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title: United States Payments Regulation Monitor | World Payments Monitor
canonical: https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states/
date_modified: 2026-10-21
publisher: Asymmetric Intelligence

# United States

US schema world-payments-v1

trajectory: not yet assessed Last updated 2026-10-21 · 14 modules · 62 sourced findings · 132 sources in the cumulative register

14 Modules baseline.modules[]

62 Findings modules[].findings[]

42 Tier-1 sources run_metadata.t1_source_count

Confidence mix (sums to 14 rendered modules; click to filter)

No modules moved this cycle.

## Member jurisdictions

This page covers United States federal law once. Each member’s page covers its own law, regulators and enforcement (51 of 51 members covered here).

- [United States – Alabama](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-alabama/)
- [United States – Alaska](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-alaska/)
- [United States – Arizona](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-arizona/)
- [United States – Arkansas](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-arkansas/)
- [United States – California](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-california/)
- [United States – Colorado](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-colorado/)
- [United States – Connecticut](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-connecticut/)
- [United States – Delaware](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-delaware/)
- [United States – District of Columbia](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-district-of-columbia/)
- [United States – Florida](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-florida/)
- [United States – Georgia](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-georgia/)
- [United States – Hawaii](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-hawaii/)
- [United States – Idaho](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-idaho/)
- [United States – Illinois](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-illinois/)
- [United States – Indiana](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-indiana/)
- [United States – Iowa](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-iowa/)
- [United States – Kansas](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-kansas/)
- [United States – Kentucky](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-kentucky/)
- [United States – Louisiana](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-louisiana/)
- [United States – Maine](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-maine/)
- [United States – Maryland](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-maryland/)
- [United States – Massachusetts](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-massachusetts/)
- [United States – Michigan](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-michigan/)
- [United States – Minnesota](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-minnesota/)
- [United States – Mississippi](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-mississippi/)
- [United States – Missouri](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-missouri/)
- [United States – Montana](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-montana/)
- [United States – Nebraska](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-nebraska/)
- [United States – Nevada](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-nevada/)
- [United States – New Hampshire](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-new-hampshire/)
- [United States – New Jersey](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-new-jersey/)
- [United States – New Mexico](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-new-mexico/)
- [United States – New York](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-new-york/)
- [United States – North Carolina](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-north-carolina/)
- [United States – North Dakota](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-north-dakota/)
- [United States – Ohio](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-ohio/)
- [United States – Oklahoma](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-oklahoma/)
- [United States – Oregon](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-oregon/)
- [United States – Pennsylvania](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-pennsylvania/)
- [United States – Rhode Island](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-rhode-island/)
- [United States – South Carolina](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-south-carolina/)
- [United States – South Dakota](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-south-dakota/)
- [United States – Tennessee](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-tennessee/)
- [United States – Texas](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-texas/)
- [United States – Utah](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-utah/)
- [United States – Vermont](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-vermont/)
- [United States – Virginia](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-virginia/)
- [United States – Washington](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-washington/)
- [United States – West Virginia](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-west-virginia/)
- [United States – Wisconsin](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-wisconsin/)
- [United States – Wyoming](https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-wyoming/)

## Jurisdiction brief

###### Latest update · 18 October 2026

#### Lead Signal

The US stablecoin compliance stack is converging toward a defined, if not yet final, shape ahead of the GENIUS Act's statutory effective date, which falls no later than 18 January 2027. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has moved its own target for a final GENIUS Act stablecoin-issuer rule forward from November to the end of October 2026, per remarks attributed to Comptroller Jonathan Gould at DC Fintech Week on 15 October 2026. The OCC's prudential and licensing rule is the most advanced single component of the implementation picture, though Treasury's own GENIUS Act Section 3 implementing proposal on stablecoin issuance, offer and sale closed for public comment on 19 October 2026 and remains separately unfinished. The practical effect is that payment stablecoin issuers face a compliance stack still assembling itself piece by piece across three regulators even as the outer statutory deadline approaches.

#### Other Developments

**OCC debanking report finds systemic account-access risk across the largest national banks.** The OCC's supervisory review found that all nine of the largest OCC-supervised national banks maintained, between 2020 and September 2025, policies capable of what the report terms politicized or unlawful debanking, implementing Executive Order 14331. For payment companies and other non-bank entities that depend on correspondent or sponsor-bank relationships with these same large national banks, the finding bears directly on how reliably that access is granted or maintained, independent of any specific enforcement action arising from the review.

**CFPB Section 1033 open-banking rule remains enjoined.** The Personal Financial Data Rights rule, finalized but currently enjoined in Forcht Bank v. CFPB in the Eastern District of Kentucky, has a revised reconsideration proposal pending OIRA review since 6 August 2026, with no published revised rule text identified this cycle. The open-banking and data-portability regime that the rule would establish remains, for now, unsettled.

#### Cross-Monitor Connections

The GENIUS Act rulemaking tracked here intersects directly with the Financial Integrity Monitor's crypto and digital-asset domain, which is separately tracking the same OCC, Treasury and FinCEN rulemaking timelines from an AML and sanctions-compliance angle; the OCC's end-of-October target and the underlying statutory effective date are shared reference points across both lenses. The OCC debanking findings are likewise tracked by the Financial Integrity Monitor as an enabler-jurisdiction-adjacent signal; the same underlying OCC report informs both the conduct and safeguarding reading rendered here and that monitor's governance-and-access reading, without either side re-analysing the other's domain.

#### Outlook

The OCC's 31 October 2026 target for a final GENIUS Act stablecoin rule is the most concrete near-term marker in this cell, as scheduled, though whether it is met on schedule is not yet confirmed. The outer statutory boundary of 18 January 2027 for the full GENIUS Act regime remains fixed in the interim, and the CFPB Section 1033 rule's path out of injunction remains unresolved pending OIRA review of the revised proposal.

_4 earlier updates not shown here._

###### Standing brief · as of 4 July 2026

_Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._

#### Lead Signal

The United States payments operating environment has crossed into a phase of simultaneous structural reform across digital money, card-interchange economics, and anti-money-laundering supervision. The defining instrument of the cycle is the GENIUS Act, which established the first US federal framework for payment stablecoins on enactment July 18, 2025, generally prohibiting issuance by anyone other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer and creating a dual federal/state track with a $10bn opt-in cap. Implementing rulemaking is now actively in train: the OCC issued Bulletin 2026-3 and the FDIC proposed a December 2025 rule adding 12 CFR §303.252, establishing application procedures for FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks and savings associations to issue payment stablecoins through a subsidiary under GENIUS Act section 5. The effective date is the earlier of 18 months after enactment or 120 days after final implementing regulations, and permitted issuers are treated as BSA financial institutions with block, freeze and reject capability and lawful-order compliance obligations.

This is more than a single statute. The GENIUS Act establishes the operative US digital-money instrument and sets the market structure for stablecoin issuance, reserves and federal preemption for the largest payments market, while no US retail central bank digital currency is being pursued. The bank-subsidiary route opened by the FDIC proposal is a distinct entry path for bank PSPs, separate from the broader issuance regime open to non-bank operators. The compliance runway for issuers will turn on the timing of the effective date, and the BSA-institution status carries downstream AML and sanctions obligations that reach into product design.

#### Other Developments

Card-interchange economics face legal disruption on two fronts. A federal district court vacated Regulation II's debit interchange standard in August 2025, on remand from the Supreme Court in the Corner Post litigation, holding the standard contrary to the Durbin Amendment while staying its own vacatur pending Federal Reserve appeal. Separately, the long-running Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1720) reached a revised approximately $38bn settlement announced November 10, 2025, lowering swipe fees 0.1 percentage points for five years, capping standard consumer rates at 1.25% for eight years, and expanding surcharging rights up to 3% — amid heavy merchant opposition and facing 2026 damages trials. The statutory debit cap stands at 21 cents plus 5 basis points plus a 1 cent fraud adjustment for issuers with $10bn or more in assets, with mandatory dual-network routing and an exemption for smaller issuers.

Market-access structures are also shifting. Stripe was granted a Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank charter by Georgia in July 2025, enabling direct Visa and Mastercard access without sponsor banks; the charter is now operative, following the Fiserv precedent. This sits against the foundational US licensing model: a dual federal and state regime under which money transmitters register with FinCEN under the Bank Secrecy Act and additionally hold state Money Transmitter Licences, with no unified EMI or PI regime as in the UK or EEA. In instant payments, FedNow and RTP operate as two competing 24/7/365 irrevocable rails with no adoption mandate and a persistent interoperability gap, while the CFPB's Section 1033 open-banking rule sits in regulatory limbo after the Bureau moved to vacate its 2024 final rule and reopened rulemaking.

AML/CFT supervision is in active modernisation. Sourced from the Sentinel feed, FinCEN proposed an April 7, 2026 rule to shift AML/CFT programs to an effectiveness-based, risk-driven model, alongside a late-December 2025 Southwest-border MSB enforcement operation and a joint FinCEN/OFAC proposal treating permitted stablecoin issuers as BSA financial institutions with mandated sanctions-compliance programs.

#### Cross-Monitor Connections

Several developments carry significance beyond payments. The W11 AML/CFT findings — the FinCEN effectiveness-based NPRM, the Southwest-border MSB enforcement operation, and the GENIUS Act sanctions rules — are sourced from the Sentinel feed and carry illicit-finance significance requiring original analysis in the Financial Integrity Monitor; the World Payments Monitor carries only the payments-context surface. Relatedly, the treatment of permitted stablecoin issuers as BSA financial institutions with block, freeze and reject capability means that sanctions-evasion and illicit-finance use of stablecoins is a matter for the Financial Integrity Monitor rather than a payments conclusion here.

#### Outlook

The near-term horizon is dense. The GENIUS Act effective date is expected around early 2027, gated on OCC, FDIC, Treasury and OFAC rulemaking. The Federal Reserve's appeal of the Regulation II vacatur is expected in the second half of 2026, alongside a separate Fed proposal to lower the base interchange component to 14.4 cents. The MDL 1720 settlement approval and 2026 damages trials are expected to develop through the second quarter, with a New York trial in April and a Chicago trial in September. The FinCEN effectiveness-based AML reform and the CFPB Section 1033 interim final rule remain in proposed or interim stages with uncertain final timing. Acquirer consolidation has reached an inflection point, with Global Payments completing its acquisition of Worldpay on January 9, 2026, alongside the announced Capital One-Discover and Shift4-Global Blue transactions. The cumulative direction is clear: the US is delivering payments resilience and conduct through layered federal supervisory guidance and a state licensing patchwork rather than the unified statutory regimes seen in the UK and EEA, and that structural divergence is hardening even as individual reforms advance.

trust tier: ai_unverified

###### Latest update · 10 July 2026

#### Regulatory Status

US-FED is the national/federal regulatory layer under which the bulk of this cycle's material developments sit. Payment stablecoins now have an operative federal framework: the GENIUS Act, enacted July 18, 2025, establishes PPSI-only issuance under a dual federal/state track with a $10bn opt-in cap, and OCC and FDIC implementing rulemaking — Bulletin 2026-3 and the December 2025 §303.252 NPRM respectively — is actively advancing. Card-network economics face simultaneous legal disruption: the Regulation II debit-interchange standard was vacated in August 2025 (stayed pending Federal Reserve appeal), and the roughly two-decade MDL 1720 litigation produced a contested ~$38bn settlement in November 2025 facing 2026 damages trials. Settlement infrastructure completed a major technical migration with the Fedwire ISO 20022 cutover of July 14, 2025, while correspondent banking continues a structural decline in active-bank numbers despite rising payment volumes. AML/CFT policy is in active modernisation via FinCEN's April 2026 effectiveness-based NPRM, escalating Southwest-border MSB enforcement, and new GENIUS Act stablecoin AML/sanctions rules. Structurally, the US market lacks a unified EMI/PI licensing regime, a DORA-equivalent operational-resilience statute, and a mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement regime — resilience and conduct instead being delivered through layered federal supervisory guidance (the 2023 Interagency Third-Party Relationships guidance) atop a 49-state MTL licensing patchwork. Open banking (Section 1033) remains in regulatory limbo pending a planned interim final rule, and instant payments continue on two non-interoperable rails, FedNow and RTP.

#### Outlook

Through the remainder of 2026, the key federal-level events to track are: the GENIUS Act's effective-date trigger (the earlier of eighteen months post-enactment or 120 days post-final-rules); the Federal Reserve's appeal of the Regulation II vacatur; the MDL 1720 settlement approval process and its two 2026 damages trials; FinCEN's progress toward a final AML/CFT effectiveness-based rule; and the CFPB's planned interim final rule on Section 1033 open banking. Collectively these converging tracks will determine how much of the current regulatory flux settles into fixed market structure this year.

