland is bound by the EU Interchange Fee Regulation caps on Visa and Mastercard interchange, by PCI DSS as maintained by the PCI SSC, and by the SEPA scheme rulebooks of the European Payments Council. The IFR's 2015 interchange caps contributed to the phase-out of several European national card schemes, and Ireland has no surviving national card scheme — leaving the international networks and SEPA framework as the structural basis of Irish card and A2A payment economics. These rules apply across both bank and non-bank participants in the card value chain.

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/retail/sepa/html/index.en.htmlretrieved
  2. T1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pubbydate/2019/html/ecb.cardpaymentsineu_currentlandscapeandfutureprospects201904~30d4de2fc4.en.htmlretrieved
  3. T3https://paymentnerds.com/blog/high-risk-merchant-accounts-in-2026-whats-getting-harder-and-easier/retrieved
  4. T3https://interchangefeeseu.com/countries/interchange-fees-in-irelandretrieved

#

Ireland's principal corridor is intra-EEA euro SEPA (the largest by value), with SEPA Credit Transfer (SCT), SEPA Direct Debit (SDD) and SEPA Instant Credit Transfer (SCT Inst) as core rails, settled on pan-European infrastructure (EBA CLEARING RT1 / Eurosystem TIPS); there is no separate Irish domestic clearing house. The EU Instant Payments Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/886) mandates instant euro transfers: euro-area credit institutions must receive from 9 January 2025 and send from 9 October 2025. A material non-euro corridor with the UK (Ireland's largest single trading partner) requires FX and faces Brexit-related friction.

Horizon · 2025-10-09 (±quarter)IPR euro instant-payment SEND mandate for euro-area PSPsin_force · T1
Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026273 words · last cycle 2026-08-05

Payment Corridor Dynamics

The central corridor development is the EU Instant Payments Regulation. Regulation (EU) 2024/886 mandates that euro-area PSPs offering euro credit transfers must also offer instant credit transfers — receive from 9 January 2025 and send from 9 October 2025 — with charges capped at no higher than ordinary transfers, daily sanctions screening and a Verification of Payee service; non-bank PSPs (PIs and EMIs) gained TARGET access from October 2025. Ireland settles SCT Inst primarily on EBA CLEARING's RT1 and on TIPS, with no separate Irish clearing house, and the CBI is the lead national enforcer. The IPR forces universal instant euro capability and VoP and sanctions screening onto IE PSPs, reshaping the core account-to-account rails for both bank and non-bank firms.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-11

Payment Corridor Dynamics

Mandatory Verification of Payee (VOP) took effect on 9 October 2025 across all euro-area payment service providers under the SEPA Instant Payments Regulation, with no staggered implementation permitted; the mandate applies equally to electronic-money institutions and payment institutions alongside banks. This landed against a historically low Irish SEPA Instant coverage baseline of approximately 5% of financial institutions ahead of the mandate taking full effect, compared with approximately 62% coverage EU-wide, indicating Irish payment institutions faced a materially more compressed infrastructure build-out than the euro-area average. AIB, Bank of Ireland and PTSB responded with Zippay, a bank-led, in-app account-to-account payment service launched 10 March 2026, an early incumbent-bank product built on top of the now-mandatory SEPA Instant rail, illustrating how the regulatory mandate is translating into consumer-facing product activity. The VOP and coverage-baseline findings are corroborated by a Tier 2 specialist-legal source (Mason Hayes & Curran); the Irish coverage percentage and the Zippay launch both rest on single Tier 4 sources (KPMG Ireland) and are treated as assessed rather than confirmed.

Outlook

The key indicator to watch is whether Irish SEPA Instant coverage continues to close the gap toward the roughly 62% EU-wide benchmark now that VOP compliance is mandatory rather than optional, and whether further bank-led or non-bank account-to-account products follow Zippay's March 2026 launch. Given the compressed timeline Irish institutions faced relative to euro-area peers, continued monitoring of processing-volume and coverage data through the remainder of 2026 would confirm whether the infrastructure build-out implied by the VOP mandate is translating into durable rail availability.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/retail/instant_payments/html/instant_payments_regulation.en.htmlretrieved
  2. T3https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/instant-payments-irelandretrieved
  3. T3https://www.pwc.ie/industries/financial-services/insights/sepa-instant-credit-transfer/mastering-sepa-instant-credit-transfers.htmlretrieved
  4. T3https://stripe.com/resources/more/payments-in-irelandretrieved

#

Ireland is a significant post-Brexit EU payments/fintech hub with a deep base of CBI-authorised EMIs/PIs. The market mixes traditional incumbent banks (Bank of Ireland, AIB) with global infrastructure players headquartered or hubbed in Dublin (Stripe, Wise, Circle, Square) and homegrown firms (Fenergo, TransferMate, Wayflyer, Fire Financial Services, Humm). The Banking & Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI), with affiliates FIBI and FPAI, represents 120+ institutions. The National Payments Strategy (launched October 2024) is steering market development, including new CBI orderly-wind-down/liquidation powers for payment firms.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026276 words · last cycle 2026-09-28

