title: Ecuador Payments Regulation Monitor | World Payments Monitor canonical: https://payments.gi/jurisdictions/ecuador/ date_modified: 2026-10-21 publisher: Asymmetric Intelligence # Ecuador EC schema world-payments-v1 trajectory: not yet assessed Last updated 2026-10-21 · 14 modules · 75 sourced findings · 130 sources in the cumulative register 14 Modules baseline.modules[] 75 Findings modules[].findings[] 26 Tier-1 sources run_metadata.t1_source_count Confidence mix (sums to 14 rendered modules; click to filter) No modules moved this cycle. ## Jurisdiction brief ###### Latest update · 18 October 2026 #### Lead Signal Ecuador's payments regulatory activity this cycle centres on the entrenchment of instant-payments infrastructure and the expansion of market access for non-bank payment aggregators, rather than on any conduct, resilience or AML/CFT-specific development. The Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera, Monetaria y de Valores issued Resolución Nro. JPRFM-2026-029-M on 18 June 2026, a reform that entrenches payment-order irrevocability once accepted, mandates 24/7 real-time payment processing, standardises QR codes across the system, and introduces payment-key portability between networks under Ecuador's Sistema Integrador de Pagos. This is a structural tightening of the rules governing how payments move through Ecuador's domestic infrastructure, with direct implications for both bank and non-bank participants in the payments system. #### Other Developments **New payment-aggregation participant authorised.** The Banco Central del Ecuador authorised fintech Payválida S.A. to operate as a participant of the Sistema Auxiliar de Pagos via Resolución Administrativa BCE-GSIMP-2026-003, dated 9 June 2026, enabling the firm to provide payment-aggregation services. This expands the set of non-bank entities with direct standing within Ecuador's auxiliary payments infrastructure. **Instant-payments volume growth.** Ecuador's Sistema de Pagos Interbancario channeled USD 104,617.8 million across 56.3 million operations in the first half of 2026, a 14.6% year-on-year increase in value, according to academic and press reporting. This growth trajectory provides context for the regulatory push toward 24/7 real-time processing reflected in the June resolution. **Fintech investment activity.** Ecuadorian fintech Jelou, which provides AI-driven financial operations via WhatsApp, raised a US$10 million Series A round, reported in February 2026. The company reports processing over US$100 million in financial operations for more than 500 enterprise clients across 13 countries, indicating a regional rather than purely domestic commercial footprint. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The Payválida authorisation and the broader instant-payments entrenchment under JPRFM-2026-029-M are of direct relevance to financial-integrity tracking: each new non-bank participant admitted to the auxiliary payments system, and each tightening of real-time processing requirements, expands the surface against which AML and sanctions controls must be applied, a dynamic distinct from, but parallel to, this cycle's separate sanctions and AML developments for Ecuador. The Jelou funding round and Payválida authorisation together illustrate a broader commercial-dynamics pattern in Ecuador's fintech sector operating alongside, rather than directly driven by, the regulatory infrastructure changes described above. #### Outlook What would most change the picture for Ecuador's payments regime is confirmation of how the 24/7 real-time processing mandate and payment-key portability requirements under JPRFM-2026-029-M are being implemented in practice across both bank and non-bank participants, and whether further non-bank entities follow Payválida's path into the Sistema Auxiliar de Pagos. No dated primary source was found this cycle for conduct, safeguarding, operational-resilience, correspondent-banking or scheme-compliance developments, so those dimensions of Ecuador's payments environment remain as previously stated. _3 earlier updates not shown here._ ###### Standing brief · as of 4 July 2026 _Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._ #### Lead Signal Ecuador's payments regulatory architecture is undergoing rapid institutional consolidation even as its stance on virtual assets remains formally settled but weakly enforced. A Ley Orgánica Reformatoria of the Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero, published 13 October 2025, merged the former Junta de Política y Regulación Monetaria and Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera into a single Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria, now the Central Bank's supreme governing body; under Transitional Provision 54 of the reform law, resolutions issued by the pre-merger juntas remain in force until the unified body issues replacement resolutions within each competence. Running alongside this restructuring, the Banco Central del Ecuador maintains that crypto-assets, including stablecoins, are neither legal tender nor an authorised electronic payment method in Ecuador. That settled prohibition sits uneasily against a widening enforcement gap: prosecutors pursuing a USD 36 million fraud scheme could seize funds that moved through banks and companies but could not trace or confiscate an estimated USD 176 million in crypto-assets across at least 36 currencies, and the IMF's 2026 Ecuador country report finds AML/CFT effectiveness remains limited, prioritising formal compliance and individual case pursuit over concerted action against criminal financial structures. #### Other Developments Ecuador's licensing and conduct baseline has thickened considerably this cycle. JPRM-2024-018-M requires SEDPES to obtain prior Central Bank operating authorisation and imposes a 0.5% reserve requirement on weekly average daily balances three months after authorisation, while SB Resolution SB-2025-02324 creates a technological-control standard for Digital Credit Concession entities requiring economic-financial feasibility, technology-credit model, risk-management model and market-position study prior to qualification. On the conduct side, SB Resolution SB-2025-1876 governs postulation, verification, selection and designation of mandatory Defensores del Cliente at all public and private financial entities under SB control, and JPRM-2024-018-M's fifth transitional provision requires POS positioning so the cardholder can observe card insertion, swipe or tap at all times. Ecuador's banking sector remains concentrated, with Banco Pichincha holding the largest share of private-bank assets at 28.95% as of June 2025, while the cooperative segment is under visible stress: SEPS notified 64 cooperatives of non-compliance with COSEDE deposit-insurance contributions in February 2026, and a 3 April 2026 resolution changed COSEDE's liquidation priority so insured depositors are first transferred to a healthy financial entity rather than waiting for direct insurance payout, a change tested during the Q1 2026 Incoop and Cariamanga liquidations. Corridor dynamics remain shaped by full dollarization: for 2025-2027 the exempt threshold for card-based consumption or withdrawal abroad is USD 5,188.26 annually. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The IMF's assessment of limited AML/CFT effectiveness, the crypto-asset seizure legal-infrastructure gap, and VASP AML-supervision detail exceed this monitor's Sentinel-carried payments-context remit and have been flagged to the Financial Integrity Monitor for original illicit-finance analysis; this brief treats the underlying regulatory and enforcement facts strictly as payments-system context. #### Outlook Watch for the unified Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria's first replacement resolutions in the licensing, safeguarding and payment-systems space, which would resolve the current ambiguity over which pre-merger rules remain operative. Continued cooperative-sector stress, following the Incoop and Cariamanga liquidations, is likely to keep COSEDE's new liquidation-priority mechanism under live testing. The gap between Ecuador's crypto-asset prohibition and its evident enforcement limitations is likely to remain a standing feature absent either enacted crypto-specific legislation or a strengthened virtual-asset seizure toolkit. trust tier: ai_unverified ###### Latest update · 14 September 2026 #### Regulatory Status Ecuador's payments regulatory environment is defined this cycle by a sustained, multi-year central-bank-led build-out of a domestic instant-payments rail. The Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria's Resolución