###### Standing brief · as of 4 July 2026

_Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._

#### Regulatory Status

The United States at the federal layer is in a phase of active reform converging across stablecoins, AML, interchange and open banking, with an overall risk level assessed as Monitored. The defining federal instrument is the GENIUS Act, enacted July 18, 2025, which established the first US federal framework for payment stablecoins, with implementing rulemaking by the OCC (Bulletin 2026-3) and the FDIC (proposed 12 CFR §303.252) advancing through 2026. The licensing baseline is a dual federal/state model: FinCEN MSB registration under the Bank Secrecy Act plus state Money Transmitter Licences, with no unified EMI or PI regime as in the UK or EEA.

On conduct and consumer protection, the EFTA/Regulation E framework governs electronic payments, with no mandatory authorised-push-payment reimbursement regime — a continuing gap relative to the UK. The CFPB issued a January 15, 2025 EFTA/Regulation E Compliance Aid clarifying error-resolution obligations across non-bank P2P providers and depository institutions. Operational resilience is delivered through the 2023 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships rather than a DORA-style statute. On card economics, the Regulation II debit interchange standard was vacated in August 2025 (stayed pending Federal Reserve appeal), against a statutory cap of 21 cents plus 5 basis points plus 1 cent; the MDL 1720 credit-interchange litigation reached a revised approximately $38bn settlement in November 2025. AML/CFT supervision is modernising via the FinCEN April 7, 2026 effectiveness-based NPRM and the joint FinCEN/OFAC GENIUS Act stablecoin sanctions rules (Sentinel-fed). Instant payments run on dual FedNow and RTP rails with an interoperability gap, and CFPB Section 1033 open banking sits in regulatory limbo. On settlement, Fedwire completed its ISO 20022 cutover on July 14, 2025, and master-account access is governed by the Federal Reserve's August 2022 Account Access Guidelines, under which Reserve Bank discretion is the structural constraint on novel charters.

#### Outlook

The federal trajectory is one of converging reform: the GENIUS Act, the FinCEN AML NPRM and the Regulation II vacatur are converging across 2025-2026. Key horizons include the GENIUS Act effective date around early 2027, the Regulation II appeal in the second half of 2026 alongside the Fed's 14.4 cent proposal, the FinCEN AML reform through the second half of 2026, the CFPB Section 1033 interim final rule around the first quarter of 2026, and the MDL 1720 settlement approval and damages trials through the second quarter of 2026. The overall federal risk level is Monitored on an active-reform trajectory; this trust tier is ai_unverified pending lawyer-diff.

trust tier: ai_unverified

###### Latest update · 10 July 2026

#### Regulatory Status

Georgia is the jurisdiction of the Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank (MALPB) charter regime, a sub-national state-chartering route that grants direct Visa/Mastercard scheme access without reliance on a sponsor bank. Stripe's MALPB charter application was accepted March 31, 2025, and the charter was granted in July 2025 and is now operative — correcting earlier reporting that had characterised it as still pending. This follows the precedent set by Fiserv, the first entity to process transactions under a Georgia MALPB charter, in April 2025.

#### Outlook

The Georgia MALPB route is maturing as a market-access channel and is likely to attract further applicants seeking to replicate the direct-scheme-access model that Stripe and Fiserv have now both established; its growth is likely to be shaped by how the Federal Reserve's master-account discretion under its 2022 Account Access Guidelines treats MALPB-chartered entities seeking settlement access alongside scheme access.

###### Standing brief · as of 4 July 2026

_Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._

#### Regulatory Status

Georgia's significance in the US payments map is the maturation of the Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank charter route, with the state's risk level assessed as Monitored. Stripe was granted a Georgia MALPB charter in July 2025, with the application accepted on 31 March 2025, enabling direct Visa and Mastercard access without sponsor banks; the charter is now operative. This follows the Fiserv precedent as the first entity to process under an MALPB charter in April 2025. The MALPB route is a state-level licensing pathway that allows a non-bank acquirer to obtain direct scheme access historically mediated by bank sponsors, and it is the distinguishing feature of Georgia's regulatory profile.

#### Outlook

Georgia's MALPB charter route is maturing as a recognised pathway, now demonstrated operationally through both Fiserv and Stripe. The trajectory is one of a maturing charter route. A material adjacent constraint sits at the federal layer: even with a Georgia MALPB charter, direct settlement access turns on Federal Reserve master-account discretion under the August 2022 Account Access Guidelines, where legal eligibility alone does not guarantee an account. Georgia's risk level is Monitored; this trust tier is ai_unverified pending lawyer-diff.

trust tier: ai_unverified

###### Latest update · 10 July 2026

#### Regulatory Status

Montana is the canonical outlier in the US state Money Transmitter Licence (MTL) landscape, exempting most money transmission activity from state licensing requirements that apply in the other 48 states. Where other states require surety bonds that can reach $500,000 or more (as in California), Montana's bond requirement is as low as $250, reflecting its broader exemption posture and standing as the reference case for federalised regulatory divergence within the US licensing model.

#### Outlook

Montana's exemption is likely to remain a standing structural outlier absent a move toward a unified federal licensing regime; it continues to be the reference point cited whenever the fragmentation costs of the 49-state MTL patchwork are assessed against unified alternatives.

###### Standing brief · as of 4 July 2026

_Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._

#### Regulatory Status

Montana is the canonical federalised-divergence outlier in the US state licensing patchwork, with a risk level assessed as Monitored. Montana exempts most money transmission from state Money Transmitter Licence requirements — the canonical exemption case in a model where a licence is otherwise required in 49 states. Within the state surety-bond range that runs from $250 in Montana to $500,000 or more in California, Montana sits at the low end, illustrating the scale of state-level cost divergence in US market-access economics for non-bank payment service providers. This is a non-bank PI/EMI matter, bearing on the licensing burden for money transmitters.

#### Outlook

Montana's exemption is the standing reference point for US sub-national money-transmitter divergence, and the trajectory is that of an exemption outlier. State-level money-transmitter divergence remains an under-indexed area, with bond and net-worth data currently sourced from vendor and law-firm guides rather than NMLS primary data; primary-source confirmation would strengthen the picture. Montana's risk level is Monitored and this position is asserted at Assessed confidence; this trust tier is ai_unverified pending lawyer-diff.

trust tier: ai_unverified

###### Latest update · 18 October 2026

#### Regulatory Status

The United States' payments regulatory environment this cycle is defined by the continuing, multi-regulator implementation of the GENIUS Act stablecoin framework and by a systemic conduct finding concerning account-access practice at the largest national banks. On licensing and market access, the OCC has accelerated its own target for a final GENIUS Act stablecoin-issuer rule to the end of October 2026, the most advanced single component of a compliance stack that also includes Treasury's Section 3 implementing proposal, which closed for comment on 19 October 2026 without yet resolving reserve, redemption-right or deposit-insurance-disclosure requirements. The outer statutory deadline for the full GENIUS Act regime remains fixed at no later than 18 January 2027.

On conduct and safeguarding, the OCC's finding that all nine of the largest OCC-supervised national banks maintained policies between 2020 and September 2025 capable of politicized or unlawful debanking, implementing Executive Order 14331, is a systemic rather than isolated finding. It bears directly on the reliability of banking access for payment companies and other non-bank entities that depend on correspondent or sponsor-bank relationships with these institutions, independent of whether any formal enforcement action follows.

#### Outlook

The OCC's end-of-October 2026 target for a final GENIUS Act rule, as scheduled, and the fixed 18 January 2027 outer statutory deadline for the full GENIUS Act regime are the two clearest near-term markers for this jurisdiction. Whether the OCC debanking findings produce supervisory guidance, remediation requirements or rulemaking remains an open question with no formal follow-through identified as of this cycle.

_1 earlier update not shown here._

###### Standing brief · as of 6 October 2026

_Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._

#### Regulatory Status

United States payments regulation this cycle is marked by state-level, not federal, movement. Florida's payment-stablecoin issuer regime (Fla. Stat. 658.997) entered into force on 1 October 2026, requiring a trust company to hold a certificate of approval or an exemption before engaging in qualified payment stablecoin issuance, backed by a one-to-one reserve requirement, monthly reserve-composition disclosure and monthly CPA examination. The statute also sets a scale-based trigger requiring transition to federal oversight within 360 days once consolidated issuance reaches $10 billion, absent a waiver. Separately, Maryland's SB0261 (Chapter 21), also effective 1 October 2026, narrows the Maryland Money Transmission Act's money transmitter definition to exclude a payor's agent providing payroll-processing services under specified conditions.

#### Outlook

The Florida transition trigger is the clearest marker so far of how a state stablecoin regime is designed to cede ground to federal oversight once an issuer reaches scale, with current visibility placing any such transition in the 2027 fourth quarter window. Both the Florida and Maryland measures point to state legislatures as the active rule-making layer for payments and digital-money licensing questions in the United States at present.

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### W1a Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

CFPB's Section 1033 (Personal Financial Data Rights / open-banking) rule remains enjoined and under full reconsideration; a new reconsideration NPRM was submitted to OIRA in August 2026. The original phased compliance schedule beginning April 2026 for the largest data providers did not take effect as a binding obligation.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 450 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The United States regulates non-bank payments operators through a dual federal and state model that has no direct equivalent in the UK or EEA. At the federal layer, money transmitters and money services businesses must register with FinCEN under the Bank Secrecy Act; at the state layer they must additionally hold Money Transmitter Licences. There is no unified EMI or PI regime. FinCEN registration via Form 107 within 180 days does not satisfy state licensing — firms need both — and the model is further federalised, with Montana exempting most money transmission. This dual structure defines the entire market-access cost structure for any non-bank operator entering the US, layering dual registration onto a 49-state licensing burden.

The state Money Transmitter Licence regime imposes an NMLS application, FBI fingerprint checks, surety bonds in the range of roughly $25,000 to $2,000,000 or more, and minimum tangible net worth typically between $100,000 and $500,000; bonds themselves range from $250 in Montana to $500,000 or more in California. This state-level cost divergence is a material and under-indexed factor in US market-access economics for non-bank payment service providers. A licence is required in 49 states, with Montana the canonical exemption case; the sub-national nesting runs from US-FED down to states such as Montana, New York and California. This specification rests on Tier-3 vendor and law-firm sourcing and is asserted at Assessed confidence.

The live development this cycle is the maturation of the Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank route. Stripe was granted an MALPB charter by Georgia in July 2025, with the application accepted on 31 March 2025, enabling direct Visa and Mastercard access without sponsor banks; the charter is now operative. This corrects an earlier research position that had presented the matter as a pending April 2025 application — the verified position is that the charter was granted and is operative. Direct scheme access without sponsor-bank reliance is a structural shift in non-bank acquiring, mirroring the Fiserv precedent as the first entity to process under an MALPB charter in April 2025. This is a non-bank PI/EMI development: it concerns how a non-bank operator achieves direct scheme access that has historically been mediated by bank sponsors.

#### Outlook

The MALPB charter route is maturing as a recognised pathway for non-bank acquirers to obtain direct scheme access, and Georgia has now demonstrated the route operationally through both Fiserv and Stripe. State-level money-transmitter divergence remains an under-indexed area: bond and net-worth data is currently sourced from vendor and law-firm guides rather than NMLS primary data, and primary-source confirmation would strengthen confidence above Assessed. The dual federal/state model is established standing knowledge and is unlikely to converge toward a unified regime in the near term.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The licensing picture for payment stablecoin issuance under the GENIUS Act continues to assemble on a multi-regulator timetable rather than through a single licence. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which has emerged as the most advanced of the three principal implementing regulators, now intends to publish its final GENIUS Act stablecoin-issuer rule by the end of October 2026, moved forward from an earlier November target. This acceleration was attributed to Comptroller Jonathan Gould in remarks made 15 October 2026 at DC Fintech Week, and covers the licensing, activities and prudential-framework conditions applicable to OCC-regulated payment stablecoin issuers.

This single-regulator acceleration should be read against the wider market-access picture rather than in isolation. The statutory effective date for the full GENIUS Act regime remains no later than 18 January 2027, and the OCC's rule, even if finalized on its stated end-of-October target, is one component among several still-unfinished pieces, including Treasury's parallel Section 3 implementing proposal on issuance, offer and sale, which itself closed for comment on 19 October 2026. A prospective issuer seeking market access therefore faces a compliance stack that is converging but not yet complete: the prudential and licensing conditions may settle before the broader statutory framework does, creating a sequencing question for any entity planning to enter the market as a permitted payment stablecoin issuer in the near term.

The acceleration itself is also informative as a signal of regulatory intent. Moving a target date forward, rather than extending it, suggests the OCC views the underlying rule as sufficiently mature to finalize ahead of its own prior schedule, which in turn may put pressure on Treasury and other implementing regulators to similarly firm up their own timetables as the January 2027 statutory deadline approaches. Market participants assessing when a GENIUS Act licence pathway will be fully operable should treat the OCC's rule as the leading indicator rather than the complete picture.