Industry Structure & Commercial

Ireland is a post-Brexit EU payments and fintech hub with a deep institutional base. It combines a deep base of CBI-authorised EMIs and PIs mixing incumbents such as Bank of Ireland and AIB with global infrastructure players including Stripe, Wise, Circle and Square and homegrown firms such as Fenergo, TransferMate, Wayflyer, Fire Financial Services and Humm; the Banking & Payments Federation Ireland, with its affiliates FIBI and FPAI, represents more than 120 institutions. This establishes the competitive landscape and the concentration of EU payments infrastructure in Dublin, spanning both bank and non-bank participants.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics

Ireland's PI/EMI sector is both the Central Bank of Ireland's fastest-growing supervised segment and a well-established destination for firms relocating from the UK following Brexit. The Central Bank has licensed dozens of EMIs and PIs since the second Payment Services Directive came into force, with a steady stream of that authorisation activity attributable to firms seeking to preserve EEA market access from an EU base after the UK's departure from the bloc. This post-Brexit relocation dynamic sits alongside, and partly explains, the sector's headline growth from 14 to 51 authorised firms between 2016 and 2023.

The structural picture this creates is a sector whose scale has grown for reasons that are only partly organic domestic expansion — a meaningful share reflects firms establishing or relocating an EU regulatory base in Ireland specifically, rather than purely Irish market demand for payment services. This distinction matters for reading the sector's commercial dynamics: growth driven by relocation activity has different competitive and concentration implications than growth driven by expanding domestic transaction volume, and the safeguarded-funds growth to EUR7,820 million by 2023 should be read with that composition in mind.

Outlook

Watch for whether the post-Brexit relocation flow into Ireland's PI/EMI sector continues at a steady pace or begins to plateau as the initial post-Brexit relocation wave completes; a plateauing relocation flow would shift the sector's growth story toward organic domestic and cross-border transaction growth rather than regulatory-base relocation.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T2https://bpfi.ie/bpfi-opening-statement-to-oireachtas-finance-committee-3rd-december-2025/retrieved
  2. T2https://bpfi.ie/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Irish-Fintech-Survey.pdfretrieved
  3. T3https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/10/06/3161612/28124/en/Ireland-Embedded-Finance-Market-Databook-2025-Tracks-100-KPIs-Across-Embedded-Payments-Lending-Insurance-Banking-and-Wealth-in-Ireland.htmlretrieved
  4. T3https://www.williamfry.com/knowledge/national-payments-strategy-launched-by-the-minister-for-finance/retrieved

Enforcement is led by the CBI's Administrative Sanctions Procedure (ASP), under which it can fine firms up to EUR 10 million or 10% of turnover and individuals up to EUR 1 million. The landmark recent payments-context action is the November 2025 fine of Coinbase Europe Limited (EUR 21,464,734 after a 30% settlement discount, from EUR 30.66m) for AML/CTF transaction-monitoring failures under the CJA 2010 — subject to Irish High Court confirmation. Historic large fines include Bank of Ireland (EUR 24.5m, 2021) for IT service-continuity/control failings. The CBI is also the competent authority for EU financial sanctions and issued its first Financial Crime Bulletin in late 2025.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026296 words · last cycle 2026-10-06

Legal & Litigation

The landmark enforcement event of the cycle defines this module. The Central Bank of Ireland fined Coinbase Europe Limited EUR 21,464,734 on 6 November 2025 — a EUR 30,663,906 penalty with a 30% settlement discount — for breaching AML/CTF transaction-monitoring obligations under the CJA 2010 between 2021 and 2025, including failing to fully monitor over 30 million transactions, subject to Irish High Court confirmation. This is the first major CASP AML enforcement action via the CBI's Administrative Sanctions Procedure and signals a high supervisory bar and material litigation and penalty exposure for crypto-payments firms operating as non-bank entities in Ireland. The underlying illicit-finance conduct is routed to FIM; the World Payments Monitor carries only the enforcement and legal fact here.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-06

Legal & Litigation

The Central Bank of Ireland's enforcement action against BlueSnap Payment Services Ireland Limited, confirmed by the High Court on 2 April 2025, stands as the concrete enforcement record behind the safeguarding expectations now being formalised through the new Head of Safeguarding controlled function elsewhere in this brief. The settlement resulted in a reprimand and a fine of two hundred ninety-eight thousand, two hundred and forty euro, reflecting a thirty per cent settlement discount against a headline sanction of four hundred sixty-three thousand, two hundred euro. The underlying findings were that the firm did not deposit its customers' funds into BlueSnap's own designated safeguarding account, and that it mixed its customers' funds with other funds, alongside delayed notification to the Central Bank of the issue and inadequate oversight of safeguarding operations that were provided at group level rather than within the local entity.