JPRFM-2026-029-M (18 June 2026) confirms the Banco Central del Ecuador as sole inter-network clearer of operations once the Sistema Integrador de Pagos is enabled, building on the underlying interoperability mandate set by Resolución JPRM-2024-029-M in 2024, which established a 90-day implementation-criteria window and an 18-month production-readiness window with phased bank/network connection. A companion cybersecurity and connection-standards instrument, BCE-GG-008-2025, gates technical access to the new rail. Corridor-level messaging-standard detail followed in March 2026, defining transmission and validation rules for real-time interoperable transfers across banks, cooperatives, mutualistas, neobanks, and SEDPES entities. Separately, fintech activity continues under the 2022 Ley Fintech's tripartite licensing structure spanning the Superintendencia de Bancos, the Superintendencia de Economía Popular y Solidaria, and the Banco Central, while open banking as a formalised category remains at an early, non-formalised stage. #### Outlook The SIP's transition from phased connection to full production is the key near-term milestone, expected within the window implied by the 2024 mandate's 18-month production target. Whether non-bank participant types (neobanks, SEDPES, cooperatives, mutualistas) achieve connection parity with traditional banks, and whether a formal open-banking regulation eventually emerges from the Superintendencia de Bancos, are the two structural questions likely to shape Ecuador's payments landscape over the coming cycles. _2 earlier updates not shown here._ ###### Standing brief · as of 4 July 2026 _Written before the update above. Where they differ, the update is the more recent position._ #### Regulatory Status Ecuador's payments regulatory architecture rests on the 2022 Ley Fintech's multi-regulator authorisation model, now overseen by a newly unified Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria formed by an October 2025 merger of the former monetary and financial policy juntas. Beneath this apex, SEDPES carries the principal non-bank e-money licence, mandatory Defensor del Cliente and POS anti-skimming rules anchor conduct standards, and BCE-GG-008-2025 is rolling out ISO 20022-based real-time payment interoperability. The Central Bank maintains that crypto-assets are neither legal tender nor an authorised payment method, even as a standalone crypto bill remains pending and prosecutors report an estimated USD 176 million in crypto-assets they could not trace or confiscate in a single fraud scheme. Financial-stability stress is visible in the cooperative sector, where SEPS notified 64 cooperatives of COSEDE deposit-insurance arrears in February 2026 and a subsequent liquidation-priority reform was tested in the Incoop and Cariamanga cases. Correspondent-bank access to the US dollar payments system remains a structural dependency for this fully dollarized economy. #### Outlook Watch the unified Junta's first replacement resolutions in licensing and payment-systems space, continued cooperative-sector liquidations under the new COSEDE priority mechanism, and whether the pending crypto-asset bill advances against a backdrop of documented virtual-asset seizure gaps. 14 of 14 modules Signal Density Selections OR within a group, AND across groups. Press / to search. ### W1a Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access Confirmed confirmed 2026-07-04 BCE Resolucion JPRFM-2026-029-M (18 Jun 2026) confirms the Central Bank as sole inter-network clearer of payment operations once the SIP is enabled, amending real-time-payment and payment-key definitions; BCE-GG-008-2025 sets cybersecurity/connection standards for SIP/RPI-connected network administrators. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 223 words · last cycle 2026-10-18 #### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access Ecuador's fintech and payments licensing regime rests on the 2022 Ley Fintech, which establishes a multi-regulator supervision model: fintech companies are policy-set by the Junta de Política y Regulación Monetaria/Financiera and supervised by the Central Bank, the Superintendencia de Compañías/Valores/Seguros, the Superintendencia de Bancos, or the SEPS according to competence. The principal non-bank authorisation route runs through SEDPES, the Sociedades Especializadas de Depósitos y Pagos Electrónicos: JPRM-2024-018-M requires SEDPES to obtain prior Central Bank operating authorisation and imposes a 0.5% reserve requirement on weekly average daily balances three months after authorisation. A further category was added this cycle: SB Resolution SB-2025-02324 creates a technological-control standard for Digital Credit Concession entities, requiring economic-financial feasibility, technology-credit model, risk-management model and market-position study prior to qualification. Across all three instruments, the licensing architecture keeps bank and non-bank routes distinct: banks operate under the Ley General de Instituciones del Sistema Financiero, while SEDPES and Digital Credit Concession entities sit within a separate, Central-Bank- and SB-authorised non-bank track. #### Outlook The multi-regulator model is likely to keep expanding by activity rather than consolidating into a single fintech licence, with the SB's technological-control standard for digital credit signalling further category-by-category rule-making. Watch for whether the new unified Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria revisits the underlying JPRM/JPRF resolutions that currently anchor this architecture. Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18 #### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access The Banco Central del Ecuador authorised fintech Payválida S.A. to operate as a participant of the Sistema Auxiliar de Pagos via Resolución Administrativa BCE-GSIMP-2026-003, dated 9 June 2026. This authorisation enables Payválida to provide payment-aggregation services within Ecuador's auxiliary payments infrastructure, representing a market-access event for a non-bank payment-institution-type entrant. The authorisation is a discrete regulatory clearance rather than a change to the underlying licensing framework itself, and it sits within a market-access environment in which Ecuador's Fintech Law sandbox has, as of the most recent check, remained unused. This single authorisation event is the principal licensing and market-access development identified for Ecuador this cycle. It demonstrates that the Banco Central del Ecuador's authorisation pathway for non-bank payment-aggregation participants is active and being used, even as the separate regulatory-sandbox mechanism created under the Fintech Law has not yet attracted an entrant. #### Outlook What would extend this picture is evidence of further non-bank entities following Payválida's path into the Sistema Auxiliar de Pagos, or of the first entrant to Ecuador's Fintech Law sandbox, neither of which was found this cycle. **3 earlier distinct update(s)** Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14 #### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access Ecuador's payments-regulatory posture shifted materially this cycle with the Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria's issuance of Resolución JPRFM-2026-029-M on 18 June 2026. The resolution amends the regulatory definitions of real-time payments and payment keys, and, critically for market-access purposes, confirms the Banco Central del Ecuador as the sole inter-network clearer of operations once the Sistema Integrador de Pagos is enabled. This centralises inter-network clearing authority at the central bank rather than distributing it across competing private clearing arrangements, a structural choice with direct implications for how any new entrant, bank or non-bank alike, gains access to real-time settlement finality once the SIP is live. This resolution does not stand alone; it builds on Resolución JPRM-2024-029-M, which had already given the BCE a defined 90-day window to set implementation criteria and an 18-month window to bring the SIP into production, with a phased approach to connecting banks and payment networks to the Red de Pagos Instantáneos. The sequencing across two resolutions spanning 2024 to 2026 indicates a deliberate, staged regulatory build-out rather than a single reactive rule change, and market-access planning for any institution, bank or non-bank payment institution, seeking to connect to the SIP should account for this phased-connection design rather than expecting a single-step authorisation event. Access to the new clearing infrastructure carries an explicit technical