#### Outlook

Whether the OCC in fact meets its end-of-October 2026 target, as scheduled, is the most immediate marker to watch in this module. Separately, whether Treasury's Section 3 proposal proceeds to a final rule on a comparable timetable, or lags behind the OCC's own schedule, will determine how complete the overall market-access picture is well ahead of the outer 18 January 2027 statutory deadline.

**3 earlier distinct update(s)**

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-06

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Maryland enacted SB0261 as Chapter 21, effective 1 October 2026, altering the definition of money transmitter under the Maryland Money Transmission Act. The amendment excludes a person designated as an agent of a payor, for purposes of that agent's provision of payroll-processing services, from the licensing definition under certain specified circumstances. The effect is to remove a defined category of payroll-processing activity from Maryland's money transmitter licensing perimeter rather than to alter the licensing regime generally.

#### Outlook

The carve-out is narrow and targeted at payroll-processing agents specifically, so its near-term effect is confined to that business model within Maryland. Watch for whether other states adopt a similar exclusion for payroll-processing agents as they revisit their own money transmitter definitions.

Periodic update · new data 2026-09-28

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The Section 1033 open-banking rule, promulgated under the Consumer Financial Protection Act's data-rights provisions, remains procedurally unsettled. A federal court in the Eastern District of Kentucky enjoined CFPB enforcement of the October 2024 final rule while the Bureau conducts a full reconsideration, and as a direct consequence the phased compliance schedule that would have begun in April 2026 for the largest covered data providers did not take effect as a binding market-access obligation. This affects both bank and non-bank participants in the open-banking data-sharing chain: the rule as originally written applied to data providers regardless of charter type, so the injunction's practical effect is to leave the entire covered population, banks and non-bank account-information intermediaries alike, without an enforceable compliance deadline.

Rather than abandoning the underlying mandate, the CFPB has continued to advance a revised approach. In August 2026 the Bureau submitted a new proposed rule, Personal Financial Data Rights Reconsideration, to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for review, a step that precedes Federal Register publication and public comment. This signals institutional intent to preserve some form of consumer financial-data access right, even as the specific compliance architecture, timelines, and scope for both bank and non-bank market participants remain to be determined through the reconsideration process. A lower-tier tracker separately corroborated that the original April 1, 2026 deadline for the largest data providers lapsed without triggering enforcement, consistent with the injunction.

#### Outlook

The determinative event to track is the Federal Register publication of the CFPB's reconsideration NPRM, which will disclose the substantive scope of any revised open-banking access obligations. Until that publication and the subsequent comment period conclude, market-access planning for both bank and non-bank data providers in the open-banking space cannot be anchored to a fixed compliance date.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

The United States operates a dual federal/state licensing model for payment firms that has no unified EMI/PI equivalent to the UK or EEA regimes. At the federal layer, money transmitters and other money services businesses (MSBs) must register with FinCEN under the Bank Secrecy Act; at the state layer, the same firms typically also require a Money Transmitter Licence (MTL) in each state where they operate, with 49 states requiring an MTL and only Montana exempting most money transmission activity from state licensing — the canonical case of US federalised divergence. Critically, FinCEN registration via Form 107, which must be completed within 180 days of commencing MSB activity, does not substitute for state licensing: operators need both tracks simultaneously to be compliant nationally.

The state MTL track itself carries a materially heavier compliance burden than federal registration alone. Applicants must complete NMLS applications, undergo FBI fingerprint background checks, and post surety bonds ranging from approximately $25,000 up to more than $2,000,000 depending on the state, while maintaining minimum tangible net worth typically between $100,000 and $500,000. Bond requirements alone diverge enormously by state — from as little as $250 in Montana to more than $500,000 in California — making state-level cost divergence a materially under-indexed factor in US market-access economics for non-bank payment service providers assessing where to establish operations.

Set against this fragmented backdrop, the clearest structural development of the period is Stripe's Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank (MALPB) charter from the state of Georgia. Stripe's application was accepted March 31, 2025, and — correcting earlier reporting that had characterised the charter as still pending — the charter was in fact granted in July 2025 and is now operative. The MALPB charter enables Stripe to obtain direct Visa and Mastercard scheme access without relying on a sponsor bank, mirroring the precedent set by Fiserv, which became the first entity to process transactions under a MALPB charter in April 2025. This is a structural shift in how non-bank acquirers can access card networks in the United States, reducing dependence on the sponsor-bank model that currently defines market access for the large majority of non-bank PSPs.

#### Outlook

The MALPB charter route is likely to mature further as a market-access channel for other non-bank acquirers seeking to replicate Stripe's and Fiserv's direct-access model, while the underlying federal/state licensing patchwork — and its associated state-by-state bond and net-worth divergence — remains a standing structural feature of US market entry with no unification currently in prospect. Montana's exemption will continue to stand as the reference case for federalised regulatory divergence in this space.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (5)**

1. T2 Wolters Kluwer / FinCEN — At the federal level, money transmitters are treated as Money Services Businesses (MSBs); with few exceptions, every MSB must register with the US Treasury via the BSA e-Filing System using FinCEN Form 107 within 180 days of establishment.
2. T1 FinCEN Fact Sheet on MSB Registration Rule — FinCEN MSB registration does NOT satisfy state licensing; firms need both FinCEN registration AND state money transmitter licences in every state where they operate.
3. T3 Remitso state-by-state guide — An MTL is required in 49 US states to send or receive money on behalf of others; Montana exempts most money transmission from state licensing — the canonical federalised divergence case (nest US-FED -> US-MT/US-NY/US-CA).
4. T2 State money transmitter laws / MTL (NMLS) — primary statutes — State MTL requirements include NMLS application, FBI fingerprint background checks, surety bonds ranging from roughly $25,000 to $2,000,000+, and minimum tangible net worth typically $100,000–$500,000; bonds/fees range from $250 (Montana) to $500,000+ (California).
5. T3 Mordor Intelligence US Payments Market — Stripe applied in April 2025 for a Merchant Acquirer Limited Purpose Bank (MALPB) charter in Georgia to reduce reliance on sponsor banks and gain direct access to Visa and Mastercard networks, mirroring Fiserv's precedent.

### W1b Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

The US lacks a unified safeguarding regime equivalent to UK CASS or EEA PSD2. State MTLs impose 'permissible investments' requirements: licensees must hold qualifying liquid assets equal to outstanding payment obligations, backed by surety bonds and minimum net worth. Conduct is enforced through state regulators (examinations at licensee expense), federal BSA/AML obligations, and CFPB consumer-protection authority. There is no single federal financial-promotions regime for payments.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 319 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

#### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

The US payments safeguarding mechanism operates through state Money Transmitter Licence 'permissible investments' — qualifying liquid assets equal to outstanding payment obligations — backed by surety bonds and minimum net worth, with no unified federal CASS or PSD2-equivalent safeguarding regime. These permissible investments function as the US customer-fund-protection mechanism, administered at state level with examinations conducted at the licensee's expense. This is a non-bank PI/EMI matter: it is the protection framework applied to customer funds held by non-bank money transmitters, and it stands in contrast to the UK CASS and EEA PSD2 safeguarding regimes. The fragmented, state-administered character of this protection is an under-indexed customer-fund-protection divergence for operators comparing jurisdictions, and it is asserted at Assessed confidence on Tier-3 sourcing.

There is no single federal financial-promotions regime for payments; oversight is fragmented across the CFPB, the FTC and state attorneys general. On conduct, the CFPB issued a January 15, 2025 EFTA/Regulation E Compliance Aid clarifying that both non-bank P2P providers and the depository institution hold error-resolution obligations, and that private network rules offering less protection than federal law cannot be relied upon. This allocates error-resolution liability across non-bank P2P providers and account-holding banks, raising compliance exposure for P2P operators. The distinction here is explicit: the obligation reaches both bank PSPs (the account-holding depository institution) and non-bank providers (the P2P platform), and neither can rely on private network rules to escape the federal floor.

#### Outlook

The state permissible-investments model is established standing knowledge as the US safeguarding equivalent, and there is no current signal of movement toward a unified federal safeguarding regime. The CFPB Compliance Aid is at Monitored impact; its practical effect is to clarify existing EFTA/Regulation E obligations rather than to impose new ones, but it sharpens the liability allocation between non-bank P2P providers and depository institutions. Financial-promotions oversight remains fragmented, and that fragmentation is itself a standing feature of the conduct landscape.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

#### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

The most significant conduct-related development this cycle is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's finding that all nine of the largest OCC-supervised national banks maintained policies between 2020 and September 2025 capable of amounting to politicized or unlawful debanking. The review was undertaken to implement Executive Order 14331, "Guaranteeing Fair Banking for All Americans," and its scope -- the entire top tier of federally supervised national banks, not a sample -- makes this a systemic conduct finding rather than an isolated institutional matter.

For payment companies, fintechs and other non-bank entities whose own market access depends on correspondent or sponsor-bank relationships with precisely these large national banks, the finding has a direct bearing on counterparty conduct risk. A bank's reputational-risk-based account-access policy, applied inconsistently or on a basis later characterized as politicized, is functionally a conduct question about how fairly and predictably access to banking services is extended to higher-risk-perceived customer segments, including payment and crypto-adjacent businesses that have historically been more exposed to de-risking decisions of this kind.

No enforcement action or formal remediation order has been identified as flowing from the OCC's findings as of this cycle. That absence is itself worth noting rather than passing over: a published systemic finding without an accompanying remediation mandate leaves open whether the OCC's intended follow-through will take the form of supervisory guidance, bank-specific remediation plans, or a future rulemaking, each of which would carry different practical consequences for how account-access conduct is governed going forward.

#### Outlook

The central question for this module going forward is whether the OCC's debanking findings translate into supervisory guidance, remediation requirements, or rulemaking, none of which had been announced as of this cycle. Entities dependent on sponsor-bank relationships with the nine reviewed institutions should anticipate continued supervisory attention to account-access conduct, independent of whether any formal action against a specific bank ultimately follows.

**1 earlier distinct update(s)**

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions

US customer-fund protection for payments operates through the same state Money Transmitter Licence framework that governs market access, rather than through a unified federal safeguarding regime. The operative mechanism is the 'permissible investments' requirement embedded in state MTL regimes: licensees must hold qualifying liquid assets equal to their outstanding payment obligations, backed additionally by surety bonds and minimum tangible net worth, with compliance examined state-by-state at the licensee's expense. This stands in clear contrast to the UK's CASS safeguarding regime and the EEA's PSD2 safeguarding rules, both of which operate as unified frameworks; the US model is fragmented and state-administered, a divergence in customer-fund protection that is under-indexed relative to its practical significance for operators comparing jurisdictions. There is similarly no single federal financial-promotions regime for payments products: oversight of promotional conduct is split across the CFPB, the FTC, and state attorneys general, rather than concentrated in one supervisory body.

On conduct specifically, the CFPB issued a Compliance Aid on January 15, 2025 addressing Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E obligations for peer-to-peer payment services. The Aid clarifies that both non-bank P2P providers and the depository institutions that hold the underlying consumer accounts carry error-resolution obligations under Regulation E, and — significantly for platform operators — that private network rules purporting to offer less consumer protection than federal law cannot be relied upon to limit liability. This allocates error-resolution exposure across both non-bank P2P operators and account-holding banks, raising compliance exposure specifically for the non-bank side of P2P arrangements.

#### Outlook

Absent a move toward a unified federal safeguarding or financial-promotions regime, the state-by-state permissible-investments model and the CFPB/FTC/state-AG conduct split are likely to remain the standing US architecture for the near term; the practical compliance question for P2P and non-bank operators is how strictly the January 2025 EFTA/Reg E Compliance Aid is enforced in practice.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T1 State MSB/MTL statutes & FinCEN MSB registration (fincen.gov) — State MTL holders must maintain permissible investments — qualifying liquid assets equal to outstanding payment obligations — alongside surety bonds and minimum tangible net worth, functioning as the US safeguarding mechanism.
2. T2 Wolters Kluwer — As part of MTL processes, licensees may be subject to examinations by state regulators (generally at the licensee's expense) and must submit audited reports including executive background, surety bonds, minimum net worth and/or collateral requirements.
3. T2 finhost.io / FinCEN — Federally, MSBs must maintain an anti-money-laundering program, keep records of certain transactions, conduct KYC/KYB, monitor transactions and file SARs to FinCEN, under the BSA (31 CFR 1010.100(ff)).
4. T2 CFPB regulations (consumerfinance.gov) — CFPB issued a January 15, 2025 EFTA/Regulation E Compliance Aid clarifying that both non-bank P2P payment providers and the depository institution holding the consumer's account have error-resolution obligations, and that private network rules offering less protection than federal law cannot be relied upon.