The case is instructive precisely because it maps directly onto the standing supervisory expectations discussed in the conduct and safeguarding context: the requirement that second- and third-line oversight of safeguarding reside within the local legal entity rather than with group or outsourced providers, the expectation of immediate notification of any safeguarding issue identified, and the expectation of daily reconciliation that would be expected to catch a fund-mixing failure of this kind before it became entrenched. The Central Bank's December 2025 Payment and E-Money Newsletter and its 2026 Regulatory and Supervisory Outlook both record that sector-wide deficiencies of a similar character, specifically concentration risk in safeguarded-fund placement and inadequate credit-risk management frameworks, persist across the Irish payment and e-money sector even after this enforcement action, with the Outlook noting that fifty-eight payment and e-money firms held a combined eleven point eight billion euro in safeguarded funds at the end of 2025, an increase of seventeen per cent on the prior year-end.

The scale noted in that Outlook figure underscores why the Central Bank has moved toward the governance-based supervisory model built around the new Head of Safeguarding function: the BlueSnap enforcement outcome demonstrates that thematic guidance and notices alone did not fully prevent a serious safeguarding failure, and the growing pool of safeguarded funds across the sector increases the consequence of any similar failure recurring.

Outlook

The BlueSnap enforcement record is likely to remain the reference case the Central Bank and the sector point to when assessing whether the new governance structure, specifically the Head of Safeguarding function, is functioning as intended, and any further enforcement action on safeguarding grounds in coming cycles should be read against the same pattern of findings, namely fund-mixing, delayed notification, and oversight gaps between group-level and local-entity-level functions.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2025/11/24/central-bank-of-ireland-fines-coinbase-more-than-e21-million-for-breaching-anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-financing-transaction-monitoring-obligations/retrieved
  2. T3https://www.dilloneustace.com/insights/legal-insights/central-bank-ramps-up-enforcement-actions-as-record-fines-imposed/retrieved
  3. T1https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/how-we-regulate/enforcement/administrative-sanctions-procedureretrieved
  4. T3https://globalsanctions.com/2025/12/irish-central-bank-issues-first-financial-crime-bulletin-including-sanctions/retrieved

#

Merchant acquiring in Ireland is dominated by global/fintech acquirers (Stripe, Adyen) alongside traditional banks, operating under EU PSD2 (SCA), PCI DSS and Visa/Mastercard scheme rules. Card-scheme dispute/monitoring regimes — Visa VAMP (full enforcement from 1 October 2025) and Mastercard's Excessive Chargeback Program — pass risk to acquirers, who manage merchant onboarding/underwriting, reserves and high-risk-MCC treatment. EU PSD2 SCA/TRA exemptions interact with these scheme programs. Chargeback rights for Irish cardholders run via Visa/Mastercard scheme procedures (typically 120–180 days).

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026275 words · last cycle 2026-07-10

Merchant Acquiring & Risk

Scheme-level merchant-risk enforcement has tightened materially. Visa's VAMP enforcement started for acquirers on 1 October 2025, consolidating older dispute and fraud programs into a single VAMP ratio — total disputes divided by total card-not-present sales — applied directly to acquirers who pass the pressure to merchants; the VAMP excessive-merchant threshold dropped from 220 to 150 basis points, and Mastercard's Excessive Chargeback Program monitors merchants over consecutive months. These rules bind Irish acquirers such as Stripe and Adyen and the merchants downstream of them, raising chargeback-management cost and high-risk-merchant scrutiny across the non-bank acquirer population.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

Merchant Acquiring & Risk

A reported, but unverified, market-practice signal from Ireland's card-acquiring side concerns gambling merchant category codes. Irish card-issuing banks are reported to have implemented transaction-level blocking of gambling merchant category codes for credit-card payments, following the statutory prohibition on credit-funded gambling that took effect on 5 February 2026; debit cards, e-wallets and bank transfers reportedly remain permitted. This account rests on a single lower-tier consumer-facing source and has not been corroborated against a bank or Central Bank of Ireland primary statement, so it is carried here as a market-practice report pending verification rather than a confirmed supervisory or industry position.

Outlook

This item should be treated as provisional until corroborated by a primary bank or Central Bank source; if confirmed, it would indicate private-sector risk controls running ahead of, and reinforcing, the statutory credit-funded-gambling prohibition.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.ravelin.com/blog/visa-vamp-changes-chargeback-disputesretrieved
  2. T3https://stripe.com/resources/more/payments-in-irelandretrieved
  3. T3https://paymentnerds.com/blog/high-risk-merchant-accounts-in-2026-whats-getting-harder-and-easier/retrieved
  4. T3https://www.getfocal.ai/blog/merchant-acquiring-risk-managementretrieved

#

Innovation is anchored by the CBI Innovation Sandbox (second cohort 'Innovation in Payments' opened 23 September 2025, applications to 10 November 2025, programme running from January 2026) and the EU open-banking/PSD2 build-out (with PSD3/PSR in train). The Eurosystem digital euro project moved to its next phase in October 2025, with a possible pilot from 2027 and first issuance potentially 2029; the CBI participates as part of the Eurosystem. Real-time rails (SCT Inst mandatory) and account-to-account 'pay-by-account' solutions (per the National Payments Strategy) are the principal product-development vectors.