precondition: BCE-GG-008-2025 sets cybersecurity and connection standards for payment-network administrators connecting to the SIP and the RPI. This means that, going forward, market access is gated not only by the JPRFM/JPRM regulatory framework itself but also by a distinct technical-standards instrument, effectively creating a two-layer authorisation gate, regulatory-status determination plus technical-connection certification, for institutions seeking to participate directly in the new rail. #### Outlook The key market-access milestone to watch is the SIP's transition from phased connection into full production. Given the 18-month implementation window established by the 2024 mandate, the platform should be approaching or reaching production status in the near term, at which point the practical market-access question shifts from regulatory design to actual onboarding queues and connection-certification throughput for the banks, cooperatives, mutualistas, neobanks, and SEDPES entities expected to participate. Periodic update · new data 2026-09-08 #### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access Ecuador's market-access architecture for non-bank payment institutions changed materially this cycle. Resolution JPRM-2024-018-M, issued by the Junta de Politica y Regulacion Monetaria on 4 September 2024, comprehensively reformed the implementing framework for the 2022 Ley Fintech and superseded the prior JPRM-2023-014-M. Under the new sequencing, a Sociedad Especializada de Depositos y Pagos Electronicos, or SEDPES, must first obtain authorisation from the Banco Central del Ecuador before the Superintendencia de Bancos will issue the operative fintech-activity licence itself. This is a two-authority gate rather than a single-authority licensing process, and it applies specifically to the non-bank payment-institution and e-money-institution category rather than to bank-affiliated payment activity, which continues to sit under the existing prudential banking framework. The primary regulatory text for this resolution was directly retrieved this cycle, and the finding carries high confidence; press corroboration from Primicias independently confirms the authorisation-sequencing requirement, at assessed confidence for the secondary account. The practical effect for market entrants is a longer and more sequenced path to market: a prospective SEDPES cannot simply apply to the banking superintendent for a licence but must first clear a central-bank authorisation step, adding a distinct decision point and a distinct regulator relationship to the market-entry process. No evidence was identified this cycle on how long the BCE authorisation step takes in practice, or on transitional arrangements for SEDPES entities already licensed under the prior JPRM-2023-014-M framework. #### Outlook Watch for implementing guidance or transitional provisions clarifying how existing SEDPES licence holders move onto the new BCE-authorisation-then-licensing sequence, and for any published timeline for the BCE authorisation step itself, neither of which was evidenced in this cycle's sourcing. Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25 #### Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access Ecuador's payments licensing architecture is anchored in the Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE), which shares fintech supervisory authority with the Superintendency of Banks, the Superintendency of Companies, Securities and Insurance, and the Superintendency of Popular and Solidarity Economy. This multi-supervisor structure means market access for a payments entrant depends on corporate form and licence category as much as on the BCE authorisation itself: a bank-affiliated participant answers to the Superintendency of Banks, while a non-bank fintech answers primarily to the BCE and, depending on structure, one of the other two superintendencies. The Fintech Law defines three licence categories that structure the non-bank payment-institution and electronic-money-institution market: ITCMP, for technological infrastructures channelling payments; ASAP, for administrators of auxiliary payment systems; and SEDPES, for specialised companies in electronic deposits and payments. Payment aggregators, gateways, remitters, and digital wallets must incorporate locally in Ecuador and obtain BCE authorisation before operating, and the BCE holds express power to withdraw licences for non-compliance, giving the regulator continuing leverage over licensees beyond the initial authorisation gate. The regulatory perimeter itself is defined narrowly: only electronic money and credit, debit, and prepaid cards count as legal means of payment under BCE rules, and crypto-assets are explicitly excluded from both legal-tender status and the payment-firm rulebook. That exclusion is a boundary decision embedded in the core instrument-scope definition, meaning crypto-asset firms sit outside the ITCMP, ASAP, and SEDPES licensing categories entirely and are not subject to this market-access regime. #### Outlook Watch for whether the BCE issues further clarification on how the multi-supervisor structure applies to hybrid or group-structured applicants spanning bank and non-bank forms, and for any change to the instrument-scope boundary that currently excludes crypto-assets from the payment-firm licensing perimeter. **Sources and findings (6)** 1. T1 [https://www.telecomunicaciones.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/RO_221222_0215S2.pdf](https://www.telecomunicaciones.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/RO_221222_0215S2.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T1 [https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf](https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf) 3. T1 [https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/resolucion-SB-2025-2324.pdf](https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/resolucion-SB-2025-2324.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T1 [https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/resolucion-SB-2025-2323.pdf](https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/resolucion-SB-2025-2323.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T3 [https://www.legal500.com/guides/chapter/ecuador-fintech/?export-pdf=](https://www.legal500.com/guides/chapter/ecuador-fintech/?export-pdf=) 6. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/JPRFM/codificaciones/LIBROI-Codificacion-JPRFM.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/JPRFM/codificaciones/LIBROI-Codificacion-JPRFM.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W1b Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions Confirmed confirmed 2026-07-04 The BCE has progressively tightened authorisation and operating requirements for auxiliary payment systems via Resolution BCE-GG-024-2024 and the January 2026 SRP resolution BCE-GG-002-2026. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 121 words · last cycle 2026-08-25 #### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions SB Resolution SB-2025-1876 (Aug 2025) governs postulation, verification, selection and designation of mandatory Defensores del Cliente at all public and private financial entities under SB control. Conduct rules also reach the point of sale: JPRM-2024-018-M's fifth transitional provision requires POS positioning so the cardholder can observe card insertion, swipe or tap at all times and prohibits staff from handling the card or wallet outside the client's visual field. Together these instruments give Ecuador a mandatory redress channel and a merchant-facing anti-skimming standard, though neither extends into a codified authorised-push-payment reimbursement regime. #### Outlook Expect continued build-out of the Defensor del Cliente infrastructure across smaller entities, and possible extension of POS visibility standards to newer non-bank acquiring channels. Periodic update · new data 2026-08-25 #### Conduct, Safeguarding & Financial Promotions The BCE has progressively tightened the conduct layer for payment-system participants over the past two years. Resolution BCE-GG-024-2024 strengthened authorisation and operating requirements specifically for auxiliary payment systems, the ASAP licence category, raising the bar for firms already inside the regulatory perimeter rather than only at the point of initial authorisation. A newer Administrative Resolution, BCE-GG-002-2026, issued in January 2026, governs the Sistema de Recaudacion Publica, including test-environment enablement and cheque and card adjustment procedures; its focus on the public-collections system indicates the BCE's conduct oversight extends into government and quasi-government payment flows as well as private payment aggregators and wallets. Separately, the Sistema de Pagos Interbancario has reached an interoperability milestone connecting participants across the payment system, but its centralisation under the BCE has raised a competition concern flagged in legal commentary: whether fintechs can access the interbank payment system on equal terms with traditional banks, or whether bank incumbency confers a structural advantage inside a BCE-centralised interoperability layer. This sits at the same bank-versus-non-bank fault line that runs through the licensing regime, but as a conduct-and-access question rather than a licensing-category question. #### Outlook Watch for further BCE conduct-layer resolutions following the pattern set by BCE-GG-024-2024 and BCE-GG-002-2026, and for whether the fintech sector's SIP competitive-parity concerns prompt a formal regulatory response or clarification of interbank-access terms on equal footing with bank participants. **Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/resolucion-SB-2025-1876-1.pdf](https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/resolucion-SB-2025-1876-1.