### W2 Stablecoins & Digital Money Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

The GENIUS Act (enacted July 18, 2025) established the first US federal framework for payment stablecoins, generally prohibiting issuance by anyone other than a 'permitted payment stablecoin issuer' (PPSI). It creates a dual federal/state track: issuers under $10bn outstanding may opt into a certified 'substantially similar' state regime; above the cap they must transition to the federal regime within 360 days or obtain a waiver. Implementing rulemaking by OCC, FDIC, Treasury/FinCEN and OFAC is in train as of 2026; the effective date is the earlier of 18 months after enactment or 120 days after final rules.

Horizon · 2027-01 (±half_year) GENIUS Act effective date_in_force_pending · T1_

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 388 words · last cycle 2026-10-18

#### Stablecoins & Digital Money

The GENIUS Act (S.1582) is the defining development of this cycle and the operative US digital-money instrument. Enacted July 18, 2025, it established the first US federal framework for payment stablecoins, generally prohibiting issuance by anyone other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer (PPSI), and creating a dual federal/state track with a $10bn opt-in cap. Issuers under $10bn may opt into a 'substantially similar' certified state regime; those above the cap must transition to the federal regime within 360 days or obtain a waiver. The framework sets the market structure for stablecoin issuance, reserves and federal preemption for the largest payments market in the world, and applies to both bank and non-bank issuers.

The effective date is the earlier of 18 months after the July 18, 2025 enactment or 120 days after final implementing regulations. PPSIs are treated as BSA financial institutions with block, freeze and reject capability and lawful-order compliance obligations. The timing of the effective date therefore determines the compliance runway for issuers, while the BSA-institution status carries AML and sanctions obligations that affect product design; the AML and sanctions dimension is routed to W11 and the Financial Integrity Monitor.

Implementing rulemaking is actively advancing. The FDIC proposed a December 2025 notice of proposed rulemaking adding 12 CFR §303.252, establishing application procedures for FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks and savings associations to issue payment stablecoins through a subsidiary under GENIUS Act section 5. This opens a bank-subsidiary route to stablecoin issuance for FDIC-supervised institutions — a bank PSP pathway distinct from the broader PPSI issuance regime available to non-bank operators — and is a key channel for bank-led stablecoin product entry. The OCC's Bulletin 2026-3 is the corresponding OCC implementation step. No US retail CBDC is being pursued, leaving regulated stablecoins as the operative federal digital-money instrument.

#### Outlook

The GENIUS Act effective date is expected around early 2027, gated on the earlier-of trigger and on rulemaking by the OCC, FDIC, Treasury and OFAC, which remains in train through 2026. A known under-indexed area is the absence of detail on which states will be certified as 'substantially similar' under the $10bn opt-in track; sub-national stablecoin divergence is a recognised gap. The trajectory is escalating: the federal framework is established, bank-subsidiary issuance procedures are advancing, and the AML/sanctions overlay is being built out in parallel.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18

#### Stablecoins & Digital Money

Implementation of the GENIUS Act's payment stablecoin framework continues across parallel regulatory tracks this cycle, with the statutory effective date for the full regime remaining no later than 18 January 2027. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has the most advanced single component, having moved its final-rule target for stablecoin-issuer licensing and prudential requirements forward to the end of October 2026. Separately, the US Department of the Treasury's proposed rule implementing GENIUS Act Section 3, covering stablecoin issuance, offer and sale, closed for public comment on 19 October 2026; this was a comment-deadline event rather than an effective date, and the proposal as drafted sets no reserve, redemption-right or deposit-insurance-disclosure requirements, leaving those elements to be addressed either in the final Section 3 rule or elsewhere in the implementing framework.

The overall picture is one of a compliance stack assembling itself in pieces across OCC, Treasury and other implementing bodies rather than arriving as a single completed regime. This sequencing matters for market participants: an issuer evaluating readiness for the January 2027 statutory deadline cannot rely on any single regulator's timetable as a proxy for the whole framework's completion, since the OCC's prudential and licensing rule, even if finalized on schedule, would not itself resolve the reserve, redemption and disclosure questions that sit within Treasury's separate rulemaking.

Taken together with the licensing-track developments addressed elsewhere this cycle, the stablecoin regime's defining characteristic at this stage remains its incompleteness relative to the fixed statutory deadline. The regulatory direction is unambiguously toward implementation, with no indication of delay to the statutory effective date itself, but the detailed compliance content that issuers will need to operate against remains only partially settled.

#### Outlook

The key near-term markers are the OCC's end-of-October 2026 final-rule target, as scheduled, and whether Treasury's Section 3 rule, following its 19 October 2026 comment-period close, proceeds to a final rule that addresses reserve, redemption-right and deposit-insurance-disclosure requirements left open in the proposal. Both tracks remain subordinate to the fixed outer statutory deadline of no later than 18 January 2027, which has not moved.

**2 earlier distinct update(s)**

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-06

#### Stablecoins & Digital Money

Florida's payment-stablecoin issuer regime under Fla. Stat. 658.997 took effect on 1 October 2026. The statute provides that a trust company may not engage in the activity of a qualified payment stablecoin issuer in Florida unless it obtains a certificate of approval or is exempted from that certificate requirement under the section. Beyond the licensing gate itself, the regime imposes a reserve-backing requirement across Chapter 658: a qualified payment stablecoin issuer must maintain identifiable reserves backing its outstanding payment stablecoins on at least a one-to-one basis. The regime further requires monthly disclosure of reserve composition and monthly CPA examination of those reserves, giving the state a recurring verification mechanism rather than a one-off licensing check.

The statute also sets a scale-based transition mechanism: once a qualified issuer's consolidated payment-stablecoin issuance reaches $10 billion, the issuer must transition to federal oversight within 360 days, absent a waiver. On current information this trigger is not expected to activate before the 2027 fourth quarter, but the mechanism itself - a state regime explicitly designed to hand off to federal oversight once an issuer crosses a defined scale threshold - is a structural feature worth tracking independent of when any single issuer actually crosses it.

#### Outlook

Florida's reserve, disclosure and examination requirements are now in force and apply to any trust company conducting qualified payment stablecoin issuance in the state. The federal-oversight transition trigger introduces a multi-year horizon item: watch issuance volumes against the $10 billion consolidated threshold, and watch whether other states adopt Florida's certificate-plus-reserve-backing structure as a template for their own stablecoin issuer regimes.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Stablecoins & Digital Money

The GENIUS Act (S.1582), enacted July 18, 2025, is the first US federal framework for payment stablecoins and now functions as the operative digital-money instrument for the US payments system. The Act generally prohibits stablecoin issuance by anyone other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer (PPSI), and establishes a dual federal/state track: issuers below a $10bn threshold may opt into a state regime certified as 'substantially similar' to the federal standard, while issuers that grow beyond the cap must transition to the federal regime within 360 days or secure a waiver. The Act's effective date is fixed as the earlier of eighteen months after the July 18, 2025 enactment date or 120 days after final implementing regulations are issued — meaning the actual compliance start date depends on how quickly OCC, FDIC, Treasury and OFAC complete their rulemaking. Under the Act, PPSIs are treated as Bank Secrecy Act financial institutions, carrying block, freeze and reject capability and an obligation to comply with lawful orders — obligations with direct AML/sanctions compliance implications for product design.

Implementation is now visibly in train at the federal banking agencies. The OCC's Bulletin 2026-3 sets out a notice of proposed rulemaking for the GENIUS Act regulations. The FDIC followed in December 2025 with its own notice of proposed rulemaking, adding 12 CFR §303.252 to establish application procedures under which FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks and savings associations can issue payment stablecoins through a subsidiary, pursuant to GENIUS Act section 5 — opening a bank-subsidiary route to stablecoin issuance specifically for FDIC-supervised institutions. Taken together with FinCEN and OFAC's April 2026 joint proposal mandating effective sanctions-compliance programs for PPSIs (the first time such a requirement has been legally mandated for stablecoin issuers), the picture is one of an actively escalating implementation architecture around a framework that is already in force in statute.

Notably, no US retail central bank digital currency is being pursued; the GENIUS Act framework — private, regulated stablecoin issuance operating under a federal/state dual track — is the model the United States has chosen for digital public money, positioning stablecoin issuance rather than a sovereign digital dollar as the operative vehicle for dollar-denominated digital money.

#### Outlook

The effective-date mechanics mean the practical compliance deadline is likely to fall around early 2027 (eighteen months after July 2025 enactment), though a faster 120-day-after-final-rules trigger remains possible if OCC/FDIC/Treasury/OFAC rulemaking concludes early. Through the remainder of 2026, expect continued rulemaking activity across all four agencies, further clarity on which state regimes will secure 'substantially similar' certification for issuers under the $10bn cap, and the finalisation of the FinCEN/OFAC sanctions-compliance requirements for PPSIs.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (5)**

1. T1 OCC Bulletin 2026-3 — The GENIUS Act was enacted July 18, 2025 and generally prohibits any person other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer from issuing a payment stablecoin in the United States, establishing a regulatory framework for payment stablecoin activities.
2. T3 Paul Hastings — The Act provides clear federal preemption of host-state licensing/chartering for federal qualified payment issuers and approved IDI/credit-union subsidiaries (Sec. 5(h)); issuers under $10bn consolidated outstanding may opt into a state regime certified 'substantially similar' by a Stablecoin Certification Review Committee (Treasury, Fed, FDIC).
3. T1 Paul Hastings / OCC — Once a state-qualified issuer exceeds the $10bn cap it must transition to the federal regime within 360 days or obtain a federal waiver; the GENIUS Act effective date is the earlier of 18 months after July 18, 2025 enactment or 120 days after final implementing regulations.
4. T1 Congress.gov S.1582 text — PPSIs are treated as BSA financial institutions, subject to AML, sanctions, customer identification and due-diligence obligations, and must have the technological capability to block, freeze and reject impermissible transactions and comply with lawful orders.
5. T1 FDIC press release / Federal Register — FDIC approved a notice of proposed rulemaking (Dec 2025) adding §303.252 establishing application procedures for FDIC-supervised state nonmember banks/savings associations to issue payment stablecoins through a subsidiary under section 5 of the GENIUS Act.

### W3 Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

The US has no single statutory operational-resilience regime equivalent to EU DORA; resilience is delivered through supervisory guidance from the prudential banking agencies. The cornerstone is the June 2023 Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management (Fed/FDIC/OCC), applying to all supervised banking organisations. Operational resilience and cybersecurity remain top supervisory priorities per the OCC's FY2025 operating plan.

Kept on Dataprotection.gi, not restated here: data and cloud switching obligations on service providers, including notice periods and charges. [Open this jurisdiction's page on Dataprotection.gi →](https://dataprotection.gi/jurisdictions/united-states/)

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 236 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

The US delivers payments operational resilience through supervisory guidance rather than a single statute. The Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC issued final uniform Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management on June 6, 2023, applying to all supervised banking organisations including those with $10bn or less in assets. This guidance is the US functional equivalent of a resilience regime in the absence of a DORA-style statute. It expects assessment of third-party operational resilience, incident-reporting, business-continuity-plan test results and telecom redundancy, and the OCC's FY2025 plan reaffirms resilience and cybersecurity as top supervisory priorities. This is a bank PSP-focused framework, applying to supervised banking organisations and their third-party relationships.

The analytical point of structural significance is that the US has no single statutory operational-resilience regime equivalent to EU DORA. Resilience is delivered through layered supervisory guidance, which is a material structural divergence for global payment service providers that operate across both regimes and must reconcile a statutory European framework against a guidance-based US framework.

#### Outlook

The Interagency TPRM guidance is stable standing knowledge and is the settled US approach to third-party and operational-resilience risk for the supervised banking sector. There is no current signal of a move toward a DORA-style statute; the supervisory-guidance model is the durable US position, and the trajectory is stable. The principal forward-looking consideration is continued supervisory emphasis on resilience and cybersecurity reflected in the OCC's planning priorities.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

The United States has no single statutory operational-resilience regime equivalent to the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA); resilience expectations are instead delivered through supervisory guidance. The Federal Reserve, FDIC and OCC's final Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, finalised June 6, 2023, is the functional US equivalent, and it applies to all supervised banking organisations regardless of size — including institutions with $10bn or less in total assets, which had previously received lighter-touch treatment under some prior frameworks. Under the guidance, examiners assess third-party operational resilience, incident-reporting practices, business-continuity-plan test results and telecom redundancy as part of ordinary supervisory review. The OCC's FY2025 supervisory plan reaffirms resilience and cybersecurity as continuing top priorities, indicating this guidance-based approach remains the active US posture rather than a transitional one pending statutory reform.