Horizon · 2027 (±year)Digital euro possible pilot exerciseproposed · T1
Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026261 words · last cycle 2026-09-05

Product Innovation & Market Development

The CBI is engaging payments innovation through a structured sandbox. The Central Bank of Ireland Innovation Sandbox Programme runs its second cohort themed 'Innovation in Payments', announced on 23 September 2025, a six-month programme beginning January 2026 with applications closed on 10 November 2025, intended to foster safer, faster, greener and more inclusive payments and to give the CBI early insight into emerging risks. The sandbox signals supervisory engagement with payments innovation and offers fintechs — bank and non-bank alike — a route to test products under regulatory observation.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-05

Product Innovation & Market Development

Confirmo Limited received Payment Institution authorisation from the Central Bank of Ireland in April 2026, adding to the MiCA Crypto-Asset Service Provider authorisation it obtained in December 2025, and the combined authorisation now allows Confirmo to passport both licences across the EEA from its Irish base. This is probable-confidence intelligence sourced from a single trade-press outlet rather than primary regulator confirmation, though the underlying authorisation events themselves are consistent with confirmed Central Bank of Ireland supervisory activity in the payment-institution space more broadly.

This dual-authorisation pattern is analytically significant as a product-innovation signal distinct from the stablecoin-regime detail owned by the crypto monitor: it demonstrates that a single Irish-authorised entity can now combine a payments licence with a digital-asset licence under one roof, positioning Ireland as a jurisdiction where regulated stablecoin-adjacent payment products can be built without needing separate authorisations in separate Member States. The timing — Confirmo's Payment Institution authorisation landing shortly after Ireland's own shortened MiCA grandfathering transition closed — suggests the combination may become a template other Irish-domiciled digital-asset firms look to replicate.

Outlook

Watch for additional dual-authorisation events of this kind among Irish-domiciled CASPs as the MiCA transitional period fully closes across the EU, and for whether Confirmo's stablecoin-payment product offering scales following its combined licensing base.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

Product Innovation & Market Development

Verification of Payee — IBAN-name matching checks — has been mandatory for SEPA Instant Credit Transfers since 9 October 2025 under the EU Instant Payments Regulation. This anti-fraud control is expected to extend across all SEPA payment rails once PSD3/PSR-driven changes take effect before 2027, broadening the check beyond instant transfers to the wider SEPA credit-transfer base.

Outlook

Watch for confirmation of the timetable extending Verification of Payee beyond instant transfers to standard SEPA credit transfers as PSD3/PSR implementation proceeds.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.mondaq.com/ireland/financial-services/1684250/central-bank-payments-innovation-sandbox-programme-a-call-for-applicantsretrieved
  2. T1https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/press-release-eurosystem-moving-to-next-phase-of-digital-euro-project-30-oct-2025retrieved
  3. T1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp251219~fd2fee081a.en.htmlretrieved
  4. T3https://www.williamfry.com/knowledge/national-payments-strategy-launched-by-the-minister-for-finance/retrieved

#

Consumer protection is governed by the Consumer Protection Code 2025 (effective March 2026) and supervised by the CBI's Consumer Protection Directorate; the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman (FSPO) is the dispute-resolution route. Unlike the UK (PSR mandatory APP reimbursement from 7 October 2024), Ireland has NO mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement scheme; APP losses (~EUR 9.9m in 2022) are addressed via CBI Consumer Protection Outlook expectations and a whole-of-system National Payments Strategy approach (a legislated shared fraud database to be developed by BPFI, plus cross-sectoral cooperation). An Oireachtas Finance Committee report (October 2024) recommended a shared fraud database and greater coordination.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026249 words · last cycle 2026-09-28

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

Ireland's approach to authorised push payment fraud diverges sharply from the UK. Ireland has no mandatory reimbursement scheme, unlike the UK, where the PSR introduced mandatory APP reimbursement from 7 October 2024; APP losses of around EUR 9.9m in 2022 are addressed via CBI Consumer Protection Outlook expectations and a whole-of-system National Payments Strategy approach, with a legislated shared fraud database to be developed by BPFI and the Department of Justice to legislate, and cross-sectoral cooperation extended to online platforms, telcos and their regulators. The absence of a mandatory reimbursement obligation materially differentiates Ireland's consumer-protection liability exposure from the UK's, affecting both bank and non-bank PSPs that hold consumer accounts.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

Payment institutions and e-money institutions authorised in Ireland are now subject to the Consumer Protection Code 2025, given effect through the Section 48 Regulations 2025 and the Standards for Business Regulations 2025 — a conduct framework that applies directly to this sector's authorised firms. Separately, the Central Bank's Consumer Protection Outlook Report sets out an expectation that firms maintain effective fraud-mitigation measures and support victims of authorised push payment scams in recovering funds.