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T2 [https://www.citi.com/icg/sa/latam/ecuador/institutional-info/rights-and-obligations.html](https://www.citi.com/icg/sa/latam/ecuador/institutional-info/rights-and-obligations.html) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T1 [https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf](https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf) 4. T1 [https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/preguntas-frecuentes/](https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/preguntas-frecuentes/) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T1 [https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/](https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W2 Stablecoins & Digital Money Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Ecuador maintains a bank-facing prohibition on crypto payments pending enabling legislation, with a draft VASP registry chapter and a possible BCE tokenised-dollar pilot on the horizon. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 120 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Stablecoins & Digital Money Per COMF Article 94/99 and JPRM Resolutions 2022-005-M, 2023-015-M and 2023-014-M, the US dollar is sole legal tender and crypto-assets, including stablecoins, are neither legal tender nor an authorised electronic payment method in Ecuador. A standalone crypto-asset and DLT regulatory-framework bill remains in parliamentary process as of 2026, with no enacted crypto-specific licensing regime yet in force, leaving an in-force-versus-pending split against the Central Bank's current prohibition stance. Any identified crypto-asset use as a payment method is referred to the Fiscalía General del Estado under COMF Article 98. #### Outlook The prohibition stance is likely to hold absent enactment of the pending bill; watch the legislative calendar for any first reading that would narrow the in-force-versus-pending gap. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (6)** 1. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/los-criptoactivos-no-son-una-moneda-de-curso-legal-ni-un-medio-de-pago-autorizado-en-ecuador/](https://www.bce.fin.ec/los-criptoactivos-no-son-una-moneda-de-curso-legal-ni-un-medio-de-pago-autorizado-en-ecuador/) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T3 [https://www.criptofacil.com/es/banco-central-de-ecuador-ratifico-prohibicion-de-criptoactivos/](https://www.criptofacil.com/es/banco-central-de-ecuador-ratifico-prohibicion-de-criptoactivos/) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://www.primicias.ec/economia/gobierno-reforma-legal-bce-sanciones-criptoactivos-criptomonedas-ecuador-76471/](https://www.primicias.ec/economia/gobierno-reforma-legal-bce-sanciones-criptoactivos-criptomonedas-ecuador-76471/) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T3 [https://metlabs.io/regulacion-blockchain/ecuador/](https://metlabs.io/regulacion-blockchain/ecuador/) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T1 [https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf](https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf) 6. T3 [https://www.connectas.org/criptomonedas-sin-control-fuga-millonaria-iglesia-ecuador/](https://www.connectas.org/criptomonedas-sin-control-fuga-millonaria-iglesia-ecuador/) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W3 Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure Confirmed confirmed 2026-07-04 Operational resilience is governed by the SB's Norma de Control para la Gestión del Riesgo Operativo, mandating ISO 22301-based BCM and ISO 27000-based information-security management, layered with BCE cybersecurity standards for the new instant-payments interoperability infrastructure. Kept on Dataprotection.gi, not restated here: data and cloud switching obligations on service providers, including notice periods and charges. [Open this jurisdiction's page on Dataprotection.gi →](https://dataprotection.gi/jurisdictions/ecuador/) Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 125 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure SB-2021-2126, as reformed by SB-2024-02855, requires an ISO 22301-based business-continuity management system with a board-chaired continuity committee and annual testing, and an ISO 27000-based information-security management system with a dedicated security officer and annual independent audits. Layered on top, BCE-GG-008-2025 mandates robust encryption of data in transit and at rest, strong access control and authentication, and documented, auditable security procedures for payment-network administrators integrating into the Sistema Integrador de Pagos and Red de Pagos Instantáneos. Together the two instruments give Ecuador an ISO-aligned resilience baseline spanning both traditional banking infrastructure and the new instant-payments rails. #### Outlook Expect continued annual-audit cycles under both regimes, with the instant-payments cybersecurity mandate likely to expand as more payment-network administrators integrate into the interoperability infrastructure. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cronograma-plazos-cumplimiento-Norma-Riesgo-Operativo-Res.-Nro.-SB-2021-2126.pdf](https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Cronograma-plazos-cumplimiento-Norma-Riesgo-Operativo-Res.-Nro.-SB-2021-2126.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T3 [https://www.piranirisk.com/es/blog/gestion-de-seguridad-informacion-entidades-financieras-ecuador](https://www.piranirisk.com/es/blog/gestion-de-seguridad-informacion-entidades-financieras-ecuador) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T1 [https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Res.-No.-SB-2024-02855-Reforma-la-Norma-de-control-para-la-gestion-del-riesgo-operativo.pdf](https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Res.-No.-SB-2024-02855-Reforma-la-Norma-de-control-para-la-gestion-del-riesgo-operativo.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T1 [https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/superintendencia-de-bancos-impulsa-formacion-en-ciberseguridad/](https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/superintendencia-de-bancos-impulsa-formacion-en-ciberseguridad/) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W4 Scheme & Network Compliance Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Card-scheme and payment-network compliance sits with the Superintendencia de Bancos and the Central Bank, with no dedicated interchange-fee regulation identified distinct from Ecuador's general interest-rate-cap regime. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 141 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Scheme & Network Compliance Article 8 of BCE-GG-008-2025 mandates ISO 20022 messaging as the standard for real-time payments up to USD 15,000 processed by payment-network administrators, while Article 9 requires clearing and settlement data to conform to the Central Bank's Specialized Clearing Chamber System specifications. Separately, Superintendencia de Bancos codification Libro I Título II Capítulo V requires card issuers and administrators or operators to be authorised entities under the Ley General de Instituciones del Sistema Financiero, and prohibits card-issuing or administering companies from investing in the capital of other financial or commercial institutions. No dedicated interchange-fee cap has been identified; Ecuador instead regulates general effective active interest-rate ceilings by credit segment. #### Outlook Watch for the first compliance deadlines under the ISO 20022 mandate as payment-network administrators integrate, and for whether any dedicated interchange-fee rule emerges distinct from the general rate-ceiling regime. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2017/06/L1_I_cap_V.pdf](https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2017/06/L1_I_cap_V.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T1 [https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf](https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf) 5. T3 [https://www.primicias.ec/economia/cambios-programa-fmi-tasas-interes-credito-bancos-cooperativas-101308/](https://www.primicias.ec/economia/cambios-programa-fmi-tasas-interes-credito-bancos-cooperativas-101308/) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W5 Payment Corridor Dynamics Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Corridor dynamics are shaped by full US-dollar dollarization since 2000, an outbound-currency tax (ISD) that directly taxes cross-border transfers, and reliance on correspondent-bank/SWIFT rails. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 149 words · last cycle 2026-10-11 #### Payment Corridor Dynamics For 2025-2027 the exempt threshold for card-based consumption or withdrawal abroad is USD 5,188.26 annually, and wire transfers abroad benefit from a biweekly exemption equal to three unified basic salaries, USD 1,446 in 2026 — the Impuesto a la Salida de Divisas remains the primary corridor-friction mechanism for outbound flows in a fully dollarized economy. Beneath this tax structure, Ecuador's dollarized banking system operates within a hierarchical liabilities pyramid with the US Federal Reserve at the apex, correspondent megabanks next, then the Banco Central del Ecuador and the national banking system; correspondent access is reported as unequally distributed among domestic banks. No PAPSS-, UPI-linkage- or dedicated regional instant-payment corridor scheme connecting Ecuador to neighbouring jurisdictions was identified this cycle. #### Outlook The ISD is likely to remain the dominant corridor-friction lever absent tax reform; watch specialist correspondent-banking and LAC regional-integration sources for any emerging real-time corridor linkage. Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14 #### Payment Corridor Dynamics Ecuador is building a domestic instant-payments rail, the Sistema Integrador de Pagos and its associated Red de Pagos Instantáneos, that is explicitly analogous in ambition to Brazil's Pix or India's UPI. This rail is being layered on top of the Banco Central del Ecuador's existing 'De Una' free instant-transfer wallet, meaning the corridor design builds on an already-live consumer-facing product rather than starting from zero adoption. A March 2026 BCE resolution set out the structure, transmission, and validation rules for the technical and operational messages that payment networks will use to execute real-time interoperable transfers, giving corridor participants a concrete messaging-standards basis for the transfers that will flow across the rail. What distinguishes this corridor build-out analytically is the breadth of the participant set the message-standards resolution explicitly contemplates: banks, cooperatives, mutualistas, neobanks, and SEDPES entities are all named as payment-network types expected to use the new real-time messaging structure. This is a corridor designed from the outset to be interoperable across the bank/non-bank divide, rather than a bank-only rail with non-bank institutions added later as an afterthought. That design choice has meaningful competitive-dynamics implications: neobanks and SEDPES-licensed non-bank payment institutions are positioned to gain the same real-time settlement access as traditional banks once the rail reaches production, narrowing a access asymmetry that has constrained non-bank competitiveness in many other markets' instant-payments build-outs. The corridor's governance sits with the BCE both as regulator and, per the confirmed sole-inter-network-clearer designation, as the settlement counterparty itself, concentrating both rule-setting and clearing functions within the central bank rather than distributing them across a separately governed scheme operator. #### Outlook As message-standard implementation proceeds toward the SIP's production target, the corridor-dynamics question to watch is uptake: whether cooperatives, mutualistas, neobanks, and SEDPES entities connect to the rail at a pace comparable to traditional banks, or whether practical technical and cybersecurity-certification barriers under BCE-GG-008-2025 slow non-bank participation relative to the design intent of an interoperable, bank/non-bank-inclusive rail. **Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://www.sri.gob.ec/en/impuesto-a-la-salida-de-divisas-isd](https://www.sri.gob.ec/en/impuesto-a-la-salida-de-divisas-isd) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T1 [https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1ecuea2026001-source-pdf.pdf](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1ecuea2026001-source-pdf.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://www.redalyc.org/journal/118/11877363006/html/](https://www.redalyc.org/journal/118/11877363006/html/) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T3 [https://www.fundacionmicrofinanzasbbva.org/revistaprogreso/reforma-gestion-del-dinero-electronico/](https://www.fundacionmicrofinanzasbbva.org/revistaprogreso/reforma-gestion-del-dinero-electronico/) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T4 not_applicable/searched ### W6 Industry Structure & Commercial Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Ecuador's banking sector is concentrated among five large private banks controlling roughly three-quarters of private-bank assets, alongside a fragmented cooperative sector under stress and a small but growing fintech ecosystem anchored by Kushki. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 117 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics As of June 2025, Banco Pichincha held the largest share of Ecuador's private-bank assets at 28.95%, out of a total sector of USD 72.6 billion (+14.87% year-on-year), followed by Banco del Pacífico at 13.02%; the top five banks control nearly three-quarters of private banking assets, though academic HHI analysis finds low-to-moderate concentration overall. Kushki is Ecuador's first fintech unicorn, having raised USD 186 million in cumulative venture funding as of September 2025, the largest of Ecuador's twelve VC-funded fintech companies out of 118 to 121 total fintechs nationwide. #### Outlook Expect continued asset consolidation among the top five private banks alongside cooperative-sector stress, with Kushki's regional expansion the primary fintech-scale signal to watch. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T2 [https://rankingslatam.com/blogs/industry-news/ecuador-s-private-banking-sector-shows-strong-growth-and-stable-leadership-march-2025-rankingsalysis](https://rankingslatam.com/blogs/industry-news/ecuador-s-private-banking-sector-shows-strong-growth-and-stable-leadership-march-2025-rankingsalysis) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T2 [https://ratingspcr.com.mx/ww2/sector-bancos-bancos-ecuador/](https://ratingspcr.com.mx/ww2/sector-bancos-bancos-ecuador/) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ecuador/7PwJ-m65RwujGFYmL7TNrZsyko6sFNfMmfjHt6eDz-o](https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ecuador/7PwJ-m65RwujGFYmL7TNrZsyko6sFNfMmfjHt6eDz-o) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T3 [https://www.primicias.ec/economia/que-seguro-cosede-bancos-cooperativas-liquidacion-quiebra-requisitos-121025/](https://www.primicias.ec/economia/que-seguro-cosede-bancos-cooperativas-liquidacion-quiebra-requisitos-121025/) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T3 [https://epsir.net/index.php/epsir/article/view/1230](https://epsir.net/index.php/epsir/article/view/1230) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W7 Legal & Litigation Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Enforcement activity centres on the SB's and SEPS's administrative sanctioning powers against unauthorised entities and non-compliant cooperatives, compounded by a legal-infrastructure gap around crypto-asset seizure. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 131 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Legal & Litigation The Superintendencia de Bancos has detected 68 unauthorised financial entities conducting reserved financial activities since 2025, publishing the list and operating a confidential denunciation channel. A parallel legal-infrastructure gap has surfaced around virtual-asset seizure: Fiscalía authorities could only seize funds that moved through banks and companies in a USD 36 million fraud scheme, while an estimated USD 176 million in crypto-assets across at least 36 currencies could not be traced or confiscated. In February 2026, SEPS notified 64 cooperatives, including some of the country's largest, of non-compliance with COSEDE deposit-insurance contributions, totalling USD 117,557 owed to the fund. #### Outlook Expect continued expansion of the unauthorised-entity detection list and further SEPS enforcement actions against cooperative arrears; the crypto-seizure legal gap is likely to persist absent new virtual-asset confiscation legislation. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/](https://www.superbancos.gob.ec/bancos/) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T1 [https://www.seps.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/SEPS-IGT-IGS-IGJ-INSESF-INGINT-0690-.pdf](https://www.seps.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/SEPS-IGT-IGS-IGJ-INSESF-INGINT-0690-.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://boletincontable.com/2026/04/21/seguro-depositos-cosede-cooperativas-ecuador-2026/](https://boletincontable.com/2026/04/21/seguro-depositos-cosede-cooperativas-ecuador-2026/) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T3 [https://www.connectas.org/criptomonedas-sin-control-fuga-millonaria-iglesia-ecuador/](https://www.connectas.org/criptomonedas-sin-control-fuga-millonaria-iglesia-ecuador/) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T1 [https://www.cosede.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/resolucionjb20111906regimensancionatorio.pdf](https://www.cosede.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/resolucionjb20111906regimensancionatorio.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W8 Merchant Acquiring & Risk Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Merchant acquiring in Ecuador runs through bank card-operator licensees and a growing non-bank acquiring layer led by Kushki and PayPhone. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 95 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Merchant Acquiring & Risk Kushki became Latin America's first regional next-generation payment acquirer, announced October 2023, and formed a strategic alliance with Yuno in April 2024. On the regulatory side, SEDPES are the designated non-bank channel authorised to operate electronic wallets that facilitate merchant payment acceptance and real-time fund transfers, subject to prior BCE authorisation. Together, Kushki and PayPhone anchor a growing non-bank acquiring layer operating within SB and BCE point-of-sale risk rules. #### Outlook Expect continued regional expansion of Ecuador's non-bank acquiring layer, with SEDPES e-wallet authorisation remaining the gating requirement for new merchant-acceptance entrants. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T3 [https://tracxn.com/d/geographies/ecuador/M9D5IN0Pzu1hO_4mTHLe1dIZR6BmYY_i2ryIuSW2hlQ](https://tracxn.com/d/geographies/ecuador/M9D5IN0Pzu1hO_4mTHLe1dIZR6BmYY_i2ryIuSW2hlQ) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T3 [https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ecuador/7PwJ-m65RwujGFYmL7TNrZsyko6sFNfMmfjHt6eDz-o/companies](https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ecuador/7PwJ-m65RwujGFYmL7TNrZsyko6sFNfMmfjHt6eDz-o/companies) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://www.nuvei.com/apm/payphone](https://www.nuvei.com/apm/payphone) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T1 [https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf](https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf) 5. T1 [https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf](https://www.gob.ec/sites/default/files/regulations/2024-11/JPRM-2024-018-M_lexis.pdf) ### W9 Product Innovation & Market Development Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Instant/real-time payments scale under BCE's SIP/RPI program; JPRFM-2026-029-M (18 Jun 2026) entrenches payment-order irrevocability, mandates 24/7 real-time processing, standardises QR codes, and introduces payment-key portability between networks. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 88 words · last cycle 2026-10-18 #### Product Innovation & Market Development BCE-GG-008-2025 sets phased implementation stages, responsible parties and deadlines for real-time electronic-money-transfer interoperability via the Sistema Integrador de Pagos, including QR-code payment execution and ISO 20022 messaging. Separately, the Ley Fintech directs the Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera to establish conditions under which the private financial system must provide open-banking services via published APIs. #### Outlook Expect further phased-rollout milestones for the Sistema Integrador de Pagos and Red de Pagos Instantáneos, and watch for the first implementing conditions under the open-banking API mandate. Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18 #### Product Innovation & Market Development Ecuador's instant-payments infrastructure was materially reformed this cycle through Resolución Nro. JPRFM-2026-029-M, issued by the Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera, Monetaria y de Valores on 18 June 2026. The resolution entrenches payment-order irrevocability once a payment order has been accepted, mandates 24/7 real-time payment processing across the system, standardises QR codes for payment initiation, and introduces payment-key portability between networks, all under Ecuador's Sistema Integrador de Pagos. Together these elements describe a significant tightening and modernisation of the rules governing how payments move through Ecuador's domestic infrastructure, applicable to both bank and non-bank participants in the system. This regulatory push sits against a backdrop of substantial organic growth in instant-payments volume: Ecuador's Sistema de Pagos Interbancario channeled USD 104,617.8 million across 56.3 million operations in the first half of 2026, a 14.6% year-on-year increase in value. The scale and growth rate of this volume provides commercial context for the regulator's decision to mandate 24/7 real-time processing and to standardise QR-code initiation, both of which are features that typically accompany a payments system handling increasing transaction density. #### Outlook The central open question is how the 24/7 real-time processing mandate and payment-key portability requirements are being implemented in practice by both bank and non-bank participants, and whether the standardisation of QR codes produces measurable interoperability gains across Ecuador's payment networks in subsequent reporting periods. **2 earlier distinct update(s)** Periodic update · new data 2026-09-14 #### Product Innovation & Market Development Fintech product development in Ecuador continues to operate under the 2022 Ley Fintech, which requires FinTech companies to incorporate as sociedades anónimas with an exclusive corporate purpose and to obtain authorisation from the Superintendencia de Bancos, the Superintendencia de Economía Popular y Solidaria, or the Banco Central, with the specific supervisory authority determined by the nature of the activity undertaken. This tripartite supervisory structure means a fintech's regulatory pathway depends heavily on product classification: a lending platform, a savings-cooperative-adjacent product, and a payments-focused product could each land under a different supervisor, adding a classification-dependent layer to product-development planning that does not exist in jurisdictions with a single fintech regulator. Open banking, as a formalised regulatory category with defined data-sharing rights and API-access obligations, remains at an early and non-formalised stage in Ecuador. This is a notable gap relative to jurisdictions that have moved to mandate structured account-information and payment-initiation access for licensed third parties; its absence means Ecuadorian fintech innovation in data-driven lending, account aggregation, or open-banking-style product categories currently proceeds without a dedicated regulatory framework to rely on, creating both flexibility and legal uncertainty for product teams building in this space. The product-innovation picture in Ecuador should also be read against the backdrop of the instant-payments rail build-out proceeding