#### Outlook

Absent congressional action, the interagency guidance framework is likely to remain the US resilience baseline for the foreseeable future, with incremental tightening delivered through supervisory priorities and bulletins rather than new legislation — a structural divergence from the EU's statutory DORA model that global PSPs operating across both jurisdictions must continue to navigate as two materially different compliance architectures.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T1 Federal Register / OCC Bulletin 2023-17 — In June 2023 the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC and OCC issued final uniform Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management (final as of June 6, 2023), replacing each agency's prior guidance and applying to all supervised banking organisations.
2. T1 Federal Reserve CA Letter 24-02 — The guidance applies to all institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve, including those with $10bn or less in total consolidated assets, and sets sound risk-management principles across the full life cycle of third-party relationships.
3. T1 OCC Cybersecurity and Financial System Resilience Report 2025 — The OCC views operational resilience and cybersecurity as top issues for the federal banking system, reiterated as key priorities in its FY2025 Bank Supervision Operating Plan, citing ransomware and DDoS threats.
4. T1 Federal Reserve FRRS guidance — The interagency guidance expects banks to assess a third party's operational resilience and incident-reporting/management processes, including business-continuity test results, telecom redundancy, and dependency on single providers for multiple activities.

### W4 Scheme & Network Compliance Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

Card-scheme rules (Visa/Mastercard) govern most US card acceptance, overlaid with PCI DSS and the federal interchange/routing regime. Debit interchange is capped under the Durbin Amendment (Dodd-Frank §1075) via Federal Reserve Regulation II at 21 cents + 5bps + 1 cent fraud adjustment for issuers with $10bn+ assets, with mandatory dual-network routing. Regulation II's standard faced a major 2025 legal challenge. Credit interchange remains unregulated by statute and is the subject of the long-running merchant antitrust litigation.

Horizon · 2026-H2 (±year) Regulation II debit interchange standard appeal_consultation · T3_

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 296 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Scheme & Network Compliance

The live development is the legal disruption to the Regulation II debit interchange standard. In August 2025, a federal district court — on remand from the Supreme Court in the Corner Post litigation — held the interchange standard contrary to the Durbin Amendment and vacated it, while staying its own vacatur pending Federal Reserve appeal. If the vacatur is ultimately upheld, it would unsettle the established debit interchange cap, materially affecting issuer economics and merchant cost. Senator Durbin has urged the Federal Reserve to set a lower cap, citing an average per-transaction processing cost of 3.9 cents in 2021, and the Fed had separately proposed lowering the base component to 14.4 cents. This is a bank PSP matter, bearing on the interchange economics of issuers with $10bn or more in assets.

The underlying statutory regime remains the Durbin Amendment as implemented by Regulation II, capping debit interchange at 21 cents plus 5 basis points plus a 1 cent fraud adjustment for issuers with $10bn or more in assets, with mandatory dual-network routing; issuers under $10bn are exempt. This statutory debit interchange and routing regime is foundational to US card economics and merchant routing choice. Credit interchange, by contrast, remains unregulated by statute and is the subject of the MDL 1720 antitrust litigation tracked under W7.

#### Outlook

The Federal Reserve's appeal of the August 2025 vacatur is expected in the second half of 2026, and the Fed's separate proposal to lower the base interchange component to 14.4 cents is the parallel rulemaking track to watch; both are at consultation stage. The trajectory is escalating. A noted gap is that PCI DSS v4 and 3DS/SCA scheme-compliance specifics are not separately evidenced beyond general statement, as scheme rulebook detail is not available through member channels.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Scheme & Network Compliance

US card-scheme economics are in a state of live legal disruption. The Durbin Amendment, implemented through Regulation II, caps debit interchange at 21 cents plus 5 basis points plus a 1-cent fraud adjustment for issuers with $10bn or more in assets, mandates dual-network routing for debit transactions, and exempts issuers below the $10bn asset threshold entirely. In August 2025, a federal district court — ruling on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in the Corner Post litigation — held that the Regulation II interchange standard was contrary to the statutory text of the Durbin Amendment and vacated it, though the court stayed its own vacatur pending the Federal Reserve's appeal. If the vacatur is ultimately upheld, it would unsettle the 21-cent-plus-5-basis-point-plus-1-cent cap that has governed debit-issuer economics since Regulation II's introduction. Separately, and independently of the litigation, the Federal Reserve has proposed lowering the base component of the interchange cap to 14.4 cents, citing Senator Durbin's own argument that the average per-transaction processing cost was only 3.9 cents in 2021 — a proposal that, if adopted, would move in the opposite direction from a full vacatur.

#### Outlook

The Federal Reserve's appeal of the August 2025 vacatur is expected to play out over the second half of 2026, and its outcome — together with resolution of the Fed's separate 14.4-cent proposal — will materially reset debit-interchange economics for issuers with $10bn or more in assets and shape merchant routing incentives across the dual-network system.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T1 Congress.gov CRS R41913 — The Durbin Amendment (Dodd-Frank §1075) authorises the Federal Reserve to ensure debit interchange fees are reasonable and proportional; issuers with under $10bn in assets are exempt, and networks/issuers cannot restrict a merchant's choice of routing network.
2. T3 Cooley — Regulation II, promulgated by the Federal Reserve in June 2011, sets a universal debit interchange cap of 21 cents plus five basis points of transaction value, with a one-cent fraud-prevention adjustment.
3. T3 Cooley — In August 2025 a federal district court (on remand from the Supreme Court in the Corner Post litigation) held Regulation II's interchange standard contrary to the Durbin Amendment and vacated it, while staying its own vacatur pending appeal by the Federal Reserve.
4. T2 durbin.senate.gov — The Fed had separately proposed lowering the debit interchange base component to 14.4 cents, with Senator Durbin urging an even lower cap citing average per-transaction processing cost falling to 3.9 cents in 2021.

### W5 Payment Corridor Dynamics Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

The US is the world's largest remittance-sending market. The US-Mexico corridor is the single largest remittance corridor globally (~$65bn annually), with the US providing ~97% of remittances to Mexico. Average US-Mexico transfer fees sit slightly below 5% for a $200 transfer (Q1 2025 World Bank data). Cross-border rails run via SWIFT correspondent chains (now ISO 20022), card networks, and emerging stablecoin/API providers. A new US 1% tax on cash-based transfers takes effect in 2026.

Horizon · 2026 (±year) US 1% tax on cash-based remittance transfers_adopted · T2_

Horizon · 2026 (±year) US 1% tax on cash-based remittance transfers_adopted · T2_

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 233 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Payment Corridor Dynamics

The US-Mexico remittance corridor is the single largest remittance corridor globally, at roughly $65bn annually, with the US providing around 97% of Mexico's inbound remittances. The average fee for a $200 transfer is slightly below 5%, per Q1 2025 World Bank and Dallas Fed data. As the world's largest corridor, its fee levels and a new 1% cash-transfer tax taking effect in 2026 materially shape money-transfer-operator commercial economics and competition. The corridor reaches both bank and non-bank operators.

The corridor is under fee and volume pressure. Inbound remittances to Mexico fell 16.2% year-on-year to $5.2bn in June 2025, the steepest drop since 2012 per Banxico data. The new US 1% tax on cash-based transfers begins in 2026 and is an additional cost factor layered onto the corridor's economics. Together these create a commercial environment of compressing volumes and rising frictional cost for operators concentrated in this corridor.

#### Outlook

The US 1% tax on cash-based remittance transfers is adopted and takes effect in 2026, affecting US-Mexico and other corridors. The corridor's trajectory is one of fee and volume pressure compounded by the new tax. A recognised gap is that corridor coverage skews heavily to US-Mexico, with emerging-market and alternative-rail signals — mobile money and US-India corridor specifics beyond competitive framing — thin; emerging-market rails are under-indexed per the methodology's bias corrections. The June 2025 volume drop is asserted at Assessed confidence.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Payment Corridor Dynamics

The US-Mexico remittance corridor remains the single largest in the world, moving approximately $65bn annually, with the United States supplying roughly 97% of Mexico's total inbound remittances. Pricing in the corridor averaged slightly below 5% for a $200 transfer as of Q1 2025, per World Bank and Dallas Fed data. The corridor is currently under material fee and volume pressure: inbound remittances to Mexico fell 16.2% year-on-year to $5.2bn in June 2025, according to Banxico data, the steepest decline recorded since 2012. Compounding this pressure, a new US tax of 1% on cash-based remittance transfers is set to take effect in 2026, adding a further structural cost to the corridor that will bear directly on money-transfer-operator commercial economics and competitive positioning between cash-based and digital transfer channels.

#### Outlook

The 2026 cash-transfer tax and the ongoing decline in remittance volumes are likely to accelerate the shift toward digital and account-to-account transfer channels in the corridor, with fee competition among money-transfer operators intensifying as the largest global remittance corridor absorbs both a new tax and a structural volume contraction.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T2 FedPayments Improvement — The US-to-Mexico transfer is the single largest remittance corridor in the world, with roughly 1.6 million households relying on US-sourced payments as their most important income source.
2. T1 Dallas Fed — In the US-Mexico corridor the average fee is slightly below 5 percent of value for a $200 remittance, per Dallas Fed analysis of Q1 2025 World Bank data.
3. T2 FXC Intelligence / Banxico — Inbound remittances to Mexico fell 16.2% YoY to $5.2bn in June 2025 (steepest decline since 2012 per Banxico); the US drove ~97% of Mexico's inbound remittances in Q2 2025; a US 1% tax on cash-based transfers begins in 2026.
4. T3 Remitso / FXC Intelligence — USA→Mexico and USA→India are among the largest and most intensely competitive corridors, contested by incumbents Western Union, Remitly and Wise; Western Union is acquiring Intermex amid declining Mexico volumes.

### W6 Industry Structure & Commercial Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

The US payments market is moderately concentrated at the network layer (Visa/Mastercard duopoly) but increasingly contested by vertically integrating fintechs. The acquiring layer is led by Fiserv, FIS/Worldpay (now Global Payments), JPMorgan and Stripe/Block. Only a handful of providers exceed one million domestic clients. Embedded/ISV-channel payments dominate, with 82% of top-50 providers by volume using the ISV channel in 2025.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 246 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics

US payments market structure is characterised by a Visa/Mastercard network duopoly — jointly processing more than $20tn worldwide — increasingly contested by vertically integrating fintechs. Per TSG 2025 data, only Square, Stripe, QuickBooks Payments, Global Payments and Worldpay exceeded one million domestic clients, and more than 40% of providers list Wells Fargo as their sponsor bank. This is a structural assessment spanning both bank and non-bank operators, distinct from the discrete commercial events tracked under W13.

The analytical spine is concentration coupled with sponsor-bank dependency. Concentration at the network layer, combined with sponsor-bank dependency where Wells Fargo serves more than 40% of providers, constitutes a structural access chokepoint. The shift toward embedded and ISV channels — representing 82% of the top-50 by volume — is reshaping distribution. As a private-company signal where under-indexing bias correction has been applied, Stripe recorded $1.4tn in 2024 volume, up 38% year-on-year, at a $91.5bn valuation via a private tender. This material is sourced from specialist intelligence and Tier-3 market research and is asserted at Assessed confidence.

#### Outlook

The market-structure picture is established standing knowledge: a network-layer duopoly contested by vertically integrating fintechs, with sponsor-bank dependency as the persistent access constraint and embedded/ISV distribution as the reshaping force. A recognised gap is heavy Tier-3 reliance for market-structure data, where primary-source confirmation would strengthen confidence. The trajectory is established rather than escalating, with the structural tension between network concentration and fintech vertical integration as the durable theme.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics

US payments market structure remains anchored by the Visa/Mastercard network duopoly, which together process more than $20 trillion in payment volume worldwide, even as vertically integrating fintechs increasingly contest that position from the acquiring and processing layers. Only five providers — Square, Stripe, QuickBooks Payments, Global Payments and Worldpay — exceeded one million domestic clients according to 2025 industry data, while more than 40% of listed payment providers name Wells Fargo as their sponsor bank, underlining a concentrated sponsor-bank dependency that functions as a structural access chokepoint for the broader non-bank PSP population. Distribution channels have shifted materially toward embedded finance and independent software vendor (ISV) partnerships, which now account for 82% of the top 50 providers by transaction volume, reshaping how payment services reach merchants relative to traditional direct-sales models. Among the private-company signals in this structural picture, Stripe processed $1.4 trillion in volume in 2024 (up 38% year-on-year) and was valued at $91.5bn via a private tender offer.

#### Outlook

Sponsor-bank concentration and the ISV/embedded distribution shift are likely to remain the defining structural features of US market access for non-bank PSPs, with the Wells Fargo sponsor-bank concentration in particular representing a continuing single-point-of-dependency risk that the market has not yet meaningfully diversified away from.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T3 Mordor Intelligence US Payments Market — The US payments sector is dominated by Visa and Mastercard networks that jointly process more than $20 trillion worldwide, remaining moderately concentrated yet increasingly contested by vertically integrating fintechs.
2. T3 TSG Payments — In TSG's 2025 Directory only Square, Stripe, QuickBooks Payments, Global Payments and Worldpay exceeded one million domestic clients; ~70 entities process over $10bn in annual US volume; over 40% list Wells Fargo as a sponsor bank.
3. T3 Businesswire / Yahoo Finance — Embedded payments dominate: 82% of the top-50 providers by volume used the ISV sales channel in 2025 (up from 72%); 61% directly marketed surcharging or cash-discount/dual-pricing programs (up from 51% in 2024 and 43% in 2023).
4. T3 Mordor Intelligence — Stripe reported $1.4 trillion in 2024 payment volume (38% YoY growth) and its first profitable year, raising its valuation to $91.5bn via private tender; PayPal, Block and Affirm are broadening into full-stack digital finance.