This conduct expectation is notable for what it is not: it is a supervisory expectation set out in an outlook report, not a mandatory reimbursement obligation with a defined legal liability allocation. That distinguishes Ireland's current position from the UK's live Payment Systems Regulator reimbursement regime, and situates Ireland instead alongside the EU's PSR3/PSD3 mandatory-reimbursement framework, which remains in the EU legislative process rather than in force. Firms authorised in Ireland today therefore face a conduct expectation to act on APP fraud without yet facing a codified mandatory-reimbursement liability rule of the kind already operative in the UK.

Outlook

The clearest development to watch is the progress of the EU's PSR3/PSD3 legislative process: its eventual adoption and transposition would convert the CBI's current conduct expectation into a codified mandatory-reimbursement obligation, materially changing the liability allocation for APP fraud losses among PI/EMI firms authorised in Ireland. Until then, firms operate under the Consumer Protection Code 2025 and the Outlook Report's conduct expectations rather than a binding reimbursement rule.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

Fraudulent payments in Ireland reached EUR 57 million in 2024, driven largely by AI-enabled social engineering, according to supervisory commentary referencing Central Bank of Ireland data. This is a Probable-confidence, dated dashboard-tier finding that quantifies the scale of authorised-push-payment-style fraud exposure in the Irish market as of the most recent full year for which data was available.

Against this fraud backdrop, IBAN-name checking has been mandatory for SEPA Instant transfers since 9 October 2025, functioning as a Confirmation-of-Payee-style verification requirement across the SEPA Instant scheme generally, not an Ireland-specific rule but one directly applicable to Irish payment flows. Separately, the CBI published its Consumer Protection Code 2025, including Standards for Business regulations issued under the Central Bank Reform Act 2010 section 17A, updating the standards-for-business obligations applicable to payment firms operating in Ireland. Once transposed, PSD3/PSR is also expected to expand authorised-push-payment fraud liability provisions, adding a further forward-looking layer to Ireland's consumer-protection-and-fraud landscape beyond the currently in-force IBAN-name-check and Consumer Protection Code measures.

Outlook

Watch for updated fraud-loss figures beyond the 2024 EUR 57 million baseline as AI-enabled social-engineering techniques continue to evolve, and for the practical detail of PSD3/PSR's expanded APP-fraud liability provisions once transposition proceeds.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://kpmg.com/ie/en/insights/consulting/authorised-push-payment-scams-consulting.htmlretrieved
  2. T1https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/press-releases/20241023-committee-on-finance-public-expenditure-and-reform-and-taoiseach-publishes-report-on-authorised-push-payment-fraud-recommends-shared-fraud-database-greater-coordination-and-communication-by-stakeholders/retrieved
  3. T2https://bpfi.ie/bpfi-opening-statement-to-oireachtas-finance-committee-3rd-december-2025/retrieved
  4. T3https://www.williamfry.com/knowledge/national-payments-strategy-launched-by-the-minister-for-finance/retrieved

#

sentinel. Carried Sentinel position for the payments context only (no original FIM illicit-finance analysis). Ireland's AML/CFT base instrument is the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 (as amended, CJA 2010), with the CBI as competent authority for credit/financial institutions including VASPs/CASPs. The EU AML package (adopted 30 May 2024) — AMLR, AMLD6, AMLA Regulation, recast Funds Transfer Regulation (FTR, in application since 30 December 2024) — applies; the directly-applicable AMLR binds Irish obliged entities (incl. payments firms) from 10 July 2027, AMLA (Frankfurt) began operations 1 July 2025. Ireland implemented the recast travel rule via S.I. 389/2025.

Horizon · 2027-07-10 (±quarter)EU AML Regulation (AMLR) applies to Irish obliged entitiesadopted · T3
Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026297 words · last cycle 2026-06-24

AML/CFT & Financial Crime

This module is carried from the Sentinel feed; the World Payments Monitor records only the payments-context AML position and does not re-analyse illicit finance, which is FIM-owned. Per the Sentinel feed, Ireland's AML/CFT regime is governed by the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 (as amended, CJA 2010), with the CBI as competent authority for credit and financial institutions including VASPs and CASPs; the recast Funds Transfer Regulation extends obligations to certain CASPs, effective December 2024, and Ireland implemented the recast travel rule via S.I. 389/2025, made 1 August 2025. This AML base instrument and travel-rule transposition define the financial-crime compliance baseline for Irish payments and CASP firms, spanning both bank and non-bank populations. Source: Sentinel (sentinel://gov.ie/department-of-finance/aml-cft).