in parallel: as the SIP/RPI infrastructure matures, it creates the underlying settlement rail that future open-banking-style products would eventually need to plug into, even though no formal open-banking mandate currently exists requiring that connection. #### Outlook The principal gap to watch is whether the Superintendencia de Bancos issues any formal open-banking regulation in a coming cycle; none was located this cycle. Absent such a framework, fintech product innovation in data-sharing-dependent categories will likely continue to develop through bilateral commercial arrangements rather than a mandated regulatory access regime, a materially different growth path than markets with open-banking mandates already in force. Periodic update · new data 2026-09-08 #### Product Innovation & Market Development Two linked developments under Resolution JPRM-2024-029-M, dated 31 December 2024, mark the most significant product-and-market-structure intervention in Ecuador's fintech framework since the Ley Fintech's original enactment. First, the resolution mandates a Sistema de Interoperabilidad de Pagos, a payments-interoperability system spanning multiple channels, described in secondary academic commentary as Ecuador's most ambitious digital-payments instrument to date. Second, the same resolution creates a differentiated regulatory corporate form, the fintech company, and expressly prohibits traditional financial entities, meaning incumbent banks, from holding equity in companies organised under that form. Both findings are assessed rather than high confidence, since the primary text of JPRM-2024-029-M was not directly retrieved this cycle and the sourcing relies on academic and press commentary rather than the resolution itself. The bank-equity restriction is a deliberate market-structure choice: it is designed to prevent incumbent banks from capturing the newly created fintech-company category through equity ownership, preserving the category as a distinct, non-bank-controlled channel for product innovation. Both the interoperability mandate and the fintech-company form build on the existing statutory base, since the underlying Ley Fintech has enabled regulatory sandboxes for novel fintech business models since its 22 December 2022 enactment; the 2024 resolutions extend that base rather than replacing it. #### Outlook The near-term product-development picture in Ecuador will turn on how quickly the Sistema de Interoperabilidad de Pagos is implemented across participating institutions, and on whether the bank-equity bar in the fintech-company form is tested or challenged by incumbent banks seeking indirect routes into the category. Direct retrieval of the JPRM-2024-029-M primary text remains the key evidentiary gap for moving both findings to high confidence. **Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/BCE/sistemas_auxiliares/BCE-GG-008-2025.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T3 [https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/economia/ley-fintech-reglamento-servicios-financieros-tecnologicos-ecuador-articulos-nota/](https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/economia/ley-fintech-reglamento-servicios-financieros-tecnologicos-ecuador-articulos-nota/) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://www.paconsulting.com/insights/the-worlds-first-central-bank-operated-mobile-payments-platform-ecuadors-revolutionary-scheme](https://www.paconsulting.com/insights/the-worlds-first-central-bank-operated-mobile-payments-platform-ecuadors-revolutionary-scheme) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T1 [https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/resolucion-SB-2025-2324.pdf](https://asobanca.org.ec/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/resolucion-SB-2025-2324.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T1 [https://www.telecomunicaciones.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/RO_221222_0215S2.pdf](https://www.telecomunicaciones.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/RO_221222_0215S2.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W10 Consumer Protection & APP Fraud Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Consumer protection is anchored by COSEDE's tiered deposit-insurance mechanism, newly reformed in April 2026 to prioritise purchase-and-assumption transfers, alongside the Defensor del Cliente route; no APP-fraud reimbursement mandate identified. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 141 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Consumer Protection & APP Fraud COSEDE deposit insurance covers up to USD 32,000 per depositor for banks, mutualistas and segment-1 cooperatives, tiered down to USD 11,250 for segment 2, USD 5,000 for segment 3 and USD 1,000 for segments 4 and 5. A 3 April 2026 Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria resolution changed COSEDE's liquidation priority so insured depositors are first transferred to a healthy financial entity rather than waiting for direct insurance payout, a change tested during the Q1 2026 Incoop and Cariamanga liquidations. No dedicated authorised-push-payment reimbursement regime was identified alongside these deposit-protection mechanisms. #### Outlook The liquidation-priority reform is likely to see further live testing given continuing cooperative-sector stress; absent new legislation, redress for payment fraud will continue to run through the general Defensor del Cliente and SB complaints route rather than a dedicated APP regime. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T1 [https://www.cosede.gob.ec/seguro-de-depositos/](https://www.cosede.gob.ec/seguro-de-depositos/) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T3 [https://www.lexis.com.ec/noticias/alcance-y-normativa-vigente-del-seguro-de-depositos-gestionado-por-la-cosede](https://www.lexis.com.ec/noticias/alcance-y-normativa-vigente-del-seguro-de-depositos-gestionado-por-la-cosede) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://www.primicias.ec/economia/que-seguro-cosede-bancos-cooperativas-liquidacion-quiebra-requisitos-121025/](https://www.primicias.ec/economia/que-seguro-cosede-bancos-cooperativas-liquidacion-quiebra-requisitos-121025/) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T2 [https://www.citi.com/icg/sa/latam/ecuador/institutional-info/rights-and-obligations.html](https://www.citi.com/icg/sa/latam/ecuador/institutional-info/rights-and-obligations.html) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T4 not_applicable/searched ### W11 AML/CFT & Financial Crime (Sentinel.gi-fed) [Sourced from Sentinel.gi ↗](https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/ecuador/#sec-dom-D7) Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Sentinel.gi payments-context position: Ecuador's new AML/CFT Law (in force July 2025) aligns with FATF standards, but IMF's 2026 Article IV assessment finds effectiveness still limited. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 109 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### AML/CFT & Financial Crime (Sentinel.gi-fed) A new AML/CFT law approved by the National Assembly in July 2024 entered into force in July 2025, incorporating FATF-aligned reforms; authorities are operationalising a Strategic Action Plan and AML/CFT Coordination Committee with IMF technical assistance. The IMF's 2026 Ecuador country report finds AML/CFT effectiveness remains limited, prioritising formal compliance and individual case pursuit over concerted action against criminal financial structures. This intelligence is carried through from the Sentinel.gi feed; original illicit-finance analysis remains with the Financial Integrity Monitor. #### Outlook Expect continued IMF and FATF-aligned technical-assistance engagement, with the Strategic Action Plan's implementation pace the key indicator of whether effectiveness improves beyond formal compliance. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (7)** 1. T3 sentinel.https://metlabs.io/regulacion-blockchain/ecuador/ 2. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) per-JID baseline profile — Ecuador — Dollarized economy; AML/CFT overseen by the Unidad de Análisis Financiero y Económico (UAFE, FIU), Superintendencia de Bancos, and Superintendencia de Compañías, Valores y Seguros (SCVS). GAFILAT/FATF's 2023 Mutual Evaluation found moderate-to-low effectiveness across most Immediate Outcomes, with BO transparency and DNFBP supervision the weakest links. 3. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-004) — Gap: sourcing-thinness 4. T2 FIM (sentinel.gi) enforcement_action_register (issue FIM-BASE-ENF-005) — Enforcement: Ecuadorian judiciary — Cocaine-trafficking and money-laundering syndicate members 5. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-002) — Gap: capacity-deficit 6. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-005) — Gap: political-constraint 7. T? FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-001) — Gap: regulatory-failure ### W12 Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 As a fully dollarized economy, Ecuador's financial system is structurally dependent on correspondent-bank access to the US dollar payments system, with the Central Bank operating the domestic Interbank Payments System and a Fondo de Liquidez backstop. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 105 words · last cycle 2026-07-04 #### Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access The Ley General de Instituciones del Sistema Financiero establishes the Fondo de Liquidez, administered by the Banco Central del Ecuador, providing automatic credit access to solvent contributing institutions to resolve clearing-chamber deficiencies. As a fully dollarized economy with no domestic currency issuance, Ecuador's financial system is structurally dependent on correspondent-bank access to the US dollar payments system for cross-border settlement. No Ecuador-specific de-risking incident was identified this cycle despite this structural dependency. #### Outlook Correspondent-bank access concentration is likely to remain an unaddressed exposure absent a specific de-risking incident; the Fondo de Liquidez remains the primary domestic backstop for clearing-chamber deficiencies. no periodic updates on record for this sub-brief ** Sources and findings (5)** 1. T3 [https://www.redalyc.org/journal/118/11877363006/html/](https://www.redalyc.org/journal/118/11877363006/html/) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T3 [https://www.bancoguayaquil.com/para-empresas/comercio-exterior/corresponsal/](https://www.bancoguayaquil.com/para-empresas/comercio-exterior/corresponsal/) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T1 [https://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/mesicic4_ecu_gral.pdf](https://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/mesicic4_ecu_gral.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/JPRFM/codificaciones/LIBROI-Codificacion-JPRFM.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/JPRFM/codificaciones/LIBROI-Codificacion-JPRFM.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T1 [https://www.cosede.gob.ec/seguro-de-depositos/](https://www.cosede.gob.ec/seguro-de-depositos/) retrieved 2026-07-04 ### W13 Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product) Probable confirmed 2026-07-04 Trailing-12-month commercial activity is dominated by regulatory-institutional restructuring events (JPRFM merger, AML/CFT law entry into force, COSEDE reform) against a still-small VC funding base led by Kushki. Standing sub-brief · as of 4 July 2026 169 words · last cycle 2026-10-18 #### Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product) A Ley Orgánica Reformatoria of the Código Orgánico Monetario y Financiero, published 13 October 2025, merged the former Junta de Política y Regulación Monetaria and Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera into a single Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria, now the Central Bank's supreme governing body; under Transitional Provision 54 of the reform law, resolutions issued by the pre-merger juntas remain in force until the unified body issues replacement resolutions within each competence. Nuvei, which channels Ecuador's PayPhone e-wallet acceptance into its global merchant network, announced a definitive agreement to acquire Payoneer for approximately USD 2.75 billion in cash — a global transaction with only indirect relevance to the Ecuadorian merchant-acceptance channel. #### Outlook The unified Junta de Política y Regulación Financiera y Monetaria's first replacement resolutions in the licensing and payment-systems space are the key indicator to watch; the Nuvei-Payoneer transaction bears monitoring for any downstream effect on the PayPhone acceptance channel rather than as a direct Ecuadorian regulatory event. Periodic update · new data 2026-10-18 #### Commercial Intelligence & Fintech Two discrete commercial events define this cycle's W13 signal for Ecuador. First, Ecuadorian fintech Jelou, which provides AI-driven financial operations via WhatsApp, raised a US$10 million Series A round, reported in February 2026. Jelou reports processing over US$100 million in financial operations for more than 500 enterprise clients across 13 countries, indicating that the company's commercial footprint already extends well beyond Ecuador's domestic market despite its Ecuadorian domicile. Figures such as post-money valuation and the identity of lead investors in this round were not publicly disclosed. Second, the Banco Central del Ecuador's authorisation of Payválida S.A. as a Sistema Auxiliar de Pagos participant, effective from the 9 June 2026 resolution, is itself a commercial market-entry event as well as a regulatory one: a new payment-aggregation provider has been cleared to operate within Ecuador's payments infrastructure. The financial terms of this authorisation were not disclosed. #### Outlook Whether Jelou's regional enterprise footprint, spanning 13 countries, attracts further funding rounds, and whether Payválida's market entry is followed by additional non-bank participants seeking similar authorisation, are the two commercial threads most likely to generate further W13 signal for Ecuador in subsequent cycles. **Sources and findings (6)** 1. T1 [https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/JPRFM/codificaciones/LIBROI-Codificacion-JPRFM.pdf](https://www.bce.fin.ec/storage/JPRFM/codificaciones/LIBROI-Codificacion-JPRFM.pdf) retrieved 2026-07-04 2. T1 [https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2025/289/article-A001-en.xml](https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2025/289/article-A001-en.xml) retrieved 2026-07-04 3. T3 [https://www.primicias.ec/economia/que-seguro-cosede-bancos-cooperativas-liquidacion-quiebra-requisitos-121025/](https://www.primicias.ec/economia/que-seguro-cosede-bancos-cooperativas-liquidacion-quiebra-requisitos-121025/) retrieved 2026-07-04 4. T3 [https://boletincontable.com/2026/04/21/seguro-depositos-cosede-cooperativas-ecuador-2026/](https://boletincontable.com/2026/04/21/seguro-depositos-cosede-cooperativas-ecuador-2026/) retrieved 2026-07-04 5. T3 [https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ecuador/7PwJ-m65RwujGFYmL7TNrZsyko6sFNfMmfjHt6eDz-o](https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-ecuador/7PwJ-m65RwujGFYmL7TNrZsyko6sFNfMmfjHt6eDz-o) retrieved 2026-07-04 6. T3 [https://www.nuvei.com/apm/payphone](https://www.nuvei.com/apm/payphone) retrieved 2026-07-04 ** No modules match.** Filters combine as OR inside a group and AND across groups. ## Editorial metadata Provenance only. Nothing below gates publication or affects the render. Editorial metadata for Ecuador| Field | Value | |---|---| | `trust.lawyer_review.status` | never_reviewed | | `trust.lawyer_review.reviewer` | no reviewer on record | | ` trust.content_source` | ai_generated | ## Provenance and declared absence **Disclosure model:** module cards load OPEN; standing positions render in full; sub-briefs and jurisdiction briefs load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count; earlier updates stay collapsed behind a counted summary. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is. **Sentinel-fed modules** receive no special rendering treatment. `sentinel_feed` is an attribution chip only: it does not suppress content, does not generate an absence reason code, and does not exclude the module from any count, filter, search index or export on this page. **Family taxonomy** is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning. **Suppressed by doctrine:** derived risk score; per-module RAG traffic light; `derived_scores` = `{"legal_accessibility": {"per_product": {"account_to_account": "regulated", "cards": "regulated", "prepaid_emoney": "licensed-emi", "stablecoin": "emerging-regime"}}}`. **Band honesty:** uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-10-21. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band. **Orphan deltas:** 2 cycle_delta row(s) target non-module objects and are listed in the rail rather than attached to a card. **Envelope:** baseline resolved at `jurisdiction_json.baseline`; 14 module(s), 75 finding(s), 130 source(s) in the cumulative register. Think something on this page is wrong? [Report an error](https://payments.gi/legal/#contact).