### W7 Legal & Litigation Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

The defining US payments litigation is the ~20-year Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1720) over Visa/Mastercard swipe fees. A revised ~$38bn settlement announced November 10, 2025 (cutting posted credit interchange by 0.1pp for five years, capping standard consumer cards at 1.25% for eight years, and expanding surcharging rights) drew heavy merchant opposition and faces 2026 damages trials. Separately, Regulation II's debit standard was vacated by a district court in August 2025 (stayed pending appeal).

Horizon · 2026-Q2 (±year) MDL 1720 settlement approval and 2026 damages trials_consultation · T3_

Horizon · 2026-Q2 (±year) MDL 1720 settlement approval and 2026 damages trials_consultation · T3_

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 257 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Legal & Litigation

The Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust Litigation (MDL 1720) reached a revised approximately $38bn settlement announced November 10, 2025. The settlement lowers swipe fees by 0.1 percentage points for five years, caps standard consumer rates at 1.25% for eight years, and expands surcharging rights up to 3%. It has drawn heavy merchant opposition and faces 2026 damages trials. Visa and Mastercard are the defendants; the NRF and NACS are among the merchant objectors. This is a scheme-level matter affecting both bank and non-bank participants in the card ecosystem.

The commercial stakes are foundational. US swipe fees totalled $111.2bn in 2024, up from $100.8bn in 2023, and this roughly 20-year antitrust saga and its settlement directly determine interchange economics for the entire merchant base. Merchant groups condemned the settlement, December 2025 brought retailer objections, and two 2026 damages trials are scheduled — an April trial in New York involving 7-Eleven, Dick's and Nike, and a September trial in Chicago led by GrubHub. This litigation, alongside the Regulation II debit-standard vacatur tracked under W4, forms the largest commercial-stakes payments litigation set in the US.

#### Outlook

A federal judge is expected to consider the revised approximately $38bn settlement in 2026, with the April New York and September Chicago damages trials as the key procedural milestones, at an expected window around the second quarter. The trajectory is escalating, driven by the contested nature of the settlement and the parallel Regulation II appeal. This finding is sourced from quality journalism and Tier-3 reporting and is asserted at Assessed confidence.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Legal & Litigation

Card-network litigation reached a pivotal moment in the period. The roughly two-decade Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust Litigation, known as MDL 1720, produced a revised settlement of approximately $38bn, announced November 10, 2025. The revised terms would lower swipe fees by 0.1 percentage points for five years, cap standard consumer card rates at 1.25% for eight years, and expand merchant surcharging rights up to 3%. The settlement has drawn heavy merchant-side opposition, with the National Retail Federation and NACS among the objectors that formally opposed the terms in December 2025 filings. Two damages trials are now scheduled for 2026: one in April in New York, with 7-Eleven, Dick's Sporting Goods and Nike among the plaintiffs, and one in September in Chicago, led by GrubHub. The commercial stakes are substantial: US swipe fees totalled $111.2bn in 2024, up from $100.8bn in 2023, meaning the settlement terms and the outcome of the 2026 damages trials will directly determine interchange economics across the entire US merchant base.

#### Outlook

The settlement's judicial approval process and the two scheduled 2026 damages trials are the key events to track; continued merchant-side opposition suggests the settlement's terms may still be contested even if preliminarily approved, extending the roughly twenty-year litigation saga further into 2026 and potentially beyond.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T3 The Daily Record / CNBC — On November 10, 2025 Visa and Mastercard announced a revised settlement in MDL 1720 (litigation dating to 2005) lowering swipe fees by 0.1 percentage point for five years, capping standard consumer rates at 1.25% for eight years, and granting expanded surcharging rights up to 3%.
2. T3 Payments Dive — Merchant groups (NRF, NACS) condemned the settlement; in December 2025 retailers filed objections alleging it perpetuates the interchange conspiracy and grants excessive antitrust immunity; a federal judge is expected to consider it in 2026.
3. T3 Payments Dive — Visa and Mastercard face two damages trials in 2026 — the first in April in New York (merchants including 7-Eleven, Dick's, Nike) and a second in September in Chicago led by GrubHub.
4. T3 The Daily Record / CNBC — US swipe fees totaled $111.2bn in 2024 (up from $100.8bn in 2023, quadruple 2009 levels) per the NRF, underscoring the commercial stakes of the litigation.

### W8 Merchant Acquiring & Risk Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

US merchant acquiring is led by Fiserv (largest non-bank acquirer), FIS/Worldpay, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and fintech-native players Stripe, Block (Square) and Toast. Acquirers settle on behalf of digital payment companies and ISOs. The market is consolidating (Global Payments-Worldpay), shifting to ISV/embedded distribution, and increasingly offering surcharging/dual-pricing. PCI DSS governs cardholder-data security across the acquiring chain; sponsor-bank relationships (e.g. Wells Fargo) remain the dominant access route for non-bank acquirers.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 233 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Merchant Acquiring & Risk

The US merchant acquiring market is led by Fiserv, FIS/Worldpay, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, alongside fintech-native operators Stripe, Block (Square) and Toast. The market is consolidating — notably through Global Payments-Worldpay — and shifting toward ISV and embedded distribution, with surcharging and dual-pricing now marketed by 61% of top providers, up from 43% in 2023. This spans both bank acquirers and non-bank acquirers, and the distinction matters: sponsor-bank dependency remains the dominant access route for non-bank acquirers, while bank acquirers participate directly.

The ISV and embedded shift, combined with surcharging expansion, materially reshapes acquiring economics. Stripe is expected to exceed $1tn in US-sourced volume in 2026, and Toast ranks around 13th to 14th by US volume with roughly 24% year-on-year growth. The now-granted Stripe MALPB charter is a structural acquiring-access shift for non-bank acquirers, reducing reliance on sponsor banks for direct scheme access. This material is sourced from specialist intelligence and Tier-3 market research and is asserted at Assessed confidence.

#### Outlook

The acquiring landscape is established standing knowledge characterised by consolidation, the ISV/embedded distribution shift, and surcharging expansion. The structural development to watch is the maturation of the MALPB route as a means for non-bank acquirers to reduce sponsor-bank dependency. The trajectory is established. As with W6, heavy Tier-3 reliance on market data is a recognised gap, and primary-source confirmation beyond available SEC filings would strengthen confidence.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Merchant Acquiring & Risk

The US merchant-acquiring market is led by Fiserv, FIS/Worldpay, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America on the bank/traditional-processor side, alongside fintech-native acquirers Stripe, Block (Square) and Toast. The market is actively consolidating, most visibly through the Global Payments-Worldpay combination, and distribution is shifting toward ISV and embedded-finance channels consistent with the broader industry-structure trend. A notable commercial development is the expansion of surcharging and dual-pricing: 61% of top acquiring providers now market surcharging or dual-pricing capability, up from 43% in 2023, a significant shift in how acquirers are positioning cost-recovery tools for merchants. Stripe is expected to exceed $1 trillion in US-sourced volume in 2026, and Toast — now roughly 13th-14th by US volume — grew approximately 24% year-on-year, indicating continued fintech-native share gains within the acquiring market. Stripe's now-granted MALPB charter is itself a structural acquiring-access shift, reducing the sponsor-bank dependency that otherwise defines non-bank acquirer market access.

#### Outlook

Continued consolidation around the Global Payments-Worldpay combination, further ISV/embedded-channel share gains, and the ongoing expansion of surcharging/dual-pricing adoption are the trends most likely to define US merchant acquiring through the remainder of 2026, with sponsor-bank dependency remaining the dominant access route for the large majority of non-bank acquirers not pursuing MALPB-style charters.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T3 Research and Markets / Payments Dive — Major US merchant acquirers include JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America Merchant Services, Fiserv, FIS, Global Payments, Shift4, Worldpay, Elavon, Square (Block) and Stripe; merchant acquirers process card transactions for retailers and settle on behalf of digital payment companies and ISOs.
2. T3 Digital Transactions / TSG — Providers like Stripe and Toast focused on SaaS/ISV-enabled merchants are the largest YoY growers of nominal volume; Stripe is expected to exceed $1 trillion in US-sourced payment volume in 2026; Toast (restaurant-focused) ranks ~13th-14th by US processing volume, growing ~24% YoY.
3. T3 Businesswire / TSG — Surcharging/cash-discount/dual-pricing programs are now marketed by 61% of top providers (up from 43% in 2023), reflecting expanding merchant surcharging rights — a key acquiring-risk and merchant-economics shift.
4. T3 Mordor Intelligence — Stripe's April 2025 Georgia MALPB charter application aims to reduce reliance on sponsor banks and gain direct Visa/Mastercard access — a structural shift in non-bank acquiring access.

### W9 Product Innovation & Market Development Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

The US operates a dual instant-payments landscape: The Clearing House's RTP (launched 2017) and the Federal Reserve's FedNow (launched July 2023). Both are 24/7/365 and irrevocable; FedNow settles in central-bank money while RTP settles between participating banks. Adoption is accelerating but lacks a government mandate, and interoperability between the two rails remains a barrier. Open banking (CFPB §1033) is in regulatory limbo after the 2024 rule was reopened and enjoined. A retail CBDC is not being pursued; FedNow is distinct from a CBDC.

Horizon · 2026-Q1 (±half_year) CFPB Section 1033 open banking interim final rule_proposed · T2_

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 317 words · last cycle 2026-10-12

#### Product Innovation & Market Development

The US instant payments landscape comprises two competing rails: FedNow, launched by the Federal Reserve in July 2023 and settling in central-bank money, and RTP, launched by The Clearing House in 2017. Both are 24/7/365 and irrevocable. There is no adoption mandate, and a FedNow-RTP interoperability gap impedes growth. This spans both bank and non-bank participants. Dual-rail fragmentation without interoperability is a structural friction, and multi-rail adoption — with 58% of US banks using both rails — shapes routing and product strategy. More than 1,500 financial institutions were in FedNow by early 2026; FedNow processed roughly 8.4 million transactions worth $853.4bn in 2025, while RTP surpassed $1.3tn in 2025, up 428% from $246bn in 2024. FedNow is distinct from any CBDC, and no US retail CBDC is being pursued.

The regulatory theme is the status of open banking. The CFPB's Section 1033 Personal Financial Data Rights rule was finalised in October 2024 and challenged by banks; in 2025 the CFPB moved to vacate it and reopened rulemaking via an August 2025 advance notice of proposed rulemaking, with a December 2025 planned 'interim' final rule that may permit data-access fees. Open banking is therefore in regulatory limbo. A data-access fee permission would reshape the economics of fintech data aggregation — a theme illustrated by the JPMorgan-Plaid pricing deal tracked under W13 — and the regulatory uncertainty is a material planning risk.

#### Outlook

The instant-payments trajectory is accelerating, with RTP volume growth and FedNow institutional adoption both rising, though the interoperability gap persists as a structural friction. On open banking, the CFPB Section 1033 interim final rule is expected around the first quarter of 2026, potentially permitting data-access fees after the Bureau moved to vacate the 2024 rule; this remains at proposed stage and is asserted at Assessed confidence. The convergence of accelerating rail adoption and unsettled open-banking rules defines the near-term product environment.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-12

#### Product Innovation & Market Development

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission's October 9, 2026 actions represent the defining product-access development for event-contract and prediction-market platforms this cycle. The interim final rule, effective immediately, excludes sportsbook and casino-style wagers from the Commodity Exchange Act's definition of a "swap." The companion notice of proposed rulemaking, issued the same day, proposes bringing sports, political, cultural and weather event contracts within that same swap definition, which would place these products under exclusive CFTC jurisdiction as federally regulated derivatives rather than leaving them to state-by-state gambling regulation.

For payment-service providers, acquirers and banking partners serving event-contract trading platforms, this regulatory action directly affects how these products should be classified, underwritten and risk-rated. A platform operating under the assumption that its event contracts are not swaps, and are therefore subject to state gambling law, faces a live possibility that the CFTC's rulemaking — if finalized as proposed — would reclassify its products as federally regulated derivatives, changing which licensing, registration and compliance framework applies to payment flows supporting the platform. This uncertainty sits on top of an unresolved circuit split regarding whether such contracts are subject to federal preemption, meaning payment providers currently face differing legal treatment of the same product category depending on which jurisdiction's law applies.

#### Outlook

The CFTC's NPRM process, together with the ongoing circuit-level litigation over federal preemption of state gambling law for event contracts, is the key development to watch for product-access and payment-classification purposes. Finalization of the NPRM, in either direction, would materially change the compliance framework payment providers and acquirers must apply to event-contract and prediction-market platforms.