no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief

Sources and findings (9)
  1. T3sentinel://deloitte.ie/amlr-readiness
  2. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) per-JID baseline profile — Ireland — Ireland's AML/CFT regime rests on the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Acts 2010-2021 (5AMLD-transposing), with the Central Bank of Ireland as lead AML/CFT supervisor for financial institutions and VASPs, the FIU embedded in the Garda National Economic Crime Bureau, and the CRO/RBO handling corporate and beneficial-ownership registration. As an EU member and international financial centre, Ireland will absorb the AMLR/AMLA package and MiCA in parallel.
  3. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-004) — Gap: sourcing-thinness
  4. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-005) — Gap: capacity-deficit
  5. T1FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-001) — Enforcement: An Garda Síochána / National Crime Agency (joint operation) — Cross-border organised crime cash-laundering network
  6. T2FIM (sentinel.gi) sanctions_change_register (issue FIM-BASE-SANC-003) — Sanctions: EU divergence
  7. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-002) — Gap: enforcement-absence
  8. T2FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-002) — Enforcement: Government of Ireland — Aughinish Alumina (Rusal-owned refinery, Co. Limerick)
  9. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-001) — Gap: regulatory-failure

#

Ireland settles euro through the Eurosystem TARGET Services: T2 (RTGS, replaced TARGET2 on 20 March 2023) for large-value, TARGET2-Securities (T2S) for securities, and TIPS for instant settlement; the Central Bank of Ireland operates the Irish component and provides settlement access. EURO1 (EBA CLEARING, a Systemically Important Payment System) is the principal private large-value net-settlement system, ultimately settling in T2. Following the Instant Payments Regulation, non-bank PSPs (PIs/EMIs) gained harmonised access to central-bank-operated payment systems including TARGET from October 2025. USD/GBP correspondent access for smaller Irish PSPs runs via Tier-1 correspondent banks.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026267 words · last cycle 2026-09-14

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The analytical spine of this module is the bank versus non-bank access asymmetry, which is now shifting in non-bank firms' favour. Ireland runs euro settlement through the Eurosystem's TARGET Services: T2 (RTGS, which replaced TARGET2 on 20 March 2023) for large-value, T2S for securities and TIPS for instant settlement; the CBI operates the Irish component and provides participants access, settling in central bank money. EURO1 (EBA CLEARING), a Systemically Important Payment System, is the principal private large-value net-settlement system, ultimately settling in T2. Historically this central-bank-money settlement layer was the preserve of banks, with non-bank PSPs dependent on bank sponsorship for indirect access.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The analytical spine of Ireland's correspondent-banking picture this cycle is the bank-versus-non-bank access asymmetry: licensed payment institutions and e-money institutions, unlike banks, do not have direct access to core settlement infrastructure and instead depend on safeguarding banking relationships with commercial banks to hold and protect customer funds. This dependency is now a named Central Bank of Ireland 2026 supervisory priority: the CBI's priorities include diversification of the safeguarding banks used by PIs and EMIs, a Probable-confidence finding that directly addresses concentration risk in this bank-dependency structure.

The diversification priority implies the CBI has identified an existing concentration among the banking relationships that Irish-licensed non-bank PIs and EMIs currently rely on for safeguarding, creating a structural vulnerability should any single safeguarding bank withdraw or restrict its relationship with multiple licensed firms simultaneously. This is consistent with the broader bank-versus-non-bank-PI/EMI distinction that structures correspondent-banking and settlement-access analysis generally: non-bank payment firms remain fundamentally dependent on bank intermediaries for settlement finality and fund safeguarding, regardless of their own direct regulatory authorisation status.

Outlook

Watch for the CBI's practical supervisory engagement with licensed PIs and EMIs on safeguarding-bank diversification through the remainder of 2026, and for any evidence of concentration among the specific safeguarding banks currently used by Ireland's non-bank payment sector.

1 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-08-11

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The analytical spine of this module is the structural asymmetry between bank and non-bank access to payment systems, and PSD3/PSR materially narrows it. The new framework gives payment institutions clearer rights to access payment systems, including TARGET2 and instant-payment schemes, directly alongside banks, reducing non-bank PSPs' structural dependence on sponsor-bank relationships for settlement access. This access expansion is paired with, rather than offsetting, a tightened safeguarding regime: PSD3/PSR introduces mandatory diversification of safeguarded client funds across at least two credit institutions once a firm exceeds a defined threshold, recognises central-bank safeguarding accounts where available as an alternative or complement to commercial-bank segregation, and imposes formal daily reconciliation-evidence requirements alongside clearer insolvency ring-fencing. Both the access-rights expansion and the safeguarding tightening are sourced to a single Tier 4 vendor guide this cycle, so both should be treated as assessed rather than confirmed pending independent corroboration, though the direction is consistent with independent commentary characterising the same access-versus-supervision trade-off. The amendments to the Settlement Finality Directive that enable this direct non-bank participation in designated payment systems carry their own, shorter transposition and application window, six months, rather than PSD3's main eighteen-month body, meaning the correspondent-banking access improvement described here could land materially ahead of the broader PSD3/PSR implementation timeline.