**1 earlier distinct update(s)**

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Product Innovation & Market Development

The US instant-payments landscape comprises two competing, non-interoperable rails. FedNow, launched by the Federal Reserve in July 2023, settles in central-bank money, while RTP, launched by The Clearing House in 2017, operates on a bank-owned model; both operate 24/7/365 with irrevocable settlement. Neither rail carries an adoption mandate, and the absence of FedNow-RTP interoperability continues to impede growth of the instant-payments ecosystem as a whole, even though more than 1,500 financial institutions had joined FedNow by early 2026, FedNow processed approximately 8.4 million transactions worth $853.4bn in 2025, and RTP surpassed $1.3 trillion in transaction value in 2025 — up 428% from $246bn in 2024. A majority of US banks (58%) now use both rails, reflecting a pragmatic multi-rail adoption strategy rather than a resolution of the interoperability gap. FedNow is distinct from a central bank digital currency; no US retail CBDC is being pursued.

Open banking remains in regulatory limbo. The CFPB's October 2024 Section 1033 Personal Financial Data Rights final rule was challenged by banks in litigation, and during 2025 the CFPB itself moved to vacate its own rule and reopened rulemaking via an August 2025 advance notice of proposed rulemaking. A planned December 2025 'interim' final rule may, for the first time, permit data-access fees — a potential reversal of the free-access presumption embedded in the original rule.

#### Outlook

The interim final rule on Section 1033, if and when issued, will be the pivotal event determining whether data-access fees become a permanent feature of US open banking; on instant payments, continued dual-rail growth without interoperability resolution is likely to remain the near-term pattern, with multi-rail bank adoption serving as the market's practical workaround.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T3 Spherepay / ClearingPost — The US operates two competing instant payment rails — FedNow (Federal Reserve, launched July 2023, settling in central-bank money with zero counterparty risk) and RTP (The Clearing House, launched 2017) — both 24/7/365 and irrevocable.
2. T3 Spherepay / ClearingPost — More than 1,500 financial institutions participate in FedNow as of early 2026; in 2025 FedNow processed roughly 8.4 million transactions worth $853.4bn, while RTP surpassed $1.3 trillion in 2025 (a 428% increase from $246bn in 2024).
3. T3 American Banker / PYMNTS — There is no US mandate to adopt faster payments, and lack of interoperability between FedNow and RTP impedes growth; banks increasingly adopt a multi-rail strategy with 58% of US banks using both.
4. T2 Cooley / American Banker / CFPB — The CFPB's October 2024 Personal Financial Data Rights (§1033 open banking) final rule was challenged by banks, and in 2025 the CFPB moved to vacate it and reopened rulemaking via an August 2025 ANPR; in December 2025 it planned an 'interim' final rule that may permit data-access fees.

### W10 Consumer Protection & APP Fraud Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

US consumer protection for electronic payments rests on the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA, 1978) implemented by CFPB Regulation E (12 CFR Part 1005), covering disclosures, error resolution, unauthorised-EFT liability, prepaid accounts and remittance transfers (Subpart B). Unlike the UK PSR's mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement, the US has NO equivalent mandatory authorised-push-payment reimbursement regime — Reg E protects against unauthorised transfers, with authorised-but-induced payments a continuing gap. A January 2025 CFPB proposal to extend Reg E to stablecoins/crypto is unlikely to be finalised.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 227 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

The US consumer protection regime for electronic payments rests on the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, implemented by the CFPB's Regulation E at 12 CFR Part 1005. Critically, there is no mandatory authorised-push-payment reimbursement regime, unlike the UK's Payment Systems Regulator framework: Regulation E protects against unauthorised transfers, leaving authorised-but-induced payments as a continuing gap. This framework applies to both bank and non-bank participants. The Regulation E error-resolution process requires institutions to investigate promptly, report within three business days and correct within one business day, and Subpart B covers remittance transfers.

The analytical point is that the absence of a mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement regime, by contrast with the UK, is a material consumer-protection divergence, and the authorised-but-induced gap is an under-indexed risk theme. On January 10, 2025, the CFPB proposed an interpretive rule extending Regulation E to stablecoins and crypto, which is widely seen as unlikely to be finalised.

#### Outlook

The EFTA/Regulation E framework is stable standing knowledge, and the trajectory is stable. There is no current signal of movement toward a mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement regime, leaving the authorised-but-induced gap as a durable divergence from the UK position. The January 2025 proposed interpretive rule extending Regulation E to stablecoins and crypto is assessed as unlikely to be finalised, so the operative regime is expected to remain unchanged in the near term.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

US consumer protection for electronic payments rests on the 1978 Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), implemented through CFPB Regulation E (12 CFR Part 1005). Regulation E protects consumers against unauthorised electronic fund transfers, requiring prompt investigation, a report within three business days, and correction within one business day of an error notification; Subpart B separately covers remittance transfers. Critically, and unlike the UK's Payment Systems Regulator authorised-push-payment reimbursement regime, the United States has no mandatory APP-fraud reimbursement obligation — Regulation E protects against unauthorised transfers, but authorised-but-induced payments (where a consumer is deceived into authorising a transfer) remain a continuing consumer-protection gap in the US framework. Separately, a January 10, 2025 CFPB proposed interpretive rule sought to extend Regulation E's scope to stablecoins and crypto assets, though this proposal is widely seen as unlikely to be finalised.

#### Outlook

The authorised-but-induced payment gap is likely to remain a standing structural divergence between the US and UK consumer-protection models absent new legislation extending Regulation E or an equivalent APP-reimbursement mandate; the fate of the January 2025 stablecoin/crypto interpretive rule proposal remains an open, low-probability-of-finalisation item to track.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T1 CFPB / NCUA — Regulation E implements the EFTA, establishing the basic framework of rights, liabilities and responsibilities for electronic fund and remittance transfers; rulemaking authority transferred from the Federal Reserve to the CFPB in 2011 under Dodd-Frank, restated at 12 CFR Part 1005.
2. T3 Consumer Financial Services Law Monitor — Reg E requires financial institutions to investigate alleged errors promptly, report results within three business days of completion and correct errors within one business day; errors include unauthorized EFTs, incorrect EFTs and statement omissions — protections center on unauthorized transfers.
3. T1 NCUA / CFPB — Subpart B of Reg E (added February 2012) implements the Dodd-Frank remittance-transfer protections for consumers sending money to individuals and businesses in foreign countries.
4. T3 WilmerHale / McDermott — On January 10, 2025 the CFPB issued a proposed interpretive rule to extend EFTA/Reg E to stablecoins, cryptocurrencies and other novel electronic payments by interpreting 'funds' broadly — widely seen as unlikely to be finalised under the current administration but potentially relevant to private litigation and state enforcement.

### W11 AML/CFT & Financial Crime [Sourced from Sentinel.gi ↗](https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/united-states-federal-national/#sec-dom-D7) Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

Sentinel.gi payments-context position: US AML/CFT for payments rests on the Bank Secrecy Act administered by FinCEN, with MSBs/money transmitters subject to registration, AML programs, KYC and SAR filing. The framework is undergoing modernisation: an April 7, 2026 FinCEN NPRM would shift AML/CFT programs to an effectiveness-based, risk-driven model and elevate FinCEN's supervisory role. Enforcement is escalating, notably a late-2025 data-driven operation against Southwest-border MSBs. GENIUS Act PPSIs are now BSA financial institutions with mandated sanctions-compliance programs.

Horizon · 2026-H2 (±year) FinCEN AML/CFT effectiveness-based program reform_proposed · T1_

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 354 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### AML/CFT & Financial Crime

The W11 intelligence in this cycle is sourced from the Sentinel feed (SENTINEL-FED); the World Payments Monitor carries the payments-context surface only, and original illicit-finance analysis is routed to the Financial Integrity Monitor. Per the Sentinel feed, FinCEN proposed an April 7, 2026 NPRM to shift AML/CFT programs to an effectiveness-based, risk-driven model, to incorporate government-wide priorities, and to make FinCEN the gatekeeper for significant supervisory and enforcement actions; this supersedes the withdrawn July 2024 proposal and reflects Treasury's June 2025 BSA-reform guiding principles. The effectiveness-based reform reshapes compliance program design for all BSA institutions, including money transmitters and permitted stablecoin issuers — a material operating-model shift spanning both bank and non-bank operators. Source attribution: Federal Register 2026-07033, FinCEN and Morrison Foerster.

Also via the Sentinel feed, FinCEN launched a late-December 2025 'first-of-its-kind, data-driven enforcement operation' targeting more than 100 MSBs along the Southwest US border, issuing six notices of investigation, dozens of IRS examination referrals and more than 50 compliance outreach letters. This escalating MSB enforcement raises compliance and licensing risk for money transmitters operating in border corridors and overlaps with the US-Mexico corridor economics tracked under W5; it is a non-bank PI/EMI matter. Source: Holland & Knight.

Third, FinCEN and OFAC jointly proposed in April 2026 to treat permitted payment stablecoin issuers as BSA financial institutions and — for the first time mandated by law — to require effective sanctions-compliance programs. The mandated sanctions-compliance programs materially raise the operational bar for PPSI product launch. The stablecoin-integrity dimension is a World Payments matter, while illicit-finance use is routed to the Financial Integrity Monitor. Source: Holland & Knight and Treasury press release sb0435.

#### Outlook

The FinCEN effectiveness-based AML/CFT program reform is expected to develop through the second half of 2026, with final rule timing uncertain; it remains at proposed stage. The three findings together — effectiveness-based reform, escalating Southwest-border MSB enforcement, and first-ever mandated sanctions-compliance programs for stablecoin issuers — indicate an escalating trajectory and a materially rising compliance bar for money transmitters and permitted stablecoin issuers. All three carry illicit-finance significance requiring original analysis in the Financial Integrity Monitor.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### AML/CFT & Financial Crime

This module's intelligence is sourced from the Sentinel.gi feed; original illicit-finance analysis of the underlying developments is carried in the Financial Intelligence Monitor, and this brief carries the payments-context surface only. FinCEN proposed, on April 7, 2026, a shift to an effectiveness-based, risk-driven model for AML/CFT programs, incorporating government-wide priorities and positioning FinCEN as gatekeeper for significant supervisory and enforcement actions; the proposal supersedes a withdrawn July 2024 predecessor and reflects Treasury's June 2025 BSA-reform guiding principles. Separately, in late December 2025, FinCEN launched what it described as a first-of-its-kind, data-driven enforcement operation targeting more than 100 money services businesses along the US Southwest border, resulting in six notices of investigation, dozens of IRS examination referrals, and more than 50 compliance outreach letters. In April 2026, FinCEN and OFAC jointly proposed rules treating permitted payment stablecoin issuers as Bank Secrecy Act financial institutions and — for the first time mandated by law — requiring effective sanctions-compliance programs for those issuers.

#### Outlook

FinCEN's effectiveness-based AML/CFT reform is expected to progress toward a final rule over the second half of 2026, with timing still uncertain; escalating Southwest-border MSB enforcement activity and the new GENIUS Act stablecoin AML/sanctions rules together raise the compliance bar materially for money transmitters and payment-stablecoin issuers. For substantive illicit-finance analysis of these developments, see the Financial Intelligence Monitor.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (7)**

1. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) per-JID baseline profile — United States (Federal National) — US AML/CFT rests on the Bank Secrecy Act as amended by the AML Act of 2020, FinCEN regulations, OFAC sanctions authorities, and (nominally) the Corporate Transparency Act. Since early 2025 Treasury has rolled back domestic beneficial-ownership reporting, delayed/vacated real-estate AML rules, relaxed CDD account-opening verification, while simultaneously escalating crypto/stablecoin enforcement (Huione, DPRK, ISIS financiers) and issuing GENIUS Act stablecoin AML rules.
2. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-002) — Gap: enforcement-absence
3. T2 FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-002) — Enforcement: OFAC — ISIS financial facilitators (Bitcoin Xchange, Spider, Alkaram, and associated individuals)
4. T1 FIM (sentinel.gi) sanctions_change_register (issue FIM-BASE-SANC-004) — Sanctions: national divergence
5. T2 FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-003) — Enforcement: OFAC — Sinaloa Cartel (Los Chapitos) money-laundering network
6. T1 FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-001) — Enforcement: OFAC — Adani Enterprises Limited (India)
7. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-003) — Gap: regulatory-failure

### W12 Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access Confirmed confirmed 2026-06-20

US settlement runs over the Fed's Fedwire Funds Service (RTGS) and CHIPS (The Clearing House); Fedwire completed its single-day ISO 20022 cutover on July 14, 2025 (CHIPS migrated April 2024). Master-account/settlement access is governed by the Federal Reserve's August 2022 Account Access Guidelines — six risk-based principles with three-tier review — with Reserve Banks retaining discretion, a key constraint for novel/fintech charters. Globally, correspondent banking continues a structural decline (~25% fewer relationships 2011-2020) driven by AML/CFT compliance costs and de-risking, concentrating access and raising costs in thinner corridors.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 358 words · last cycle 2026-06-20

#### Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

The analytical spine of this module is the asymmetry between bank and non-bank access to settlement and correspondent infrastructure. On messaging, the Fedwire Funds Service completed its single-day ISO 20022 cutover on July 14, 2025 — rescheduled from March 10, 2025 — discontinuing the proprietary FAIM format; CHIPS migrated in April 2024, and SWIFT MT/MX coexistence ended in November 2025, making ISO 20022 the global cross-border standard. The cutover completes the US real-time-gross-settlement migration to structured data, with downstream impact on correspondent messaging, reconciliation and compliance screening; it affects both bank and non-bank participants.

The access constraint is governed by the Federal Reserve's Account Access Guidelines. Master-account and settlement access is governed by the August 2022 guidelines, which set out six risk-based principles and a three-tier review, with the 12 Reserve Banks retaining discretion. Legal eligibility alone does not guarantee an account, a key constraint for novel and fintech charters. Reserve Bank discretion over master-account access is the structural chokepoint for novel and fintech charters seeking direct settlement — directly relevant to the kind of direct-access ambition implied by Stripe's MALPB charter. This is the heart of the bank versus non-bank access asymmetry: even a chartered non-bank entity does not obtain settlement access by right.

Global correspondent banking is in structural decline. Active correspondent banks declined roughly 25% between 2011 and 2020 — around 4% in 2020 alone — while payment volumes rose, driven by AML/CFT compliance costs and de-risking. The BIS noted in November 2025 that sustained decline plus greater concentration is raising transaction costs in thinner corridors. This is principally a bank PSP phenomenon, but the resulting cost and de-risking exposure creates a structural opening for non-bank and stablecoin rails.

#### Outlook

The Fedwire ISO 20022 cutover is complete and is now established standing knowledge, as is the November 2025 end of SWIFT MT/MX coexistence. The Federal Reserve Account Access Guidelines remain the durable framework governing settlement access, with Reserve Bank discretion as the persistent constraint on novel charters. The correspondent-banking structural decline is a continuing trajectory that, combined with concentration, sustains the opening for alternative rails. The module's trajectory is established.

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

This module's analytical spine is the structural asymmetry between bank and non-bank access to core settlement infrastructure. The Fedwire Funds Service completed a single-day ISO 20022 cutover on July 14, 2025 — rescheduled from an initially planned March 10, 2025 date — discontinuing the proprietary FAIM messaging format. This followed CHIPS' own ISO 20022 migration in April 2024, and the November 2025 end of SWIFT MT/MX coexistence, which together make ISO 20022 the global standard for cross-border payment messaging. Access to that settlement infrastructure, however, remains discretionary rather than automatic: the Federal Reserve's Account Access Guidelines, adopted in August 2022, set out six risk-based principles and a three-tier review process for master-account and settlement access, but the twelve Reserve Banks retain discretion over individual applications — legal eligibility alone does not guarantee an account. This discretion is the key structural constraint facing novel and fintech charter types, including MALPB-chartered entities of the kind Stripe now holds, in pursuing direct central-bank settlement access.

Beneath this bank/non-bank access asymmetry, correspondent banking itself is in structural decline. The number of active correspondent banks fell approximately 25% between 2011 and 2020, including a roughly 4% decline in 2020 alone, even as payment volumes continued to rise over the same period — a divergence driven by AML/CFT compliance costs and de-risking behaviour. The BIS, in a November 2025 speech, noted that this sustained decline, combined with growing concentration among the remaining correspondent banks, is raising transaction costs in thinner corridors, creating a structural opening for non-bank and stablecoin-based settlement rails to compete for cross-border volume that correspondent banks are exiting.

#### Outlook

The bank/non-bank settlement-access asymmetry — Reserve Bank discretion over master accounts on one side, and continuing correspondent-banking concentration and decline on the other — is likely to remain the central structural theme of this module through 2026, with novel-charter entities such as MALPB holders serving as the test case for how much that asymmetry can be narrowed without statutory change.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (4)**

1. T1 Federal Reserve Financial Services / PCBB — The Federal Reserve adopted ISO 20022 for the Fedwire Funds Service in a single-day implementation on July 14, 2025 (rescheduled from March 10, 2025), discontinuing the proprietary FAIM format; CHIPS migrated in April 2024.
2. T1 St. Louis Fed — In August 2022 the Federal Reserve Board finalised Account Access Guidelines for master-account and payment-service requests, grounded in six risk-based principles with applicants tiered into three review categories; the decision rests with the 12 Reserve Banks, and legal eligibility alone does not guarantee an account.
3. T1 IMF Note 2025/002 / Congress.gov CRS — The number of active correspondent banks declined ~25% between 2011 and 2020 (about 4% in 2020 alone) while payment volumes rose, driven by stricter AML/CFT rules and de-risking — increasing concentration and transaction costs in countries with limited access.
4. T1 BIS speech sp251127a / Finextra — BIS (November 2025) notes a sustained decline in correspondent banking across all regions combined with greater concentration, contributing to rent-seeking and higher transaction costs; the SWIFT MT/MX coexistence period ended November 2025, making ISO 20022 the global cross-border standard.

### W13 Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product) Probable confirmed 2026-06-20

Trailing-12-month US payments commercial activity is dominated by consolidation among acquirers and processors plus stablecoin/instant-rail product launches. Headline deals: Global Payments' acquisition of Worldpay (closed Jan 9, 2026) with simultaneous divestiture of Issuer Solutions to FIS; Capital One-Discover ($35.5bn); Shift4-Global Blue ($2.5bn); Western Union-Intermex. Product: Global Payments' Genius POS platform launched Q2 2025; Fedwire ISO 20022 cutover; Stripe's $91.5bn valuation tender.

Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 394 words · last cycle 2026-10-12

#### Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product)

The headline commercial event of the trailing-12-month window is the Global Payments-Worldpay-FIS transaction. Global Payments completed its acquisition of Worldpay and the simultaneous divestiture of Issuer Solutions to FIS on January 9, 2026 (announced April 17, 2025), with a Worldpay net purchase price of $22.7bn and total value of $24.25bn, and Issuer Solutions transferring to FIS for $13.5bn. The transaction repositions Global Payments as a pure-play merchant solutions provider. This completed M&A event — deal value disclosed at $24.25bn, primary source Global Payments' SEC 8-K — is the largest commercial event in the window and reshapes the US merchant-solutions and issuer-processing landscape. Global Payments is a non-bank operator here.

Two further M&A events are announced rather than completed. Capital One announced in February 2025 plans to acquire Discover Financial Services for $35.5bn, aiming to challenge Visa/Mastercard network dominance — a network-layer transaction potentially creating a third major US card network, with Capital One a bank operator; this is asserted at Assessed confidence on Tier-3 sourcing. Shift4 Payments agreed in February 2025 to acquire Global Blue for $2.5bn, adding more than 400,000 luxury retail locations and tax-free shopping capabilities — a non-bank acquirer's vertical expansion, also asserted at Assessed confidence.

On products, Global Payments launched its next-generation Genius POS platform in Q2 2025, citing strong commercial traction and significantly increased monthly sales; this is a completed acquiring-category product release supporting the merchant-solutions repositioning. Finally, JPMorgan Chase and Plaid announced a September 2025 data-transfer agreement with a pricing structure whose specifics were not publicly disclosed (amount_disclosed=false), reflecting the shift toward fee-bearing open-banking data access. The deal signals the commercial direction of US open banking amid the Section 1033 uncertainty tracked under W9, and serves as a precedent for monetised bank-fintech data access.

#### Outlook

The Capital One-Discover and Shift4-Global Blue transactions are at announced/advancing status, and the network-layer Capital One-Discover deal in particular is a structural competitive event to watch. Acquirer consolidation has reached an inflection, concentrating the US merchant-solutions and processing layer amid the ISV/embedded distribution shift. Two recognised gaps apply: the Western Union-Intermex acquisition is referenced in standing positions but lacks a dedicated finding with deal value, status and event date, leaving remittance-sector M&A under-covered; and heavy Tier-3 reliance for the Capital One-Discover and Shift4-Global Blue values means primary-source confirmation would strengthen confidence above Assessed. The trajectory is escalating.

Periodic update · new data 2026-10-12

#### Commercial Intelligence & Fintech

Three distinct commercial events mark this cycle's US payments-adjacent dealflow. OKX completed an undisclosed-size funding round at a reported $25 billion valuation, announced October 6, 2026, with participation from Ripple Labs, Circle Internet Group, Standard Chartered's SC Ventures and QRT. The amount raised was not publicly disclosed, and the valuation figure traces to secondary reporting citing Bloomberg and Reuters rather than a primary filing, though the named-participant list spans both crypto-native and traditional-finance investors.

Anchorage Digital, a digital-asset custodian, announced on October 9, 2026 its acquisition of payments company Routable, embedding payout capabilities directly into its infrastructure. The amount of this transaction was not publicly disclosed. This acquisition follows a broader pattern of custody and exchange infrastructure providers building or acquiring payments capability rather than relying solely on third-party rails.

Separately, Samsung Wallet announced support for USDC-on-Solana targeting US cross-border transfers, with the product feature beginning rollout in October 2026. This product launch extends stablecoin-rail availability directly into a major consumer-facing wallet, representing a distinct retail cross-border payments use case from the institutional and exchange-infrastructure focus of the OKX and Anchorage Digital developments.

#### Outlook

Continued convergence between crypto-native infrastructure providers and traditional payments capability, illustrated by the Anchorage Digital/Routable acquisition and the OKX funding round, should be watched alongside the extension of stablecoin rails into consumer-facing products such as Samsung Wallet's USDC-on-Solana integration, as an indicator of broader stablecoin adoption into retail cross-border payment use cases.

**1 earlier distinct update(s)**

Periodic update · new data 2026-07-10

#### Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product)

The largest commercial event of the trailing-twelve-month window is Global Payments' completed acquisition of Worldpay, which closed January 9, 2026 after being announced April 17, 2025. The deal carried a Worldpay net purchase price of $22.7bn and $24.25bn in total transaction value, and was executed alongside a simultaneous divestiture of Issuer Solutions to FIS for $13.5bn — together repositioning Global Payments as a pure-play merchant solutions provider. Two further M&A events add to the consolidation wave: Capital One announced in February 2025 its plan to acquire Discover Financial Services for $35.5bn, explicitly framed as a means of challenging Visa/Mastercard network dominance by building a competing network; and Shift4 Payments agreed in February 2025 to acquire Global Blue for $2.5bn, adding more than 400,000 luxury retail locations and tax-free shopping capability to its portfolio.

On product releases, Global Payments launched its next-generation Genius point-of-sale platform in Q2 2025, reporting strong commercial traction and significantly increased monthly sales following launch. And in a partnership-restructuring event with implications for the commercial direction of US open banking, JPMorgan Chase and Plaid announced a data-transfer agreement in September 2025 built around a pricing structure whose specific terms were not publicly disclosed, signalling the shift toward fee-bearing data access ahead of the CFPB's Section 1033 rulemaking outcome.

#### Outlook

The Global Payments-Worldpay integration, the progress of the announced Capital One-Discover and Shift4-Global Blue deals toward closing, and the commercial terms eventually disclosed (or not) around the JPMorgan-Plaid data-access arrangement are the key W13 items to track through 2026.

1 further periodic run re-emitted the standing brief unchanged and is not shown.

**Sources and findings (5)**

1. T1 Global Payments SEC 8-K (FY2025/FY2026) — Global Payments completed its acquisition of Worldpay and divestiture of Issuer Solutions simultaneously on January 9, 2026, repositioning as a pure-play merchant solutions provider; the deals were announced April 17, 2025 (Worldpay net purchase price $22.7bn / $24.25bn total value; Issuer Solutions to FIS for $13.5bn).
2. T3 Mordor Intelligence — Capital One announced (February 2025) plans to acquire Discover Financial Services for $35.5bn, aiming to challenge Visa and Mastercard network dominance.
3. T3 Mordor Intelligence — Shift4 Payments agreed (February 2025) to acquire Global Blue for $2.5bn, adding 400,000+ luxury retail locations and tax-free shopping capabilities.
4. T1 Global Payments SEC 8-K / DEF 14A — Global Payments launched its next-generation Genius POS platform in Q2 2025, citing strong commercial traction and significantly increased monthly sales.
5. T1 Congress.gov CRS IF13117 — In September 2025 JPMorgan Chase and Plaid announced a data-transfer agreement with a pricing structure (specifics undisclosed), reflecting the shift toward fee-bearing open-banking data access.

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## Editorial metadata

Provenance only. Nothing below gates publication or affects the render.

Editorial metadata for United States| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| `trust.lawyer_review.status` | never_reviewed |
| `trust.lawyer_review.reviewer` | no reviewer on record |
| ` trust.content_source` | ai_generated |

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