Outlook

Watch for the Settlement Finality Directive amendments' shorter transposition window landing ahead of the main PSD3 body, since that would be the concrete signal that non-bank PSPs' TARGET2 and instant-payment-scheme access rights are becoming operative rather than remaining a stated entitlement. The tightened safeguarding regime, diversification across credit institutions, central-bank account recognition, and daily reconciliation evidence, is the compliance cost side of this same access expansion and should be tracked as a parallel, not offsetting, development for non-bank payment institutions and e-money institutions operating in or through Ireland.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T2_(settlement_system)retrieved
  2. T1https://www.centralbank.ie/financial-system/payments-and-securities-settlements/target-services/t2retrieved
  3. T1https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/quarterly-bulletins/quarterly-bulletin-signed-articles/money-and-payments-infrastructure.pdf?sfvrsn=2a44731a_6retrieved
  4. T1https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/retail/instant_payments/html/instant_payments_regulation.en.htmlretrieved

#

Trailing-12-month commercial activity (run date 2026-06-24): Irish fintech attracted ~$259.4m across 2025 (up 9% YoY per KPMG Pulse of Fintech H2'25), with 7 fintech acquisitions in 2025. Largest deal: Teybridge Capital Europe ($58.61m, trade finance). Payments-specific: NomuPay raised $77m across two rounds; Wayflyer raised $35m (revenue-based finance). Dublin-founded Stripe was valued at $159bn (February 2026 tender offer; up from ~$91.5bn in 2025) and made stablecoin/AI acquisitions (Bridge, Privy, Metronome). Undisclosed-value events flagged with amount_disclosed=false.

Standing sub-brief · as of 26 June 2026307 words · last cycle 2026-10-20

Commercial Intelligence

Ireland's commercial-payments momentum is captured in two discrete events this cycle. On the investment side, the Irish fintech sector attracted $259.38 million in deals in 2025, up 9% year-on-year per the KPMG Pulse of Fintech H2'25, with 7 fintech acquisitions in 2025 versus 5 in 2024; the largest deal was Teybridge Capital Europe at $58.61m in trade finance, payment software firm NomuPay raised $77m across two deals at growth stage, and Dublin-based Wayflyer raised $35m for revenue-based financing. This quantifies the jurisdiction's deal and investment momentum as a commercial-significance signal for market structure.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-20

Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Two discrete commercial events anchor the fintech intelligence for Ireland, both connected to the country's payments-licensing and payments-technology employment base. The first and more structurally significant is Payward Inc.'s signed agreement, dated 14 October 2026, to acquire Saldo Finance Oy, the Finnish holding company that owns Lithuania-licensed Saldo Bank UAB. Payward, the parent company of the Kraken exchange, currently holds a Central Bank of Ireland electronic money institution licence, which has served as its European regulatory base. The company frames the Saldo acquisition explicitly as an upgrade path, moving from an electronic money institution licence to a full European Union banking licence. The deal is expected to close in 2027, subject to regulatory approval, and financial terms were not publicly disclosed. The stated rationale, attributed to Payward co-chief executive Arjun Sethi, is that a regulated EU bank is the piece that lets the company serve European clients the way a primary financial institution should, with one place to hold assets, move them freely, and put them to work. The transaction's jurisdictional footprint spans Ireland, Lithuania and Finland, reflecting the layered nature of Payward's current and prospective European licensing base.

The second commercial event is Mastercard's opening of a second Dublin office, Two South County, within its Leopardstown European Tech Hub, on 8 October 2026. This expansion lifts Mastercard's Dublin payments-technology headcount past 2,000 people, a substantial increase from the 36 employees the company had in Dublin in 2008. The Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, publicly described the opening as a strong endorsement of Ireland's reputation as a leading location for innovation, technology and digital transformation. Unlike the Payward transaction, this event carries no regulatory-review dimension identified; it is a capital and operational commitment rather than a licensing or acquisition event.

Taken together, these two events illustrate different facets of Ireland's standing in the payments and fintech commercial landscape: one is a licensing-upgrade-oriented acquisition by a crypto-exchange parent using its existing Irish electronic money institution base as a stepping stone to full EU banking status, and the other is a continued scaling of an established global card-scheme operator's Irish technology workforce.

Outlook

The Payward-Saldo transaction's progress toward its expected 2027 completion, and the regulatory approvals it requires across Ireland, Lithuania and Finland, are the clearest forward markers in this space. Should the transaction close as described, Payward's European regulatory base would shift from an Irish electronic money institution licence to a banking licence anchored in the acquired Lithuania-licensed entity, a structural change worth tracking for its implications for the company's European operating model. Mastercard's continued headcount growth in Dublin suggests the city's role as a payments-technology employment hub remains on an upward trajectory, though no further specific expansion announcements beyond the October 2026 office opening were identified.

4 earlier distinct update(s)
Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14

Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Confirmo Limited secured dual MiCA CASP and Payment Institution authorisation from the Central Bank of Ireland, announced April 2026. This is a Confirmed-confidence, discrete commercial event, distinct from any structural market-wide trend: a single named firm obtained both crypto-asset-service authorisation and payment-institution status from the same supervisor, positioning it to offer crypto and stablecoin payment services on an EEA-wide passported basis from a single Irish base. The authorisation was timed ahead of MiCA's transitional grandfathering deadline for existing crypto payment providers, after which unauthorised firms would face restrictions on continuing EU operations.

This is a specific, named commercial development rather than a broader industry-structure observation: it demonstrates that the CBI's authorisation architecture accommodates combined CASP-and-PI business models under a single supervisory relationship, and it establishes a live template that other firms pursuing similar dual-authorisation status could potentially follow. As with all commercial-intelligence items, the value or scale of Confirmo's underlying transaction volumes or business plan were not disclosed within this cycle's evidence set.

Outlook

Watch for whether other crypto-payment firms follow the Confirmo dual-authorisation template at the CBI in subsequent cycles, which would indicate this is becoming a recognised market entry pattern for stablecoin-payments providers seeking EEA-wide reach from an Irish base, rather than a one-off event.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-05

Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Confirmo Limited's dual MiCA CASP and Payment Institution authorisation is this cycle's discrete commercial event for Ireland: a completed product-authorisation milestone, dated April 2026 for the Payment Institution leg following the December 2025 CASP authorisation, with no transaction value or investment amount disclosed. The event is framed commercially as positioning Confirmo among the most comprehensively licensed stablecoin-payment providers in Europe, timed deliberately against the expiry of MiCA's transitional grandfathering arrangements. This is probable-confidence, single-source trade-press intelligence.

Distinct from the structural product-innovation reading under W9, the W13 lens treats this as a specific, dated commercial announcement: parties to the event are Confirmo Limited and the Central Bank of Ireland as the authorising body, the event status is completed, and amount_disclosed is false — the commercial terms or capital backing behind Confirmo's licensing push were not made public in the source reviewed this cycle.

Outlook

Track whether Confirmo announces commercial partnerships or product launches leveraging its combined licence base in the coming cycles, and whether comparable Irish CASPs pursue similar dual-authorisation commercial announcements timed against their own MiCA transition milestones.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-11

Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Cayman Islands-based FundBank acquired Irish blockchain start-up Trrue Chain for approximately EUR 10 million, a completed transaction reported by a single Tier 3 trade-press source and rationalised as part of FundBank's European-market expansion into blockchain capability. Separately, Irish fintechs attracted $259.38 million in disclosed deal value across 2025, up 9% from $237.95 million in 2024, according to a Tier 3 industry report; the largest single deal of the year was Teybridge Capital Europe's $58.61 million raise. On the product side, AIB, Bank of Ireland and PTSB launched Zippay, a bank-led, in-app account-to-account payment service, on 10 March 2026, a specific, dated product release distinct from the structural instant-payments regulatory shift it sits on top of. No transaction value was publicly disclosed for the Zippay launch itself, consistent with its nature as an internally funded product release rather than an M&A transaction. Each of these three items, the FundBank acquisition, the aggregate 2025 funding figure, and the Zippay launch, is recorded here as a discrete commercial event rather than a structural market-trend read, consistent with this module's remit.

Outlook

The $259.38 million 2025 aggregate funding figure, up 9% year-on-year, is the baseline against which subsequent Commercial Intelligence entries for Ireland should be measured; watch particularly for whether PSD3/PSR implementation activity itself becomes a driver of consolidation among smaller non-bank payment institutions seeking scale ahead of the transposition deadline. Further discrete M&A or product-launch events involving Irish-domiciled fintech and payments firms would be the concrete signal of continued commercial momentum in the sector this cycle's evidence base only partially quantifies.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product)

The Central Bank of Ireland authorised multiple new Crypto-Asset Service Providers during 2025, including Kraken's Irish CASP authorisation — a completed product/infrastructure authorisation event rather than a disclosed transaction, with deal value not applicable and amount not publicly disclosed. Ireland is separately reported among the top two EU jurisdictions for MiCA white-paper filings, with more than 150 filings recorded by early 2026, underscoring the jurisdiction's position as a preferred EU base for crypto-asset service provider licensing.

Outlook

Ireland's CASP authorisation volume and white-paper filing position will be tested by the 1 July 2026 MiCA grandfathering closure; further CASP authorisation events and product launches referencing Ireland should be watched for in coming cycles.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://kpmg.com/ie/en/insights/fintech/pulse-of-fintech-h2-2025.htmlretrieved
  2. T3https://www.irishtimes.com/business/2026/02/24/irish-founded-fintech-stripe-valued-at-159bn/retrieved
  3. T3https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ireland/__qo4iDQXalIFuCA3IWeUyREYkELhGSEZhbJdj3Ce45Qgretrieved
  4. T3https://www.siliconrepublic.com/business/stripe-tender-140bn-valuation-fintech-axios-report-irelandretrieved
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Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 14 module(s), 63 finding(s), 173 source(s) in the cumulative register.

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